
















The Dissertation Committee for Saad Ghazi Abi-Hamad Certifies that this is the 











William R. Louis, Supervisor 
Denise A. Spellberg 
M. Gwyn Morgan 
Kamran S. Aghaie 
Michael J. Reimer 
Dueling Perceptions: 









Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 













Saad Ghazi Abi-Hamad, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2007 
 
Supervisor: William Roger Louis 
 
This study is an attempt to ascertain the degree to which occupied and occupier 
can truly understand each other.  The focus is Egypt between 1882 and 1919. This work 
attempts to ascertain how a whole host of Egyptians of various outlooks perceived the 
British Empire that had recently occupied their country.  It investigates the perceptions 
that each of these factions held of the British.  Then, it looks into just how well those very 
same British occupiers understood the Egyptians they ruled.  More specifically, the 
British perceptions of the prominent Egyptians with whom they either had to share some 
power or wished to exclude from power altogether. 
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When violent demonstrations broke out all over Egypt in 1919 after the 
deportation of the nationalist politicians involved in forming the wafd, the Egyptian 
nationalist delegation, the British were for the most part caught unaware.  The British 
comprehension of Egyptian public opinion seemed woefully and dangerously out of date.  
The British had not realized just how thoroughly the wafd had managed to capture and 
hold Egyptian public opinion, behind their demands for complete Egyptian independence.  
The sudden and violent outpouring of Egyptian resentment against the British occupation 
was widespread and in some ways reminiscent of the 1882 Urabi revolution.  The 
demonstrators came from all walks of life, including the previously quiescent peasant 
farmers -- a shocking development for the British, who had prided themselves on being 
the guardians of the poor farmers.  Britain had conquered Egypt in 1882 with the consent 
of its Ottoman suzerain, but justified its continued occupation with claims of moral 
responsibility towards the downtrodden peasant.  This violent peasant rejection of 
Britain’s role in Egypt was an excellent indicator of just how badly the British were out 
of touch with Egyptian developments.   
The demonstrations were eventually suppressed, but only after the use of military 
force and the shedding of blood. Indeed, in another echo of the initial invasion of 1882, 
the British dispatched a destroyer to the shores of Alexandria to remind the Egyptians of 
the fatal consequences of opposing British demands. But here again the British seemed to 
have misread the situation, for the populist involvement in the 1919 revolution was far 
greater than in that of 1882.  In 1882 the defeat of Urabi’s troops, and the surrender of the 
leadership, had ended the conflict and allowed Britain to offer conciliatory terms and 
attract collaborators.  The circumstances were far different in 1919, for the unrest was far 
more widely spread, and the enemy was imbedded in and supported by the populace. 
Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, the newly appointed High Commissioner entrusted with 
suppressing the disturbances, quickly realized only a massive increase of British troop 
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numbers or negotiations could work to end the revolution permanently. The British 
government was persuaded of the wisdom of negotiating only too late. In the period of 
time preceding the outbreak of violence, the British government had ignored similar 
advice from Sir Reginald Wingate, its previous High Commissioner, and had missed a 
valuable opportunity to resolve their differences with the Egyptian nationalists in a 
peaceful manner.  The outcome of those negotiations might have been uncertain, but they 
would have had a much greater chance of success than those after the outbreak of 
violence.  After imprisoning the wafd, and after the violent mobilization of the Egyptian 
populace, Saad Zaghlul, the leader of the wafd, had neither the appetite nor the courage to 
oppose Egyptian popular will and arrive at an acceptable compromise with Great Britain. 
The initial bloody events of 1919 then, had serious long-term ramifications, for they 
poisoned the future Anglo-Egyptian relationship, to the detriment of both Egypt and 
Great Britain.   
Given these extremely serious consequences, it is quite natural to wonder: How 
could the situation have deteriorated to such an extent without British awareness of 
increased dissatisfaction among the Egyptian population?  What were some of the crucial 
changes between 1882 and 1919 that had caused such a broad swath of Egyptian society 
to unite in opposition to British presence?  When and how did the British relationship 
with the Egyptian elite deteriorated to the point where they had alienated even long time 
collaborators?  How, and when, had the network of local collaborators that Lord Cromer 
and his successor Sir Eldon Gorst so painstakingly built, collapse?  On the other side of 
the equation, how had the ideology of Islamic reform and modernism evolved, and what 
effect did it have on Anglo-Egyptian relationships?  How had Egyptian elite perceptions 
of the British changed, and how did that alter their attitudes towards the occupation? 
In the course of answering these questions, this study will minutely reconstruct 
some often-overlooked facets of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship between 1882 and 
1919.  It will show the extent to which personalities and ideologies influenced the 
progression of events.  It will trace how and why the adherents of reform, who had 
cooperated fully with Cromer, Britain’s first Agent to Egypt, no longer saw their interests 
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aligned with those of Great Britain.  In addition this study will assess the consequences of 
this realignment and reveal just how important interpersonal relationships were in 
assuring the smooth conduct of Anglo-Egyptian affairs; as well as the negative 
repercussions of ignoring these relationships.  This is absolutely vital to understanding 
the gradual hardening of attitudes among the majority of the Egyptian intelligentsia 
towards the occupation. It also has the added advantage of revealing why Lord Alfred 
Milner’s vision in 1920 of renewed Anglo-Egyptian collaboration was unsustainable 
given the changed attitudes of Egypt’s most influential nationalists. 
Saad Zaghlul was one such Egyptian reformer whose attitudes towards Great 
Britain underwent extreme change.  Zaghlul was influenced by the ideology of Islamic 
reform and was a willing collaborator under both Cromer and Gorst. However, during 
Kitchener’s tenure as Agent, Zaghlul’s position transformed radically.  A conflict of 
personalities and ideologies between Kitchener and Zaghlul drove the latter to become 
the most effective of Britain’s opponents.  The examination of Zaghlul’s altered 
perceptions of Great Britain between 1912 and 1914 help us understand just how such 
clashes of personalities and ideologies could result in a larger intractable conflict.  The 
same is equally true when one examines Kitchner’s perceptions of the Egyptians with 
whom he worked.  Fundamentally, this project contends that conflicts of personalities and 
ideologies, and the often-misinformed perceptions that British and Egyptian individuals 
had of each other, were undoubtedly major contributing factors behind the violent events 
of 1919.  A better understanding of these people and their relationships is the key to a 
better understanding of the course of events in Egypt in 1919. 
In a broad sense, this study is an attempt to ascertain the degree to which occupied 
and occupier can truly understand each other. This work attempts to determine how a 
whole host of Egyptians perceived the British Empire that had occupied their country 
since 1882, it then attempts to determine just how well those very same British occupiers 
understood the Egyptians over whom they ruled.  More specifically, the British 
perceptions of the prominent Egyptians with whom they either had to share some power 
or wished to exclude from power altogether.  Why this importance attributed to 
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perceptions?  Very plainly it is because people often act or react based on what they 
perceive to be occurring and not what is occurring in reality.  Perception drives action.  
This is true with regards to individuals and institutions and governments.   
Egypt is ideal for this kind of case study for several reasons.  First it was the first 
of the Arab and Muslim countries of the Middle East to be occupied by a western and 
Christian Power.  Second, unlike India, it enjoyed a much greater degree of homogeneity 
when it came to religion.  The vast majority of the Egyptian population, close to 90 
percent, was Muslim.  This made mass movements more likely, and the program of 
divide and conquer more difficult to apply.    Yet another notable aspect of the British 
occupation of Egypt was the fact that in principle it was to be a temporary occupation and 
one that was undertaken with the agreement of the Ottoman Sultan Egypt’s suzerain, and 
the Khedive Egypt’s Viceroy.  Hence the occupation was governed, at least in principle, 
by a set of complex agreements between the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the 
European Powers who held a significant portion of Egypt’s public debt.  In essence, the 
initial conquest of Egypt by 1882 was an extreme form of foreclosure on property for 
delinquent debt payment.  This was also an invasion that crushed a nascent indigenous 
nationalist movement, in the form of the Urabi Revolution.  Unlike many other European 
conquests in the East during the 19th century, Egypt had already experienced the inklings 
of a nationalist movement that could excite large portions of the populace in its support.  
For all these reasons having an accurate perception of the native population was crucial to 
the British occupation. 
The presentation of this dissertation is relatively straightforward.  Excluding the 
Introduction and conclusion, it is comprised of four chapters, each written to stand 
independently, but with a clear thematic link binding them.  Chapter One covers the 
Islamists, reformers and nationalists that were influenced by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s 
reform ideology and who subsequently influenced Egyptian events between 1882 and 
1919. The individuals introduced in Chapter One are also the subject of the second 
chapter as we examine their perceptions and understanding of the British Empire and the 
Anglo-Egyptian relationship.  In an attempt to develop as comprehensive a picture of 
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events in Egypt between 1882 and 1919 Chapter Three presents the various British 
Agents who served in Egypt from 1882 to 1919.  Their backgrounds and personalities are 
covered so as to allow the reader to understand how those shaped the Anglo-Egyptian 
relationship.  The fourth chapter then turns towards the Islamists, reformers and 
nationalists, but this time by examining British perceptions and understanding of the 
Anglo-Egyptian relationship. The first two chapters and the second two chapters are thus 
intimately coupled.  The first part of each pair presents a certain number of individuals 
and ideas for discussion, while the second gives them voice by allowing them to speak 
for themselves. 
The first chapter introduces the Muslim reformers, modernists, and nationalists 
involved in Egyptian affairs in the late 19th and early 20th century.  Those individuals 
include Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Abdallah al-Nadim, Mustafa 
Kamil, Rashid Rida, Saad Zaghlul and ‘Ali Abd al-Raziq.  Not all will receive equal 
attention, and a few will not have their narrative continued in all the succeeding chapters, 
but all are of some importance and interest.  In addition to introducing their backgrounds 
and personalities, this chapter presents their ideological programs or the schools of 
thought to which they belonged. A common trend in all these schools of thought is that 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani served as their originator or progenitor.  It was he who brought a 
new spirit of Muslim reform to Egypt.  In Egypt, his school of thought evolved 
dramatically, branching out and mutating with each successive generation. The second 
chapter, or its couple, continues the story of these individuals by focusing on their 
perceptions of the British Empire.  
The third and fourth chapters of this study, as indicated earlier, also form a close 
couple.  Chapter Three introduces the reader to the British Agents and High 
Commissioners in Egypt from 1883 through 1919.  It examines their lives, and more 
significantly, their character, with an eye to understanding how these personalities 
contributed to the improvement or worsening of Anglo-Egyptian relations.  Chapter four 
then examines the correspondence sent to the British government by the Anglo-Egyptian 
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officials, regarding many of the individuals introduced in the first chapter.  It is a look at 
the reformers, modernists and nationalists of Egypt through, British eyes. 
Many works have remarked on the inability of the British Government to 
comprehend accurately what was going on in Egypt.  Even knowledgeable 
contemporaries such as Cromer commented on this fact in his book, Modern Egypt 
(1908).  George A. Lloyd, the High Commissioner in Egypt between 1925 and 1929 
repeated the refrain in Egypt Since Cromer (1908).  In addition John Darwin’s work, 
Britain Egypt and the Middle East (1981) highlights some of the most serious issues that 
plagued the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, including the differences of view between the 
Milner Mission and the Agency in Cairo.  Never to my knowledge, though, has there 
been an attempt to track and analyze the correspondence between Cairo and London; 
over a long period of time.  That is exactly what Chapter Four endeavors to do. 
This project builds upon, but also significantly adds to the existing literature on 
the Islamists, reformers and nationalists by paying careful attention to the external 
political factors that influenced them.  The most notable of these external political factors 
was the Anglo-Egyptian administration.  This careful attention to the external political 
factors, is what makes this work different from those that have preceded it.  Noteworthy 
among those previous works is Hamid Enayat’s Modern Islamic Political Thought (1982) 
This work deserves high praise for its thorough treatment of the various trends of Muslim 
political thought as well as the clarity with which it draws many of the connections 
between these schools of thought.  His work is especially praiseworthy for the efforts he 
took to incorporate Shii political thought into the discourse.  In order to accomplish this, 
though, he had to focus on internal developments, and consequently downplayed how the 
British occupation administration affected the reformers in Egypt.  Enayat also does not 
fully expose the roots of many of the seemingly secular nationalists within these various 
schools of Muslim reform. 
This project also shares relatively superficial similarities with four prominent 
works: Albert Hourani’s Arab Thought in the Liberal Age (1970), Anouar Abdel-Malek, 
Contemporary Arab Political Thought (1983) and Majid Khadduri’s, Political Trends in 
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the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics (1970) and Arthur 
Goldschmidt’s Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt (1999).  The obvious 
similarities rest on the choice of characters for this study, most of whom have been 
discussed in the works just mentioned. The current work differs substantially from all 
four in its exclusive focus on the Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani school, which sprang up in 
Cairo and was expanded on by his intellectual heirs.  It is also obviously quite different in 
scope, as it is a significant study of interaction between these figures and the British 
Empire, something outside the realm of all these works.  Badawi’s work on The 
Reformers of Egypt (1978) is another excellent work. Yet it focused exclusively on al-
Afghani, Abduh, and Rida, the ideologues of the reform movement, while ignoring the 
political activists deeply influenced by it.  While Badawi focused on the interaction of 
western and Islamic ideas, and ignored the political compromise that often resulted.  
Readers familiar with Nikki Keddi’s, An Islamic Response to Imperialism (1968) will 
find certain similarities between that work and the section of this work focusing on al-
Afghani.  In this narrative, though, al-Afghani will be dealt with as part of a much greater 
whole. Rashid Rida and his perceptions of the West, have also been a subject of study by 
Emad Eldin Shahin.  Shahin’s work Through Muslim Eyes: M. Rashid Rida and the West 
(1993) focuses solely on Rida and follows his steps beyond the timeframe of this study. 
Its careful attention to the evolution of Rida’s ideas on westernization and modernization 
is well done.  Rida the political thinker truly comes through in this work.  Shahin though 
studied Rida from a single perspective, relying heavily on al-Manar to form his narrative 
of events.  The narrative then relies on Rida’s absolute veracity when discussing his 
dealings with the British.  This work will address this imbalance by presenting Rida’s 
views of the British as elucidated in al-Manar but the British perspective of him as well. 
A very recent publication that also deserves mention is Charles Tripp’s Islam and the 
Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism (2006)  This valuable new contribution to 
the field of Islamic Studies discusses in some detail the attempts by various Muslim 
societies to apply the teachings of the reformers such as al-Afghani and Abduh to the 
economic field.  It is a study of various attempts to render modern western-derived 
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capitalist systems more compatible with Islamic principles.  Although the aims of Tripp’s 
study are quite different from the ones envisioned for this dissertation, it reaffirms the 
assertion herein of al-Afghani’s and Abduh’s influence on the thinking of subsequent 
Muslim reformers and modernists. 
A quick note with regarding the Arabic historiography: There are substantial 
studies in Arabic on many of the individuals included in this chapter, to which this work 
is indebted.  The literature can be extremely detailed in its treatment of the individuals 
and of many aspects of their ideology, but it rarely looks at the way that their ideas 
evolved in response to political changes, which is again one of the unique features of this 
study.  The Arabic literature is also unfortunately still incapable of impartially 
considering the often-intimate ties that many of those figures had with the British 
Administration.  This is possibly due to the nationalist sentiments of many of their 
readers, but it nevertheless creates a lacuna in their studies difficult to ignore.  Despite 
this, there are many works of high standard.  Notable among those is Amal Fahmy’s al-
Alaqat al-Masriyyah al-Uthmaniyah fi Ahd al-Ihtilal al-Britani (2002).  The value of this 
work on the Ottoman-Egyptian relations during the period of the British occupation is 
exacting in its utilization of the sources and its careful discussion of the Egyptian 
nationalist parties and their ties with the Ottoman Empire. 
The larger usefulness and relevance of a study such as this is apparent when one 
considers the nature of many of today’s ongoing conflicts.  The lack of comprehension 
among diverse peoples across the globe is the same today in many respects as it was in 
the heyday of the British Empire.  Faulty perceptions continue to lead modern nations 
into disastorous and unintended actions. Perceptions themselves were in turn nourished 
by misinformation and oftentimes prejudice.  Can occupier and occupied ever truly 
understand each other?  One must conclude that two opposing forces will always prefer 






Reformers, Islamists, and Nationalists: Evolution of an Ideology 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to a host of influential     
Islamic reformers, modernists, and Egyptian nationalists from the late 19th and early 20th   
century.  Some of these individuals were not of Egyptian descent, but all resided and 
worked in Egypt; and undoubtedly had significant impact on the development of modern 
Egyptian political thought.   Moreover, they were, no matter what their ideological 
leanings, concerned with the empowerment and advancement of their society.   
Furthermore, all these individuals were to some extent Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani’s 
intellectual and ideological descendants.  However, as al-Afghani’s ideas were 
disseminated, individuals adapted them to best suit their own purposes.  These 
adaptations of al-Afghani’s original ideas will be carefully covered in this chapter.  The 
result will be an essay that combines a study of individuals and their lives as well as their 
contributions to the growth, evolution, and permutations of an ideology. 
 Understanding exactly how this ideology of Muslim reform and modernization 
can grow, evolve and mutate will allow the reader to grasp the complex and often 
tortured path that a progressive idea might take.  It will also help to clarify how it is that 
the inheritors of the same intellectual teachings and ideological beliefs can still differ 
vastly in the perception of the world around them.  The reader will see how the same 
teachings that originated with al-Afghani could be adapted in the Egyptian context to 
allow for the existence of reform-minded collaborators, radical nationalists, and later on 
fundamental Islamists.  This will help to explain the vast variance in outlook with regard 
to the British occupation of Egypt, from a whole host of individuals that claimed al-
Afghani’s ideas as their inspiration.  Moreover, they were, no matter their ideological 
leanings, concerned with the empowerment and advancement of their society.   All were 
working to accomplish this goal at the time when Egypt was under British occupation.  
It is fair to say that few Muslim reform minded intellectuals have had as many 
pages dedicated to them as al-Afghani.  As an intellectual and firebrand orator, al-
Afghani had few rivals.  He managed to have himself expelled from Constantinople, 
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Cairo, and even had his publication shut down in Paris thanks to British pressure.  But, 
again we must look at the generation of students he left behind, and their students after 
them, to understand his impact.   
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
 
Jamal al-Din-al-Afghani was intellectually and politically active during the latter 
part of the 19th century.  His national origins are an issue of contention.  By his own 
account he was born at As’ad Abad, near Kabul, in Afghanistan.  Western and Persian 
scholarship has tended to place his birthplace as a village near Hamadan in Persia, and 
his religious upbringing as possibly Shii.1Al-Afghani likely claimed Afghanistan as his 
place of birth when he traveled and taught in Sunni Muslim countries, since identifying 
himself as Shi’i would have not have allowed him entry into the world of the Sunni elite. 
His education is also of no help to those trying to determine his place of origin, as he 
received it in different parts of Persia and Afghanistan as well as India.  It was in India at 
the age of eighteen that he was exposed to western learning and the possibilities of 
Muslim reform. In the late 1850’s al-Afghani entered the service of Amir Dust 
Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan.  After Dust’s death he entered the service of one of his 
sons, Muhammad Azam, but that proved unfruitful as Azam ultimately lost out to one of 
his brothers in the Afghan civil war.2  This necessitated Afghani’s departure to healthier 
climes.  No matter what his origins, his influence transcended any one geographical 
region and made itself known throughout the Islamic world.  This is especially true of 
Egypt, “the country where his legacy is most strongly felt.”3 Indeed, al-Afghani has 
become part of Egyptian myth, as he is today often viewed “as a crucial link in 
establishing Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and the united Muslim defiance of 
western imperialism.”4
                                                 
1 Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London, 1933) p. 4;  Nikki Keddi, An Islamic 
Response to Imperialism, (Berkeley, 1968) pp. 5-11 
2 Ibid., p. 5 
3 Rudi Matthee, “Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the Egyptian National Debate,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 21, no. 2, (May, 1989) pp. 151-169 
4 Ibid., p. 153 
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Although the legacy and myth of al-Afghani have not been without their critics, 
there has never been a shortage of authors who are quick to respond to these critics and to 
reaffirm his status.  The fierce debate in the mid 1990’s between Louis Awad, a Coptic 
Christian literary figure and critic of al-Afghani, and Muhammad Imara, is a perfect 
example.  At the heart of this debate were the accusations by Awad that Afghani sought 
to conceal his Persian, and hence heterodox Shi’i origins, and that at his very core he was 
a political opportunist.  These claims were not completely original, as Nikki Keddi had 
already trod that path, but their publication in Arabic by an Egyptian author made them 
an issue of great contention.  
Al-Afghani as an intellectual was firmly grounded in the Islamic traditions of 
learning.  His scholarship was very much reliant on the medieval Islamic philosophers 
but onto this base were grafted certain modern aspects and concepts.5 Rather than 
detracting from its worth this hybridization actually enhanced his scholarship, as it placed 
these modern concepts in a familiar setting to a Muslim reader hence making it less 
foreign and more easily assimilated.  One cannot underestimate the value of this ability, 
as al-Afghani was attempting to reform Egyptian and Muslim society as a whole by 
introducing into it elements of western science and philosophy.  Afghani saw these 
elements as crucial to the empowerment and advancement of Islamic society in the face 
of western hegemony. Their introduction, though, was hardly a simple matter of 
translation and publication.  al-Afghani and his fellow modernists and reformers 
understood that the initial resistance of Muslim scholars and Muslim society to the 
introduction of western philosophical and scientific concepts could destroy their hopes 
for reform and revival.   To them then fell the task of presenting this foreign material in a 
familiar and acceptable manner.       
This is demonstrated clearly in his article “On the Types of Despotic 
Governments” published in the May 24, 1879 issue of the magazine Misr,.6  Although 
                                                 
5 L.M. Kenny, “Al-Afghani on Types of Despotic Governments,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 
86, no. 1, (Jan. – Mar. 1966) pp.19-27.   Translation of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s “Despotic Governments,” 
with forward and analysis by L.M Kenny. 
6 Ibid., pp. 21-27 
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recognizing the superior nature of the republican style of government7, he was forced to 
admit to the impossibility of its contemporaneous application. This, he argued, was due to 
Muslim rulers and elites having abandoned the true Islamic sciences of political 
philosophy.8 By this argument al-Afghani was laying claim to political philosophy as a 
true Islamic science, and not an alien concept.  Hence the concept of representational 
government was not a western import but an Islamic tradition.  
Intelligent enough to realize the resistance of entrenched political interests to such 
concepts even when justified by Islam, he sought at the very least the implementation of 
an informed and “enlightened government.”  He stated that “wise leaders know that the 
foundations of the kingdom and the lives of its subjects are agriculture, industry and 
commerce.”  Yet, the “mastery of these things come about only” with the acquisition of 
“true beneficial science and the useful arts.”  Those in turn required the establishment of 
“well organized schools run by skillful teachers of virtuous character,” who exhibited 
patience and compassion towards their students. Secondary to this was the “provision of 
agricultural tools and industrial machinery,” as well as the facilitating of the means of 
communication and commerce.9 All these factors, along with the application of 
democratic principles, and strict accounting and statistical practices to ward off waste and 
cultivate capital, were seen as key factors in the success of the West.10  Although al-
Afghani’s understanding of the reasons behind western success was at that stage not fully 
developed, and was lacking truly perceptive depth, his approach was nonetheless 
outward-looking and sought to effect change in Muslim society as a whole.  He promoted 
a two-pronged approach, first the “support [of] religious leaders who sought to revive 
Islam, and second, a tolerant attitude towards those who advocated the adoption of 
                                                 
7 Note: al-Afghani would become a major proponent of constitutionalism and representative government.  
He used the Islamic concept of shura  to argue that representative government was actually prescribed by 
Islam.  He took his argument even further and argued that power and authority rested with the people.  In 
this manner some in the religious establishment were brought over to the support of these liberal ideas.  See 
Khadduri p. 29-30.  The problems arose “once the liberals succeeded in establishing modern institutions, 
they ignored the role of the religious groups,” looking westwards exclusively.   p. 41. Hence the failure of 
the religious establishments support of these liberal ideals led to a backlash against them as well as a ‘moral 
crisis,’ p. 55. 
8 Ibid., p.21 
9 Ibid., p. 25 
10 Ibid., p 22, 26 
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European civilization.”11 Unfortunately he never formulated a coherent system that 
indicated how his ideas could be put into practice.   Previous attempts to introduce 
aspects of modernity, whether by Muhammad Ali of Egypt, or the Ottoman Sultans had 
not proven very successful, but it must be noted that their primary concern had been 
changes in the army and bureaucracy, and not to society as a whole. 
 This modernist penchant for reliance on science and its equation with reason and 
rationality eventually led, according to one commentator, to the modernist’s “rejection of 
the traditional, theological and philosophical understanding, and to the acceptance of new 
philosophical and theological interpretations that [were] based only on science.”12 These 
beliefs were of course to bring the adherents of the modernist school of thought into 
direct conflict with the traditionalists. To many of the traditionalists, such an approach 
verged on heresy or bidah.  In any case, they were neither equipped nor willing to engage 
in such a radical departure in the study of theology. 
 Al-Afghani also railed against sectarianism, laying at its door a good deal of the 
blame for Muslim backwardness.  Not since Nadir Shah, founder of the “short lived 
Afsharid state in Iran” during the seventeenth century, had any serious efforts been made 
to address the Shi’i-Sunni enmity.  For al-Afghani, and to a lesser extent his students, 
“Islamic unity” was an article of faith.13  The end of sectarianism was also inherent to the 
spirit of “[r]ationalisms, which governed the better part of the modernists reformulation 
of the Islamic spiritual heritage.”14 Such unity was necessary on a very basic level since 
it was crucial to the struggle against western domination.  It was a reasoned and rational 
response to evolving challenges. 
 Al-Afghani, and to a greater extent his student Muhammad Abduh, took a very 
bold stance with regard to the adoption of modern sciences.  Empirical science to them 
stood as the highest form of reason.  Since rationalism and reason were the bywords of 
                                                 
11 Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics (Johns 
Hopkins, 1970, 1972) p 57 
12 Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of 
Sayyid Qutb (Beirut, 1992) p. 132 
13 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Though (Texas, 1982) pp. 40-41 
14 Ibid., p. 42 
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the Islamic modernists, these principles were to be rigorously applied in the 
understanding of holy writ.  This opened the Muslim modernists to the accusation of 
adopting the views of the schismatic Mu’tazilah of the 8th-9th centuries.  The Mu’tazilah 
were “associated with the first attempts to reconcile reason and revelation in Islam.” 
They, like the modernists were “willing to borrow non-Islamic intellectual tools in order 
to defend their faith.”15 However intellectually apt this association might have been, it 
could hardly have been welcomed, carrying as it did the prejudice of centuries and the 
label of heresy. 
 Al-Afghani’s persistent calls for reform proved increasingly upsetting to the 
Muslim rulers and elite of Egypt.  As a consequence he was expelled from Egypt in 1879. 
He then moved to India and eventually to Paris where in 1883, with the assistance of his 
former student Muhammad Abduh, he published an Arabic language weekly, al Urwa 
al’Wuthqa (The Firmest Bond).  As mentioned earlier, this journal was, 
according to the authors, forced to shut down in 1884 after only 18 issues due to 
British pressure.  The content of this journal will receive much closer 
examination in the next chapter, as we consider the authors’ perception of British 
actions. 
Al-Afghani’s legacy is in some ways quite problematic.  A Muslim reformer and 
modernist, and defender of his faith against secular and Christian aspersions, he 
nevertheless left little in the way of a concrete program for the practical reconciliation of 
Islam and modernity.  As Nikki Keddi aptly pointed out: “if al-Afghani were mainly 
pragmatic or political, there is no reason to expect from him a well thought out 
reconstruction of the Islamic religion.”16  This is quite true as far as it goes, but how 
pragmatic al-Afghani was is a matter open to serious debate.  Despite his seeming 
familiarity with the British Empire and with the West and the tremendous inequality of 
power between them and the Muslim world, al-Afghani promoted anti-British activism to 
the point that it was actually detrimental to his cause of reform.  His rejection of 
collaboration and accommodation at all stages did not take into account the realities of 
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balance of power and the inequality of means.   Such an uncompromising attitude is 
hardly in keeping with the description of him as a pragmatist.  Al-Afghani might have 
sown the seed of reform in the Middle East, but it actually required others, of more 
moderate personalities, to cultivate it. 
Muhammad Abduh 
 
Just as important as the written legacy left behind by Afghani were his cadre of 
dedicated followers of whom Muhammad Abduh was the most prominent.  In the 
inimitable style that has made his work such a success, the prominent Middle East 
scholar Albert Hourani provides the following description of Abduh: 
  
A photograph taken on the terrace of the House of Commons when he 
visited England in 1884 shows a handsome man, well built, dark of 
complexion, with a tranquil and almost melancholy charm that does not 
quite conceal the look of conviction in his eyes. In later years the 
gentleness increased, and those who knew him well were conscious of 
his kindness and intelligence and a certain spiritual beauty. He was on 
good terms both with Cromer and with the most eloquent of his critics, 
Wilfrid Blunt, and he had around him a group of devoted friends and 
followers who were to become prominent in the life of Egypt. But the 
intransigence was still there.17
 
Indeed his ability to reach accommodation with his adversaries and survive politically 
has often opened Abduh to accusations of being more interested in his personal 
position than in the cause of reform and revival.   
 Abduh was born in Egypt in 1849.  His family was not particularly affluent, 
yet he was schooled in the mosque school in Tanta, north of Cairo.  After his early 
schooling he moved to Cairo in order to continue his education at the al-Azhar 
University, which at the time was regarded as the premier center of Sunni Muslim 
learning in the world.  Indeed “no school existed that could vie with it . . . by the 
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turn of the century… a census of its foreign students justified the claim that in 
the realm of knowledge it was the Ka`ba, comparable to the pilgrimage shrine at 
Makka”18 Although this census came quite a bit later than the date of Abduh’s 
attendance as a student, Al-Azhar’s reputation was one of long standing.  In 1877 
Abduh received his degree of ‘alim from Al-Azhar, but only after the rector at 
the time, Shaikh Muhammad Ali-Abbasi, intervened on his behalf with the 
examining committee.  Abduh’s status as al-Afghani’s student, and his 
championing of change and modernization, had upset many of the conservative 
ulama, who would have gladly denied him his degree as ‘alim, without which he 
could not teach.   Indeed, the greatest influence on Abduh as a student were not 
the teachers or teachings at al-Azhar, which he would later claim had done much 
more harm to his intellect than good, but those of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. As a 
result of his attachment to Afghani and his message of reform and 
modernization, when Khedive Tawfiq exiled al-Afghani from Egypt in 1879, 
Abduh also was banished to his home village.  It was hoped that this would 
eventually silence their reform message.  Fortunately for Abduh, upon the return 
of the liberal Prime Minister Riad Pasha from a trip abroad, he was recalled to 
Cairo in 1880 to assume the editorship of an official gazette called, Al-Waqai’ 
al-Misriyyah (Egyptian Events).19
 By the time of the 1882 Urabi revolution, Abduh had become deeply 
involved in this event. He utilized his position as the editor of the official Al-
Wakai al-Masriyyah, and as the general censor of the local press, to promote the 
cause of the revolution.20  When the revolution was crushed, Abduh was 
sentenced to three years in exile.  After a brief stay in Beirut, he joined his 
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former mentor al-Afghani in Paris and helped him to publish Al Urwa l’Wuthqa.  
In 1884, after the closure of the paper, he returned to Beirut and taught at an 
Islamic school until his return to Egypt in 1888.   
Having departed from al-Afghani’s belief in the necessity of confronting 
the British Occupation directly, Abduh became a friend to the British Agent 
Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer.  Soon after his return from exile the Khedive 
Tawfiq appointed him as a judge in the newly formed “native courts.”  These 
courts had been introduced to enforce the new non-Shari’ah derived code of law.  
Abduh then began his ascent of the ladder of officialdom under the auspices of 
Tawfiq and with the full approval of the British.  In 1895 he was appointed to the 
new administrative council of Al-Azhar University and four years later he was 
named Grand Mufti of Egypt.  He thus became responsible for the country’s 
religious courts as well as an official advisor to the government on all issues that 
infringed on Islamic law.  He retained his position as Grand Mufti until his death 
in 1905. 
Abduh’s aims were much like those of his mentor, even if he settled on 
different methods to carry them out. Abduh grew to see the British occupation of 
Egypt as an opportunity to advance his reform project.  Reform had to be 
initiated, Muslim society had to be empowered, and the relative freedom of the 
press which the British guaranteed early on in their occupation was crucial to the 
broadcasting of these ideas. His task was daunting as he “was forced to present 
rather than withhold ideas as the question of preserving the stability of the 
community was no longer relevant,” given what he believed to be the moral 
collapse of that community.21 The challenge was tremendous, for all new ideas 
had to be presented in a manner that would not alienate the majority of 
conservative opinion.  Alienation ran the risk of rendering all attempted reform 
ineffective.  Fortunately, he was well equipped to master this task, for while not 
a traditionalist, he was conservative by nature. The result was that while the 
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“foundation of his thought was Islamic,” he perceived and preached that “the 
‘praiseworthy aim’ of revitalizing the community demanded the inculcation of 
Western ideas.”22   
There were limits to this inculcation. The wholesale importation of 
western culture was hardly what Abduh strove for.  He believed that the solution 
to the stagnation of Islamic society rested in Islam itself.   It was not Islam, 
“whose truth is valid for all times,” that was the cause of Muslim stagnation and 
decadence but rather the Muslims themselves.23 His aim was to introduce into 
Muslim society the modern sciences and modern methods of scientific 
investigation that would in turn help the faithful better understand their religion.  
Mastery of these implied the acquisition of reason and rationalism.  Once that 
occurred, Muslim society could discriminately and intelligently import western 
ideas that would help advance it.24 It could also intelligently reject those aspects 
of modern western society that could harm the integrity of the Islamic 
community.   
With those views in mind, Abduh opposed the adoption of western laws 
and institutions, despite having served as a judge on the secular courts.  The 
needs of modernity in his view did not necessitate such an adoption. Adapting to 
modernity could be done within the bounds of shari’ah, which carried within it 
“boundless resources for legal innovation.” It was blind orthodoxy that had 
“fostered the misconception that Islam by its very nature [was] incapable of 
coping with the growing complexity of modern life, and Muslims therefore had 
to have recourse to foreign laws.”25Once they had mastered the modern scientific 
methods, which were in any case part of their heritage, then Muslims would be 
able to find in the Shari’ah all the answers they needed. 
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This kind of approach that praised the modern western sciences and urged their 
adoption, along with his powerful endorsement of true Islam and his stress on its 
adaptability, made Abduh the darling of many on both sides of the ideological divide.  
Those desiring to adapt to the West found support for their position in his attitudes, but so 
did those who argued that Islam contained within itself the seeds of advancement. This 
would pose a problem since Abduh, much like al-Afghani, also failed to create a 
functional system that would harmonize between the two aspects of his plan for reform.26
Abdallah al-Nadim 
 
A close contemporary of Abduh and a fellow revolutionary, Abdallah al-
Nadim, perhaps the staunchest critic of the British Occupation, deserves mention 
here as well.  Although not a great thinker like al-Afghani or Abduh, al-Nadim 
was a revolutionary through and through.  He was a pioneer political satirist 
whose work inspired many of the younger generation of nationalists, such as 
Mustafa Kamil.  Al-Nadim was born in 1843 to Musbah Ibn Ibrahim, a migrant 
laborer who had moved from the countryside to Alexandria seeking employment 
in the new government industries.  His early education was at the local kuttab or 
religious school, where he acquired the basics of reading, writing and religious 
studies.  He then attended the Jami al-Anwar to continue his education, but left 
his studies before their completion to join a band of wandering poets and 
performers. Tiring of life on the road, al-Nadim next moved to Cairo and joined 
the telegraphy school.  Upon completing his coursework he worked for the 
railroad and afterwards at one of the royal palaces for the Khedieve Ismail’s 
mother.  He was later fired from this job for a mistake in deciphering a telegram, 
which made him quite resentful of the Kedieval family.27  After a new period of 
wandering, he made the acquaintance of Shahin Pasha Kenj in Tanta in 1876.  
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Kenj was one of the founders of al-hizb al-watani. (Nationalist Party, although 
distinct from the later party of the same name). 
Eventually, al-Nadim returned to Cairo and became a frequent visitor to 
the coffee house where al-Afghani held his meetings.  In al-Afghani, al-Nadim 
found a mentor and an inspiration. From him he learned the finer aspects of 
public speaking.  He eventually joined al-hizb al-watani, on whose behalf he 
employed his newly acquired oratorical skills.28 In 1879 while on a trip to 
Alexandria he also joined Misr al-Fatat, a new political organization founded by 
a number of officers in the Egyptian Army.  Upon the accession of the Khedieve 
Tawfiq to the throne, Afghani was banished from Egypt and his former students 
harassed by the authorities.  In response to this al-Nadim founded his own 
newspaper in the autumn of 1882, al-Tankit wa al-Tabkit (The Amusing and the 
Saddening), so as to continue his mentor’s message.  His talent was in writing 
amusing allegorical stories that sought to educate as well as entertain.  They 
were social critiques written in a form accessible to a very wide audience.29 They 
were also an attempt to impart many of the lessons of al-Afghani and the 
modernist reformers to those lower down the ladder of society.30
Al-Nadim also played a key role in the 1882 Urabi revolution.  The task of 
gaining the support of the peasants fell to him, and in this he was quite 
successful.  In September of 1881 when Urabi and the army demonstrated in 
Cairo, al-Nadim was among the leaders of the demonstrations.  He also founded 
a new journal Al-Taif that became the voice of the revolution.  After the failure 
of the revolution and Urabi’s surrender, Al-Nadim fled into the countryside a 
wanted man.  His popularity was such among the peasants that he was able to 
remain hidden among them for nine years.31  In 1891 he was finally captured and 
                                                 
28 Hamzeh, p. 49 
29 Ibid., p. 52 
30 The story of Arabi Tafarnaj (An Arab “gone western”), is a perfect example of this.  It concludes with a 
pithy remark on the superficiality of those who forget their own origins and can only imperfectly and 
stupidly imitate others that they understand even less. 
31 Muhammad Ahmad Khalaf Allah,  Abdallah al-Nadim, Mouthakaratih al-Siyyassiah (Cairo, 1956) p. 15 
 20
banished to Jaffa in Palestine.  His exile though was of short duration and he 
returned to Egypt in early 1893 after the death of the Khedieve Tawfiq.  The new 
Khedieve, Abass II, pardoned him on the condition that he neither write about 
nor get involved in politics.32
The restrictions on him were later relaxed and he was licensed to launch a 
new newspaper, al-Ustadh (The Teacher).  He dedicated the Ustadh to the 
staunch support of the khedival authority and criticism of the British occupation 
and western imperialism in general.  Al-Ustadh eventually attracted the ire of the 
British and their allies, and al-Nadim was once again exiled to Jaffa in June 
1893, likely at the behest of the British authorities.33  During this second period 
of exile in Jaffa, he began criticizing the Ottoman Sultan Abdel Hamid.  This 
resulted in his transfer to Istanbul, where he was reunited with his old mentor, 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, as compulsory “guests” of the Sultan.  He died in 
Istanbul in 1896, leaving behind two important legacies, his writings and the 
influence he exercised over a rising young nationalist, Mustafa Kamil. 
As a populist publicist and orator al-Nadim had outstanding skills.  Had al-Nadim 
had the time and resources, he might even have been able to mobilize the Egyptian 
population in 1882, much in the same way that Zaghlul managed to do in 1919.  In the 
final instance though, al-Nadim was a follower and not a leader.  Once attached to a 
cause or a person, whether the Urabi revolt, or the Khedive Abbas Hilmy, he was mostly 
uncritical and unquestioning.  His talent was in mobilizing the masses, yet he rarely 
decided the ends to which they were to be mobilized.  In 1882 those ends were disastrous 
and led to the destruction of Alexandria and conquest of Egypt.  In 1893 the 
consequences were less grievous, but he once again had to leave his homeland, and left 
the Khedive Abbas, his sponsor, in a weakened position. 
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Muhammad Rashid Rida 
 
The great challenges faced by Abduh and al-Afghani paled in comparison 
to the dilemmas faced by their students. In 1921 Mustafa Kamil Ataturk and the 
Grand National Assembly stripped the post of Caliphate of all temporal power.  
They followed up on this in 1924 by abolishing the post and banishing the last 
Ottoman Sultan from Turkey.  The end of the Caliphate produced the idea of the 
Islamic State as a utopian alternative. This concept could accommodate the new 
post-Ottoman reality and the advent of the nation-states in the Muslim world. It 
was Muhammad Rashid Rida, Abduh’s pupil and biographer, who became “in 
many ways the founding theoretician of the Islamic State in its modern sense.”34
Born in the small coastal town of al-Qalamuwn close to Tripoli in modern 
day Lebanon in 1865, Rida later migrated to Cairo, although his connection to 
what was then known as bilad al-Sham remained quite firm.35  His family 
claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad, through the Husayni branch, and 
they made use of the honorary title of Sayyid.  Rida went to some pains in 
stressing this connection, even signing some of his works “Rashid Rida al-
Husayni,” possibly to give himself and his work more validity and respect.36  His 
early education began at the local kuttab in Tripoli.  He then spent a year at a 
government primary school, which taught both Arabic and Turkish, after which 
he joined the Islamic National School in Tripoli.  The government refused to 
recognize this school as a religious institution and to exempt its students from 
military service, which led to its closure. He then completed his education under 
the private tutelage of Sheikh Husayn al-Jisr, the founder of the ill-fated 
National Islamic School.37 Upon completing his education with al-Jissr, Rida 
attempted to make contact with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani seeking to become one 
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of his pupils.  Rida was disappointed in this, as he received no response and al-
Afghani died before he could pursue the matter further.  His next step was to 
seek out Muhammad Abduh, whose acquaintance he had initially made in Beirut.  
In order to renew the acquaintance Rida decided to move to Cairo in 1898.  
 Not long after his arrival he began the publication of a journal, al-Manar, 
(the Lighthouse), with the encouragement and support of Muhammad Abduh.  
The purpose of al-Manar was to publicize of the Islamic reform program along 
the lines advocated by Muhammad Abduh.  In fact, until Abduh’s death in 1905, 
his was the spirit who guided it.  As a consequence of his ownership of al-Manar 
and his promotion of peaceful Islamic reform, Rida’s fame grew.   This allowed 
him to travel to Istanbul in 1909, immediately after the constitutional revolution, 
to look into the possibility of setting up a new Islamic reform school.  He was 
also actively involved in attempting to work out some of the issues of contention 
between the Turks and their Arab subjects.  His reputation was not just limited to 
the Middle East.   Rida traveled to India at the invitation of Shaykh Shibli al-
Ni’mani in 1912, where he meet some of the most renowned Indian ulama 
including Abd al-Haqq al-Baghdadi, the teacher of Arabic at Deoband.38    
Rida traveled widely in the Muslim world, which undoubtedly confirmed 
his views on the necessity of Muslim cooperation.  Prior to the First World War, 
Rida had supported the Ottoman Empire because of its connotations of Islamic 
universalism. He believed that, if properly reformed, the Ottoman Empire could 
play a positive role in promoting cooperation among the various Muslim nations, 
kingdoms, and populations.  His support, though, was tempered by the failed 
promises of the 1908 revolution. The Young Turks (Ijtihad Party) had swept into 
power in 1908 pledging “to establish communal equality and safeguard human 
rights.”39  Unfortunately for those within the Empire who had placed their hopes 
in the Young Turks, what actually followed was a policy of Turkification. 
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Launched by the Empire in an attempt to bind its subjects to it, this policy led 
instead to the alienation of the Arab populations.40 During the war itself the 
British kept Rida under close surveillance in Egypt, not for supporting the 
Ottomans, but rather for urging his fellow Arabs not to trust British promises.41 
Postwar events, especially consequences stemming from the Balfour declaration, 
irrevocably convinced him of the rightness of his previous warnings. By 1924, 
the date the Caliphate was abolished, his commentary on the event was quite 
detached and analytical. Islamic universalism was still a crucial component of 
his thinking, but by this point he had thrown his entire support behind the idea of 
establishing an Arab Caliphate.  To that end in 1924 he published his thoughts in 
an “important treatise” -- the Caliphate and the Supreme Imamate (Al-Khilafa aw 
al-imamah al-uzma ).  These were originally a series of articles that had 
appeared in various issues of al-Manar between December 1922 and May 1923.  
This new Arab Caliphate that Rida envisioned was to preside over the reopening 
of the gate of ijtihad and become the enunciator and interpreter of Islamic 
dogma.42The Caliph thus endowed with spiritual authority could exist alongside 
the political framework of the modern state.  The problem with such a construct 
was the centrality of Islamic dogma to an Islamic state.  The Caliph would 
essentially become the ultimate arbiter of the Shari’ah, the sole basis of law in 
an Islamic state.  This would endow any potential Caliph with tremendous 
political clout unlikely to be acceptable to any National Legislative Assembly. 
As he reinterpreted Abduh’s ideas, Rida became much more attached to 
the ideas of the possibility of internal Islamic reform.  According to Rida, the 
attitudes that had allowed the West to excel were those of early Islam, and hence 
Muslims did not need to look westward at all, but to return to their own history.  
It was to the first generation of Islam that Rida looked, toward the holy book, 
and the hadith and traditions of the companions of the prophet.  In attitude this 
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made him close to the Wahhabi ideology prevalent in Najd and adopted by the 
house of al-Sa’ud.  Indeed he clearly expressed his admiration of King Abdallah 
Ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud in several al-Manar articles.  This belief in the 
possibility of internal reform through reversion to the fundamentals of Islam 
without reference to the West created a serious split between him and those of 
Abduh’s more liberal disciples. Hence from the legacy of al-Afghani and Abduh 
two radically different schools of thought emerged: Rida, who advocated a 
reform program based on an insular fundamentalism, and the more liberal of 
Abduh’s students who remained convinced of the advantages of a reform 
program based on selective importation of western ideas.  
Ali Abd al-Raziq 
 
The abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 
1925 caused much discussion and rethinking in the Arab and wider Muslim 
world.  Among the boldest voice to speak out on the issue was Ali Abd al-Raziq.  
In that same year Abd al-Raziq published a work on the Caliphate as a political 
institution, in which he asserted that that the office of Caliphate had no proper 
sanction in the Qur’an.  Furthermore, he made strong argument for the 
“necessary historical separation between religion and political power.”43 Abd al-
Raziq clearly stated that Muslims had fallen into a misapprehension, “namely 
that the caliphate is a religious role, and that he who holds power over the 
Muslims occupies amongst them the same position as God’s Prophet.”  He then 
added that it was in “the interest of various sultans to propagate this error 
amongst the people, so as to use religion as a shield with which to protect their 
throne against rebels.”44 His arguments were thoughtful and sound, reflecting his 
education and experience, as a graduate of Al-Azhar and as a judge on the 
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religious courts.  Although familiar with western thought from having attended 
Oxford (his Oxford stay was interrupted the First World War before he received 
a degree), Abd al-Raziq based his argument on “the legal and historical 
antecedents of Sunni political theory.”  He contended that the Caliphate had “no 
basis either in the Quran, or the Tradition, or the consensus.” The injunction to 
obey the Ulu al-Amr (Holders of Authority) did not sanction the position of 
Caliphate nor sanctify it, as some have contended.45 Furthermore, Abd al-Raziq 
argued that religion and politics were separate even during the time of the 
Prophet who carried out those two functions separately.  Hence religion and 
politics did not need to be intertwined and it was left up the wisdom of the 
Muslim community to choose the form of government that suited it best. 
Abd al-Raziq’s essay was not well received in Muslim intellectual circles.  
It sparked a storm of attacks that culminated in disciplinary action by a Special 
Court of Al-Azhar that condemned the book.  Another committee, comprised of 
25 prominent al-Azhar scholars, would take additional steps of revoking his 
diploma and removing him from the religious courts.46 Abd al-Raziq was also 
made the object of attack and derision by such prominent thinkers as Rashid 
Rida, who savaged him in al-Manar.  Abd al-Raziq never recovered from this 
controversy and spent the “rest of his life working at the Arabic Language 
Academy in Cairo.”47 The great tragedy of it all was that with his carefully 
considered and religiously based arguments, Abd al-Raziq had provided the 
reformers and the ulama, had they just seized it, with the opportunity to refute 
the necessity of obeying despotic power. It would have given them the freedom 
of choice, so prized by Afghani and Abduh, to choose a form of government that 
met their communities’ needs. Although Abd al-Raziq would not become one of 
the power brokers in Egyptian politics, he demands mention for his original 
thinking and his daring approach to the issue of reform and modernization. 
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Saad  Zaghlul 
 
 Saad Zaghlul has few equals among Egyptian statesmen when it comes to 
reputation and fame.  Zaghlul has come to be known as the father of his people and the 
father of his country.48 His life and nationalist struggle have become legendary, and as 
such slightly distorted.  Most sources claim that Saad was of Fallah or peasant stock.  
This, while strictly true, is slightly misleading. His father was the ‘umda (headman), of 
the village of Abyanah in the western province.  He was a very successful gentlemen 
farmer and quite comfortably situated.  Saad was born in 1859 and lost his father at the 
age of five.  The first five years of his education were in the village kuttab, after which he 
moved on to al-Azhar.49 There he joined Muhamad Abduh’s halaqa and became one of 
his students.  Through Abduh, he met Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and attended his lectures 
on despotism and freedom.50
 In 1880 Saad became a junior editor in al-Waqai al-Misriyah of which 
Muhammad Abduh was chief editor.  From there he moved on in 1882 to another 
government post, as overseer of the administrative headquarters for the province of Giza.  
That was the same year as the Urabi revolution, of which Zaghlul was a supporter if not a 
major actor. After its suppression he was imprisoned for several months, accused of 
being a member of a secret organization seeking to overthrow the government.  He was 
eventually found innocent of the charge and released.51 Suspicion had fallen upon him 
because of his close association with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. 
His old teacher had been one of the proponents and supposed leaders of the 1882 
revolution.52   
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 In 1884, partly due to his prison experience, Zaghlul entered law school.  He took 
and passed his law exams in France, where he received his degree.  His career as a lawyer 
was successful and quite distinguished, bringing him both wealth and recognition. In 
1892 he was appointed deputy judge of the civil appellate courts. He remained a judge 
until he was appointed a Government minister in 1906.  In his last year on the court he 
had become a proponent of the idea of establishing an Egyptian university along western 
lines.  Hence in October of 1906 he was actually named vice president of the committee 
in charge of the university project.53 Yet as soon as he was named minister of education, 
he resigned this position.  That created a rift between him and Mustafa Kamil, the young 
nationalist fire-brand and journalist, who saw Zaghlul’s withdrawal from the project as a 
capitulation to British desires and a blow to the nationalist movement.54
 Zaghlul’s appointment to the ministry of education came at the behest of Lord 
Cromer.  Zaghlul was the son-in-law of Mustafa Fehmy, Cromer’s long time friend and 
ally, and was seen as a perfectly congenial choice from the British perspective.  He also 
had the added benefit of being initially acceptable to the nationalist camp.55 Despite the 
early nationalist attack against him, Zaghlul was destined to become the leading figure of 
the post-First World War nationalist movement and a thorn in the side of the British 
administrators of Egypt.  Some contemporary observers believed that the final rupture 
between Zaghlul and the British took place in late autumn 1914.  This was reportedly due 
to a personal animosity between him and Kitchener and the latter’s refusal to consider 
Zaghlul for the post of Intendant of the Egyptian Educational Mission in Paris.56 By the 
time of the First World War, Zaghlul had attained a leading position among the 
opposition in the Legislative Assembly. Throughout the war years he solidified his 
position and emerged as the opposition’s outright leader.  Hence after the signing of the 
armistice, Zaghlul presented the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, with a 
demand for complete Egyptian independence. When Wingate replied that he did not have 
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the authority to respond to such a request, Zaghlul and his fellow nationalists asked for 
permission to travel to London in order present their case directly to the British 
government.  This request was turned down.  By March the situation was dire, and 
Zaghlul delivered a letter to the palace urging in strong terms that no new government 
should be formed. Sir Milne Cheetham, acting High Commissioner in the absence of 
Wingate, used this as an excuse to recommend the deportation of Zaghlul and several 
other nationalists.  This was carried out on March 8, when Saad Zaghlul, Hamid el 
Bassal, Ismail Sidki, and Mohammad Mahmoud were arrested and placed on a British 
destroyer headed to Malta. As a result of this action the entire country went up in flames. 
The British responded with the application of military force, under the direction of 
General Buffin, but the results were not clearly advantageous nor did they end the rioting 
and violence. 
 The British government of Lloyd George then decided to dispatch General Sir 
Edmund Allenby effectively, if not technically, to replace Sir Reginald Wingate.  After 
arriving in Cairo and making a study of the situation, Allenby recommend the release of 
the four Egyptian political prisoners.  On April 7, a proclamation was issued to that 
effect. Zaghlul and the wafd (delegation) were released and allowed to proceed to the 
Paris Peace Conference.  In Paris the wafd were severely disappointed by the 
international and especially American position that endorsed the British Protectorate over 
Egypt, but they did not relinquish their claims for independence.  The British 
Government in an attempt to resolve the issue decided to dispatch Lord Alfred Millner at 
the head of a Royal Commission to study the situation in Egypt. The mission, which had 
as its main aim the preservation of Egypt as a “British satellite” for the “foreseeable 
future”, was decried by Zaghlul and the nationalists and was boycotted.57  In the 
meantime, Zaghlul remained in Paris and did not return to Egypt to negotiate directly 
with the Commission.  Upon the Commission’s return to London an Egyptian delegation 
was sent, with the tacit agreement of Zaghlul, to open dialogue. Ultimately, no matter the 
concessions made by the Commission, Zaghlul claimed he could not and would not 
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accept anything short of full independence.  Without his outright support the Millner 
report and its recommendations had no chance of success. 
 Zaghlul returned to Egypt and resumed his activities as head of the opposition.  
He moved quickly to enhance his popular status and base.  Yet he proved intractable on 
the issue of Egyptian independence and sovereignty and was from the British point of 
view an obstructionist and an agitator.  Lord Allenby sought to remove this obstacle by 
yet again arresting Zaghlul on December 22, and deporting him on the 29th.  The High 
Commissioner, after consultations in London, returned to Egypt and on February 28, 
1922 declared the Protectorate over, but retained the status quo on issues of security, the 
government of the Sudan, and foreign relations until such a time as they could be 
resolved.  Sarwat Pasha took over as Prime Minister and prepared to form a cabinet.  The 
Sultan was now officially re-designated His Majesty the King of Egypt, a state of affairs 
that hardly pleased the majority of pro-Zaghlul nationalists. 
 On March 24, 1923, Zaghlul was again released and returned to Egypt on 
September 27.  By this time Yehiya Pasha, who had replaced Sarwat as Premier, had 
pushed through a constitutional settlement and the King had signed it. Zaghlul would 
soon came out against the declaration of 1922 and called for revisions to the constitution.  
His position was made even stronger when the January 1924 elections brought his wafd 
party a clear majority of about 190 of the 240 seats in the Chamber. Zaghlul was then 
invited by the King to form a Government, and he promptly accepted. 
Zaghlul’s government though was shortly placed in an untenable position by the 
murder of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor General of Sudan and the Sirdar of the Egyptian 
army.  Set upon by his political opponents for failing to provide peace and security, and 
unable to accept the full list of demands made by Allenby, Zaghlul was forced to resign.  
Ahmed Zawar Pasha then formed a new government more congenial to the King and the 
British.  Zaghlul’s political fortunes were not long eclipsed though and in the next 
elections the wafd once again won a majority of the seats in Parliament. The Zawar 
ministry resigned after the elections, and the King took that opportunity to 
constitutionally dissolve parliament.  When the next elections arrived, Zaghlul, and the 
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wafd demonstrated their enduring popular support yet again by attaining a majority in 
parliament.  Although as head of the parliamentary majority Zaghlul was entitled to the 
position of Prime Minister, British opposition to him was so intractable, that he was 
persuaded to step aside.  Despite this, Zaghlul retained full control of the wafd and 
remained until his death on August 23, 1927, the undisputed power behind the 
government.  
It is quite difficult to arrive at an accurate summation of Saad Zaghlul’s character.  
His diaries draw a picture of a man who was prideful, egotistical, quick to take insult and 
anger, and often conceited.  At the same time he was capable of generosity and was not a 
stranger to self-assessment and even self-recrimination.  Furthermore, all, including the 
British, attested to his honesty, intelligence, and administrative ability. When, late in his 
life, he found himself in conflict with the British, Zaghlul both gloried in his hold over 
the multitudes, and feared being abandoned by them or exposed to their displeasure.  
Ultimately Zaghlul, the longtime collabor’ator and politician, was forced by 
circumstances to become the revolutionary leader.  He was never able to bridge the gap 
between the two roles and because of that a golden opportunity was lost to Egypt; the 
opportunity for Egypt to develop stable democratic institutions with the support of the 
British.  Zaghlul was aggressive in his demands when he believed he had the upper hand, 
yet he showed timidity when confronted with Allenby’s unwarranted demands of Egypt 
after the murder of Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army.  These criticisms 
notwithstanding, Egypt undoubtedly owed its independence to Zaghlul’s activism, and 
for that he earned the title of “father of his people.” 
Mustafa Kamil 
 
Mustafa Kamil was, arguably, the most militant of Egypt’s nationalist figures.  He 
was born in Cairo in 1874.  His father was an engineer, first for the army, and then for the 
state civil authorities.  He received his secondary education at the Khidyawiyah,  
(khedieval School) in Cairo, from which he graduated in 1892.  From the Khidyawiyah he 
elected to move on to the Khedieval law school, while simultaneously attending the 
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French law school.58  Receiving his French law degree required that he sit for the exams 
in Paris.  He went there in 1893 and took his first-year exams and returned to take his 
second-year exams in 1894.  When the school in Paris did not allow him to take the third-
year exam, on an accelerated schedule, he transferred to a more accommodating 
university in Toulouse.  Hence in 1894, he received his degree in Law from Toulouse.  
Thereupon he wrote his brother a brief letter in which he explained that “I now have the 
law degree, I had decided to become a lawyer so as to defend the rights of the individual, 
but if I am blessed with good fortune, and I achieve what I hope for, I would then become 
the defender of the rights of the nation as a whole, in front of the entire world, because 
Egypt is this world’s paradise and does not deserve to have its honor trampled underfoot, 
and we, her dear sons, become derided strangers.”59 Given these strongly expressed 
feelings with regard to the British occupation and his deep connection with the French 
intellectual world, Kamil became an ardent Anglophobe. His French connections did not 
create his Anglophobia but definitely enhanced it.  For these connections he was mostly 
indebted to Madame Julliette Adams, one of the leading intellectual and political 
hostesses of her time.60
 Another source of influence on Kamil’s political outlook was Abdallah al-Nadim.  
Al-Nadim had been among the key figures in the 1882 Urabi revolution, and one of the 
most vehement anti-British figures in Egypt.  He had eluded capture for a long period 
after 1882, but ultimately was found and sentenced to exile.  He returned from exile in 
1892, only to be kicked out of the country again, but not before Kamil met him. Kamil 
acquired from al-Nadim what the latter thought were the key lessons on the failure of the 
Urabi revolution.  The most important among those was that any successful revolution 
had to be initiated by the people and not led by the army.  The other lesson he learned 
was that any dissension between the Khedive and the revolutionary movement would 
lead to the revolution’s failure, as in 1882.  To that end Kamil became a strong proponent 
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of an independence movement directed by the Khedive.61  This led to accusations that 
Kamil was hardly a revolutionary seeking independence, but rather the Khedive’s paid 
man.62  His volatility and uncompromising brand of nationalism did not always suit the 
Khedive though, and this resulted in periods of alienation and hostility between them.  
 Upon graduating from Toulouse and returning to Egypt in 1896 he eschewed the 
practice of law in favor of a career as a political activist and agitator.  His actions in 
France and on his return to Egypt did not go unnoticed by the British, who supposedly 
retaliated against Kamil by harassing and ultimately court-martialing his brother, an 
officer in the Egyptian army.63 That issue aside, Kamil had taken upon himself the role of 
Egypt’s defender, at home and to the western world.  In 1895 he had indeed spoken in 
front of the French parliament on the issue of Egyptian independence and in 1896 he 
returned for a two-month period and continued publicly denouncing the English 
occupation. From France he traveled to Germany and then to Austria, again speaking on 
behalf of Egyptian independence.  He toured Europe again in 1897, and then again in 
1898, carrying the same message all over the continent, from Austria, to Germany, to 
Hungary.   
 The confrontation at Fashoda between French and British army contingents, 
which resulted in France’s de facto concession of British authority over the Nile Valley, 
was a terrible blow to Kamil and all the nationalists. This was later compounded by the 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899 that basically placed the Sudan outside Egyptian 
control. Realizing that seeking external European leverage to remove the British from 
Egypt was insufficient, he called for the promotion of Pan-Islamism and adherence to the 
Ottoman Empire among the Egyptian population.64 To this end Kamil launched in 
January 1900 a newspaper, al-Liwa al-Misriyah (The Egyptian Standard).  Stridently 
anti-British in tone, very populist, and even bellicose at times, al-Liwa achieved a large 
circulation and had significant impact among the educated youth of Egypt.  It was 
through the pages of al-Liwa that Kamil aired his views and promoted his causes. On the 
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pages of al-Liwa, Kamil promoted the Ottoman pan-Islamic movement and affirmed the 
Sultan’s claims of ultimate sovereignty over Egypt.  Through its pages he attempted to 
defend Ottoman interests and promote anti-British sentiment, which to Kamil were very 
much one and the same thing.  The Entente Cordial signed between France and England 
in 1904, which essentially granted England a French carte blanche with regards to Egypt, 
made this new reliance on the Ottoman Empire and Pan-Islamism even more necessary, 
in Kamil’s view. The possible implications of admitting the sovereignty of a distant 
Ottoman Sultan over Egypt was a matter of much less importance than the reality of 
British occupation and control. 
 Kamil visited London in 1906, after the Danshawi incident,65 to object to the 
sentencing and to capitalize on the large outcry in Egypt and abroad, against the brutal 
punishment the villagers had received.  His visit was quite eventful, as he was well 
received by the orientalists in England and was sought after by newspapers and 
politicians.  He was able to make an eloquent plea for his cause.66 In Egypt itself the 
Danshawi fiasco gave huge momentum to the nationalist movement and forced the 
British administration onto the defensive. 
 Regarding internal Egyptian matters, Kamil was a great proponent of an Egyptian 
nationalism that purported to see no differentiation between Muslim and Christian Copt: 
“The Muslims and Copts are one people tied together by their nationality, customs, 
manners, and their sources of livelihood, and it is not possible to divide them against each 
other eternally.”67 But in his passion for the removal of the British and to achieve his goal 
of independence, he was willing to use almost any method, even declaring support for the 
Ottoman Caliph. 68
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  In keeping with his self-appointed role as Egypt’s spokesmen to the West, he 
issued two other newspapers in 1906, the French language Etendard Egyptien and the 
English Language Egyptian Standard.  Kamil wished to circumvent the European 
newspapers and addressed directly the Europeans, specifically those residing in Egypt.  
The costs of founding the paper were to be raised by forming a shareholding company 
and collecting 20,000 Egyptian pounds in capital.69
 One of the last important tasks undertaken by Kamil prior to his early demise was 
the transformation of the national movement into an actual political party, the Nationalist 
Party.  In December 1907 the Nationalist Party had its first general assembly. Its goal was 
an independent Egypt, under the nominal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.  Kamil did 
not live long enough to see any of his efforts come to fruition.  Two months after this first 
assembly of the Nationalist Party Mustafa Kamil passed away from an illness that had 
afflicted him for some time.  His death was greatly mourned, especially among the 
younger generation of students and graduates who had been inspired by his fiery rhetoric. 
Many thousands of mourners were said to have participated in the public procession that 
carried him to his grave.70  
There is no doubt that Kamil was a brilliant individual and a naturally gifted 
orator and publicist, much like al-Nadim his mentor.  In the span of eight years between 
1899 and 1907 he had founded three publications, two of them in foreign languages, 
traveled all over Europe lobbying for Egyptian independence, and founded what was at 
least under his leadership an effective Nationalist Party. 
Brilliance though, cannot and should not be confused with wisdom.  So vehement 
was Kamil in his calls for Egyptian independence that he spared little of his considerable 
energy and ability actually to prepare his countrymen to assume the responsibilities of 
running their country in the future.  The vast inequalities present in Egypt, the corruption 
and ineptitude of many of Egypt’s elite class, were all ignored or glossed over in his drive 
to oust the British from Egypt.  Intermediate goals, such as the improvement of 
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education, were often recognized as vital, but the need to pursue them prior to calling for 
independence was ignored.  The foundations upon which a modern state could be built 
were not yet fully available to the Egyptians, no matter what Kamil in his impatience for 
independence wished to believe.  Ultimately though, this harsh judgment of Kamil has to 
be mitigated by the fact that he died very young and hence his project was unfinished.  
A last observation worth mentioning with regard to Kamil is the great prestige 
accorded him by the Arab and Egyptian nationalist authors. In contrast many of the 
English language works that allude to him do so in a belittling manner.  Traits they would 
laud in a western nationalist, such as a grasp of certain aspects of realpolitik, become 
negative aspersions on his character.71 Ultimately though, even some of his harshest 
critics acknowledge the “undoubted qualities of ability and leadership” he exhibited 
while presiding over the Nationalist Party.72
CONCLUSION 
 
The individuals featured in this chapter do not by any means represent the full 
roster of modernists, reformers and nationalists involved in the formation of the modern 
Egyptian nation during the period of British occupation. They were chosen from among 
the rest, in some cases because of their prominence, in other cases because of their 
legacies, and in yet other instances because their efforts were illustrative of the ongoing 
struggle to reshape Muslim society Egypt itself.  Another crucial reason was their 
interaction with the British.  This interaction could have been confrontational or 
conciliatory, but it provides us with the opportunity to assess their views of British 
involvement in Egyptian political life.  Finally most of these figures produced journals, 
corresponded prodigiously, or left detailed personal journals from which a reader can 
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Reformers, Islamists, and Nationalists: 
Perceptions of the British Empire 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the views of the various Egypt-based 
reformers and nationalists introduced in the previous chapter on the actions of the British 
occupation and the British Empire in general. Careful consideration will be given to 
discussing perceived threats, dangers, and opportunities for empowerment and 
independence. The narrative will also cover instances when the reformers, including 
prominent collaborators, perceived British steps as counter to the spirit of reform and 
eventual self-rule.  These will all be accompanied by critical commentary and analysis 
that will place them in their proper context.   
In all cases the reformers’ grievances, accusations, and complaints, will be 
presented in their own voices. One of the objects is to try to ascertain how they 
comprehended the events of their time as it involved them and the British Empire.  The 
ultimate result will be to see the British Empire, not as it actually was but rather as the 
reformers and nationalists saw it.  The benefit of this approach will be to allow us to view 
the sources from which much of the nationalist histories that inform today’s populations 
have been derived.  Additionally, since among the characters discussed in this work were 
certain prominent Islamic reformers whose impact went well beyond the borders of 
Egypt, this study will help us gain a better understanding of some of the historic 
grievances with the British Empire specifically and the West in general, as expressed by 
the adherents of Islamic reform and universalism. 
To accomplish this goal several sources will be used.  Among those are a host of 
periodicals as well as relevant political speeches, correspondence, memoirs and diaries.  
Many of the grievances against the West will be generalized in nature and refer to a 
nebulous policy, while others will be much more specific regarding actions taken against 
the reformers and their supporters.  Others still will focus on specific figures, attributing 
to them certain actions, speeches, or sentiments with regard to Egypt.  Yet all will serve 
to demonstrate the author’s perceptions of the British Empire, and allow us to assess the 
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relative sophistication, or more importantly the accuracy, of their understanding of that 
empire.  
Several different reformers covered in the previous chapter will appear again in 
the following pages.  They often present dramatically different views of the British.  
These views will run the gamut from the demonic to the virtuous and noble.  They will 
also vary over time, according to circumstances and the authors’ political leanings and 
aspirations. In many cases, very complex personal, economic, and political relationships 
existed between Egyptian elites and the British and those will be examined in turn.  It 
also must be noted that since in some cases we will be covering peoples’ perceptions over 
a decade or more, we will sometimes see fluctuations and changes of heart.  This is very 
clearly the case when dealing with Muhammad Abduh and Saad Zaghlul.  The one 
constant throughout this chapter will be the portrayal of the British and their involvement 
in Egyptian affairs through Egyptian eyes, and in the Egyptians’ own voices. 
Prior to the examination of each publication or document, it will be introduced to 
the reader with a short biographical sketch when relevant.  This short sketch will include 
the dates of publication, the identity of their founders, a reminder of their political 
leanings, a brief description of content, and an explanation of their closure if necessary, 
as reformist journals would often be shut down by the authorities.  The following is the 
list of the journals that we will be covering; al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, al-Ustadh, and al-
Manar.  In addition to these journals, we shall be looking closely at the political 
speeches, articles, and correspondence of Mustafa Kamil, as well as, the diaries and 
correspondence of Saad Zaghlul. 
AL-URWA AL WUTHQA (THE INDISSOLUBLE BOND): 
 
Al-Afghani’s stay in Paris was marked by the most ambitious of his projects.  
With the aid of his pupil Muhammad Abduh, he launched a Paris-based Arabic language 
monthly journal, to trumpet his call for Muslim social, economic, political, and religious 
reform; for pan-Islamic action; and to attack European and more specifically British 
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imperialism.73  The first edition of the journal appeared on March 13, 1884.  The Urwa 
al-Wuthqa had a comparatively short run of 18 issues before it had to shut down. Its 
closure was attributed to British attempts to block its distribution throughout the Muslim 
nations under their influence.74 Given the journal’s content and its overt calls for the 
overthrow of British rule in India and Egypt, the British attitude toward it could hardly be 
called surprising.  Pan-Islamic unity and calls for pan-Islamic action were repeatedly 
promoted as a means of curtailing and even breaking British hegemony over India and 
other parts of the Muslim world.  
In an article on al-Ta’ssub (fanaticism), al-Afghani revealed his true feelings 
about European, and especially British hypocrisy as he saw it: “A man among them will 
reach the highest level of freedom, such as Gladstone, then you will not find a word 
coming out of his mouth that is not imbued with the spirit of Peter the monk [preacher of 
the Peasant’s Crusade]. In fact, you will see his soul is a copy of [Peter’s] soul.”75 
Ultimately then in al-Afghani’s view, British expansion in Muslim lands was nothing but 
a renewed crusade, a Christian holy war against Islam. The British actions in Egypt, for 
instance, are painted in the bloodiest and most barbaric terms possible: “The English 
soldiers strike at the Egyptian lands as they go and as they come, killing and 
despoiling.”76 The theme of crusade is picked up again when discussing General Gordon 
and the Sudan expedition, especially in the assessment of the English motives for 
establishing contact with King John of Ethiopia:  
 
The soldiers of the English government having failed on the shores of the 
Red Sea, and the [English government] having failed in preparing new 
soldiers to drive into the middle of the Sudan has turned to the Ethiopian 
King to ask his help against the Muslims of Sudan….The information that 
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has come out this week confirms that England is determined to harm the 
Muslims of Sudan, because they are Muslim, and not just to end the 
revolution, or to spread civilization…There is no other name for this but 
religious war, that reminds one of…the Crusades, and feeds the fires of 
religious fanaticism…”77   
 
In the British, al-Afghani saw deadly enemies to Islam and Muslims everywhere:  
 
The English government is a staunch enemy of Muslims because of its 
absorption of Muslim kingdoms…for it takes pleasure in tormenting the 
people of religion (Muslims).  [The English government] seems to take 
pleasure in debasing [Muslims] and eradicating their 
property…Gladstone’s…many speeches during the Russo-Turkish war, 
and the articles [written by] his like, gave the clearest statement to the 
enmity residing in the hearts of the English towards Muslims.78  
For the likes of al-Afghani, Britain’s rule over so much of what had previously been dar 
al-Islam, or Muslim lands, was intolerable.  British rule over India and the occupation of 
Egypt, with the attendant decline of Muslim prominence and prestige, were clear 
evidence in his mind of Britain’s enmity towards Islam. 
In an evocative article titled “al-Wahm” (illusion or myth), al-Afghani described 
the British and their empire in these terms:  
[A European observer], judges [Britain’s] strength in the far-flung reaches [of its 
empire] and its ability to defend them akin to its abilities to defend the British 
Isles.  He does not observe, however, that the English body [strength] has been 
stretched lengthwise and sideways to the extent that any disturbance could tear its 
extremities apart, and their strength would be dissipated until they had none left 
(literally: no position of power) …All this but for the veil of illusion.”79   
 
He continued to remind the Egyptian people that their own divisions that had allowed the 
British to occupy Egypt and remarks:  
 
The people of Egypt act as if they are ignorant of the reasons that have 
allowed the British to occupy their lands.  It is as if they believe that the 
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people had been united in their resistance to the English, and that they had 
all been defeated and suppressed by the English.  It is as if the Egyptians 
have forgotten how divided they were and that the English were only able 
to enter the country with Egyptian help.  That is the incredible illusion.   
 
Al-Afghani perceived a great difference between the appearance of power and the reality 
of it.  He was also infuriated by the self-defeatism that led Egyptians not to realize their 
own potential strength.  Britain had occupied Egypt owing to Egyptian foolishness and 
divisions and it could be driven out by Egyptian unity and wise action: 
 
Those very same people that two years ago were the very reason for the 
success of the English troops and their occupation of the Nile valley; 
without whom they could not have set a foot in it, now believe that those 
same troops could suppress the entire population and subjugate it to the 
will of the British government…. Don’t they realize that if the English 
troops were occupied in the Sudan and even a slight disturbance occurred 
in the eastern district, and the Bahria, and Fayum, the English would 
panic, and their will would collapse, and they would leave the country to 
its people.”80  
 
 In lines such as these, al-Afghani and Abduh called for Muslim unity, as a means to 
defeat the British and drive them from Muslim lands. In al-Afghani’s view if the Muslims 
of India, Egypt and the Sudan, could rid themselves of the illusion of British invincibility 
and act in concert, they would then be able to defeat the British and tear the extremities of 
the Empire apart. 
Upon the occasion of the Mahdist uprising in Sudan, the journal published an 
article Zilzal al-Ingliz fi al-Sudan (The English Earthquake in Sudan) in which he 
elaborates on the previous theme:  
 
The enemy marched upon you under a banner of affection (mahaba), then 
he turned his back upon it and showed you his dark side (Dhar al-majn).  
He took in his oppressive hands your public affairs, military, monetary, 
administrative and judicial, and nothing was left to you except being 
denied the ability to serve your country…and this when he has not yet 
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destroyed all local strength…so what if he establishes himself…and rids 
himself of all opposition.  
 
The Indian experience must have been uppermost in al-Afghani’s mind here, for once 
they had established themselves in India the British had indeed persevered.  In the Mahdi 
uprising al-Afghani saw a golden opportunity for a successful Egyptian revolt against the 
British occupation.  In an attempt to inflame his target audience, he mercilessly reminded 
the Egyptians of all they had lost and all they had yet to lose: 
 
You have seen that he has corrupted your affairs, caused you discomfort. 
[He has] denied your men service, impoverished thousands of families, 
and given of your country to your enemies. [He has] damaged your 
interests in agriculture, trade, industry, and closed the door of gain in your 
face. [He] has sought to intervene in your religious affairs (like the awqaf). 
He has [also] determined to destroy your defenses and remove your 
strength by firing your soldiers, and this is only the beginning. So what 
will the end bring. 
 
This ominous warning was quickly followed by a rousing call to arms:  
 
You have the ability now to strike at your enemy and he is incapable of 
striking back, but in time the situation will be reversed, and you will 
become incapable of fighting him and in his hand he will carry the big 
stick (Assa al-Jabrout) with which to subjugate you.81   
 
Time, al-Afghani stressed was one of the things that Egyptians could least afford to lose.  
With time the British would only grow stronger and their ability to dominate Egypt 
would increase.  
As to claims that the British had improved and reformed the Egyptian 
infrastructure, al-Afghani’s response was simple and straightforward:  
 
It would be correct for an Egyptian to believe that what has happened to 
his country over the last 20 months or so (since occupation) is a prelude to 
its reform and the ordering of its affairs. Indeed, it could occur to someone 
that this is in preparation for some industrial project in Egypt…that with 
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time would transform it into a garden of paradise. But as for the people (of 
Egypt) they are not the objects of consideration, for should they perish, 
then other nations will take their place.82
 
For al-Afghani, all that Britain did or would do in Egypt was designed only to increase 
British wealth and good fortune.  That was the message he so desperately wished to 
impart to all Egyptians.  
Al-Afghani continued to harp on the Egyptians because he strongly believed that 
only by finding willing local collaborators could Britain remain in Egypt. He saw them as 
the mainstay of British imperialism.  In an article titled al-Sharaf  (Honor), he 
commented:  
 
Certain princes in the Muslim lands have been given titles of honor from 
countries such as England, for their services in fighting to conquer their 
very won lands. The English were then able to march in behind them and 
seize those lands, while fellow Muslims are striving mightily to find ways 
to expel them. What comparison is there between Uthman Pasha al-
Ghazy’s medals [honorable deeds], and those on the chests of those 
deceived [princes]?”83   
 
This position is strongly in keeping with the emphasis placed by modern historians on the 
crucial role played by collaborators in aiding British rule.84
 India with its multitude of Muslims was an area of great interest to the journal, 
and the articles painted a picture of India as a land in which the British hold could be 
broken, should the Muslims but unite and take advantage of the struggles of the great 
powers.  In the various articles on the subject al-Afghani’s great passion for Islamic 
unity, no matter the sect, emerges very clearly.  Having been in the service of the 
governments of both Shii Persia and Sunni Afghanistan, he urged the two neighbors to 
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set aside their sectarian differences in the face of the much greater threat of British 
imperialism: 
 
Do you remain oblivious to the fact that every Muslim in India looks 
towards you eagerly, awaiting your coming should you but unite with your 
Afghan brothers…This is the time for brotherhood and agreement, for the 
enemy has surrounded your lands from the east and from the west…he but 
waits an opportunity to assault your borders.  Should you let this 
opportunity pass you by, you might not have one like it again, for the 
English are in a deep bind over the Egyptian issue because of their 
military weakness, and they are involved in arguments with many nations 
who oppose their goals.  
 
The object of his Muslim unity then was not merely defensive, but a will to regain the 
lands lost to Muslim rule.  His articles seemed to have had at least some impact in India, 
for it appears that certain newspapers were reported by al-Afghani to have falsified his 
words, in translation, in an attempt to mislead their readers.  He also generated some 
adherents, whom he was quick to thank for their proper translation of his articles “to the 
benefit of their countrymen.”85
 Al-Afghani was not shy about looking towards any possible source of aid against 
British imperialism, even seeing possibilities in Russian ambitions with regard to India:  
 
During this new epoch in politics, [Russia’s possible attack on India] 
should the countries of Iran with the principality of Afghanistan come to 
an agreement, then they would have great fortune and profit, for even 
should anger against the British in the hearts of the Indians aid the 
Russians, there are still obstacles in their path that only an alliance with 
the Afghans and the Iranians would clear…and Russia having received the 
aid of the Persians and Afghanis in opening the doors of India cannot but 
share with them the spoils and benefits otherwise they would be an 
insurmountable obstacle to its goals.86   
 
In these lines we see the cold calculating pragmatism, and the understanding of 
realpolitik, that have led many of al-Afghani’s critics to label him unethical and 
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opportunistic.  It is not my goal to refute or confirm these claims or confirm them, but to 
highlight the level of hatred and distrust with which al-Afghani regarded the English, 
whom he perceived as the greatest threat to the Muslim Umma. 
One of the fascinating facets of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa was its coverage of events far 
removed from the Muslim lands, but which were understood to reflect on the British 
empire, and thus were of importance to India, Egypt and the Muslim Umma.  A prime 
example of this was the attention given to Ireland’s independence struggle and the 
implications for Egypt:   
 
Everyday the British present logical evidence and rhetorical arguments 
that they only went to Egypt to bring peace and justice to it.  But every 
time they prepare their arguments to convince the doubtful of their 
‘famous’ case, the Irish contradicts them…for no period of time passes 
that they [the Irish] do not carry out an operation to break the hold of the 
English government in Ireland.  They place dynamite to destroy buildings 
and bridges and disrupt the railways, and they assassinate the government 
employees. Having grown sick of [the English government’s] tyranny, 
they seek all means to get rid of its authority, and they remain firm in their 
quest.87  
 
 Here we see a sophisticated awareness of the scope and problems of the British Empire.  
This interest was not merely sensationalistic, but was in keeping with his perception of 
the English power as stretched too thin, and susceptible to pressure at the extremities.   
 The inner workings of Britain’s political system and its political parties were also 
a source of interest to al-Urwa al-Wuthqa.  The judgment leveled by the journal on the 
Liberal Party’s imperial politics and those of the Conservative Party leaves one in little 
doubt that al-Afghani saw little practical difference between the two.  The following is a 
small selection of the analysis that appeared in the journal: 
 
The opinion makers in England fall into two groups.  One group urges the 
government to proclaim its sovereignty over the Egyptian lands and to 
take over all its administration, in other words to join it to its empire… 
and this is the group of the business and financial interests …and it is 
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supported in its views by various newspapers, the most famous being The 
Times.   
 
Translated articles from The Times were a common feature in al-Urwa al-Wuthqa and 
provided al-Afghani chances for endless commentary: 
 
As for the other group [of opinion makers] in the English nation, among 
whom are the interior minister and Mr. Gladstone, they exhibit, or so it is 
remarked, honesty and declare in their speeches that the English 
government cannot take over the running of Egypt and that it cannot join it 
to its empire …This is what they pronounce on their podiums…but this 
same group have meanwhile worked to secure their footing in Egypt, and 
really oppose the first group only in the way they wag their tongues.”88   
 
Al-Afghani seemingly gave little credence to Gladstone’s promises of imminent 
withdrawal from Egypt. 
 Despite his general hostility toward the English, al-Afghani was certainly not 
blind to the merits of those Englishmen he considered friendly toward Egypt and 
Muslims.  A prime example of this was Wilfred Blunt, described in the journal as a man 
“who has become famous for his love for Muslims and his defense of Egypt.”  Mr. 
Blunt’s recommendations regarding Egypt seem to have met with Afghani’s whole-
hearted approval.  A letter of Blunt’s to The Times regarding the “Egyptian Matter” was 
translated in the journal with minimal commentary and carried the following 
recommendations:  
 
The English government must come to an agreement with the international 
community to make the Egyptian nation independent in its administration, 
and to make the international community the guarantor of this 
independence without exception, and the privileges accorded to foreigners 
must be amended.  Any issue over which there is disagreement should be 
resolved with the agreement of the European nations who can resolve the 
issue as they please.  There should be no foreign officers in the army, and 
the Suez Canal should be considered a common way, in which all 
countries should have a partnership, and under international supervision.  
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The country’s administration must be in the hands of a government elected 
by the people.89
 
An independent and strong Egypt with a representative government, supported by an 
Egyptian Army indigenously officered, was exactly al-Afghani’s aim.  If that could 
succeed in Egypt, then the rest of the Muslim world would have a model to follow and 
the dream of reform and empowerment could be fulfilled. 
Al-Afghani was quite convinced that the British were determined to ban his 
journal from all their areas of influence.  He remarked in an article al-Urwa al-Wuthqa 
wa Jaraid al-Ingliz (The Indissoluble Bond and the English Newspapers): 
 
We determined to establish this journal of ours, and certain French editors 
learned of this, so they wrote about it before it was ever published, without 
explaining its origins, or revealing the truth of its intent. When the editors 
of the important English newspapers came upon these stories, they were 
seized by passions… and they warned their government of the effects this 
journal could have on England’s politics and its influence in the Eastern 
lands, and they urged the government to take all steps to stop it from 
getting it to India and Egypt… 
 
The British, nevertheless, according to al-Afghani, were not satisfied to ban the 
circulation in areas under their direct rule but had taken even additional measures: 
 
…They have gone to the extreme of recommending that pressure be put on 
the Ottoman Empire to ban it as well.  All this from them and the first 
issue had not yet been published, and before a single one of them had 
known its political leanings. All this [was done] when this journal was not 
established to rouse passions, or to promote strife, but rather to defend the 
rights of all Easterners in general, and Muslims specifically…to what is in 
their best interest, and has taken a moderate approach and a straight and 
just path….Let the English government know that it cannot stop us from 
spreading our ideas in the East whether through this journal or by other 
methods if it came to that, for the proponents of right are many.90   
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Clearly, the feelings of animosity al-Afghani held for the British were reciprocated in 
full. This animosity came to a head when the Egyptian ministers finally banned the 
journal at the behest of the British and imposed a five to twenty-five Egyptian pound 
penalty on anyone caught with it.  This action engendered the following facetious 
comment from the journal’s editors: “This is indeed a stiff fine; maybe it is necessitated 
by the impoverishment of the Egyptian treasury due to the blessings of English actions in 
Egypt.”91
 The cessation of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa was abrupt, and no special final edition was 
published in which to warn its subscribers and readers.  The impression is given 
throughout that British efforts to disrupt its operation were relentless, a theory accepted 
by the majority of the Arabic language literature on the subject and in the historical 
introduction to the bound volume of the journal. 
ABDALLAH  AL-NADIM’S AL-USTADH (THE TEACHER) 
 
 Abdallah al-Nadim’s years as a fugitive in the Egyptian countryside and later 
exile in Jafa had not reduced his zeal for Egyptian independence but had redirected it.  
Al-Nadim strongly believed that the failure of the Urabi Revolution was a direct result of 
palace opposition. Hence, for any independence movement to succeed it must have the 
backing of the palace and must operate under the direction of the Khedive.  With this 
newfound conviction al-Nadim launched the weekly al-Ustadh on August 24, 1892.  In 
the introduction to the first issue al-Nadim described the content and the purpose of the 
journal thus:  
 
We do not restrict ourselves to a single subject but publish what is good to 
publish and what is pleasant to hear…as long as it insults no religion or 
dishonors anyone and does not carry what incites and does not deal with 
contemporary politics, in that it does not speak of the administration, or of 
the affairs of the ministries, or of their employees…and as for politics in 
general we will discuss only its intellectual aspects, for the study of 
history, manners, traditions, the organization of the state and are all the 
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branches of political studies which is independent of the politics of 
administration.92  
 
In short, al-Nadim promised to discuss political ideas only in theory, and to refrain from 
referring to contemporaneous administrative practices.  This in its own way was no less a 
form of political commentary than the direct naming of names, for it set a bar against 
which the reader is left to judge current events. 
 The articles and stories in al-Ustadh were directed to the literate audience in 
general, regardless of their social position.  It carried articles on literature and science, 
while at the same time carrying a series of satirical pieces in the ‘amyah, the common 
Egyptian dialect.  These were in the form of a running dialogue between several 
characters that addressed topics ranging from the introduction of drinking establishments 
in Egypt and their effect on family life, to the destruction of local trades by the influx of 
foreign goods, to the benefits of female education.  The topics of these stories 
concentrated mostly on the ills introduced into Egypt by the Europeans and the British 
occupation, but sought solutions not in reactionary actions but in Egyptian self-
improvement and self-awareness. 
 Al-Nadim’s concerns were mostly localized and internal.  Unlike al-Afghani and 
Muhammad Abduh, the coeditors of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, al-Nadim concentrated on 
internal Egyptian empowerment.  This was in keeping with his support of the Khedive, 
but also with his precarious position under the eye of the palace on one hand and of the 
British administration and its allies on the other.  Al-Nadim initially remained cautious in 
his articles and refrained from naming names.  He was also careful to not directly indict 
the British occupation, but preferred to speak of the Europeans in general, even when his 
own experience was predominantly with the British.  His writing could best be described 
as political satire.  What on first glance appear to be laudatory statements often turn out 
to be facetious comments shared with a knowing audience. 
 In the manner that he perceived the British Empire, al-Nadim was quite similar to 
al-Afghani.  He regarded European and British expansion in general as motivated equally 
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by greed and religious intolerance.  Although he did not the use of the word “crusade,” 
there is little doubt that he perceived it as such:  
 
‘If you were in our position you would have done as we did.’  These are 
words repeated by Europe to Easterners every time it is driven to do 
something by the exigencies of imperial colonization (al-Isti’mar al milki) 
or religious expansion.  It has judiciously balanced between the powers of 
religion and state, for it made the first a winsome ambassador and the 
second a whip wielding rider…93   
 
According to al-Nadim Easterners could understand European behavior towards them by 
realizing that Europeans did not regard them as fellow human beings:  
 
The actions of Europe have astonished us.  It has not allowed an easterner 
to own even an inch in its lands, yet it throws us out of our dwelling places 
and takes up residence without any contractual conditions or cause.  It 
must be excused though, for it has found no one to oppose it and no one to 
fight it.  It does not acknowledge that we share a common humanity, but it 
declares, that if you were in our position, you would have done as we 
did.94
  
When it came to European claims of expanding in the East in order to spread 
stability and modernity al-Nadim, again much like Afghani, was clearly derisive:  
 
No European country enters an Eastern country in the name of conquest, 
but does so in the name of reform and the spreading of modern 
civilization. It claims when it first enters that it will not attempt to alter 
religion or tradition, then turns around and gradually begins changing 
both….[For example] England entered Egypt with an invitation from its 
people and the excuse of supporting the honored position of the Khedive 
(read sarcasm writ large), then [they added] the excuse of establishing 
order, and a new stable government, similar to those in Europe  
 
In the end the English had stolen the country from its quiescent populace, and all due to 
that population’s apathy:   
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It is like the story of the thief that entered someone’s house and asked 
them to load for him all they had in furniture and valuables, and they 
complied without objections.   Had a policeman walked in through the 
door and seen them voluntarily loading their property for the thief, would 
he presume this was a thief, no, rather that he was the master of the house 
and they his servants 95
  
According to al-Nadim the tragedies being visited upon Egypt were very clearly due to 
the Egyptian inability to unite behind their king and defend his position and his honor:  
 
Did they say to the Egyptian we shall spend millions on engineering 
projects without regard as to how it is used, and do not dare to question 
these amounts for which you shall become slaves, indebted to Rothschild 
and his likes.  Or are they the ones that doled out the contracts, and 
expanded the scope of the treaties until they have drawn a noose around 
every Egyptian endeavor.  96
 
Grievous as that was to al-Nadim, it paled in comparison to what he believed the 
Egyptians had allowed to happen to their education system:  
 
… Or are they the ones that decreased the number of Egyptian students in 
their schools, and increased the use of foreigners in them, and moved 
towards killing their language by giving rewards to those who excelled in 
English, so that a student may forget the language of the Quran and hence 
forget religion, which stands as an obstacle in Europe’s way, as they say in 
their assemblies and elite clubs.  No by God…Why do we feel pain at 
their [the British] actions, while our own leaders have dedicated 
themselves to sitting in their castles and riding their carriages for pleasure, 
and our wise men remain silent…97  
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The way forward in al-Nadim’s view was again to rally around the Khedive:  “Stop 
talking of this and of that oh Egyptians, for the countries of the world have judged us as 
full of speech and no action.”98
 The British Empire then was presented as an opportunistic entity that would take 
advantage of weaknesses where it found them: “For if every Englishmen sees you mired 
in this passivity, while he dedicates himself to his work night and day, he would say ‘if 
you were as we are, you would have done the same.”99  And returning to his earlier 
advice to his countrymen he urged them to support their Khedive in whom they should 
trust their hopes, for he loved all his subjects no matter their religion, and would raise the 
patriots and appoint them to administer it: 
 
He but needs men to carry out his wishes who have been awakened by the 
shock of Europe so that they would turn away from their prideful stances 
and surround their prince and bind themselves to him loyally so he may 
say to the men of England, here are the men who you want to support my 
constitutional (nidhamia) government, so put the running of it in their 
hands and test them to see how they carry out their jobs.100
 
Al-Nadim understood the need for Egyptians to acquire Western knowledge, but not at 
the price of abandoning their country and their prince.  Much as al-Afghani had preached, 
al-Nadim was calling upon Egyptians, no matter their religious creed or background, to 
unite in the face of British domination. 
Ultimately, his concerns with internal Egyptian empowerment created a clash 
with those he saw as collaborators.  This newly prominent group, he believed, were 
weakening the Khedieve and the nation for the sake of their European masters. Prominent 
among these were the migrants from Syria, mostly Christian, who had gained prominence 
in the government and were favored by the British occupation (mostly for their facility 
with languages).  On those al-Nadim passed a scathing indictment:   
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I am your brother so why have you denied me? What are Egypt and the 
lands of the Sham, but twins from the same father? what harm comes to 
one comes to the other, so when the sons of both disagree, and the Syrians 
move away from the Egyptians, even as they dwell in Egypt, would it not 
have been better for us to spend all our knowledge and mental capacity in 
the effort to reform our country and spread the spirit of learning and 
nationalism; or for a twenty pound salary a man among us will sell his 
brother, his country, and even beyond that his race and his religion. For 
seductive words we spend our lives in the service of the foreigner, to aid 
him over our brothers so he may have vengeance upon those who have 
committed no sin, and assault those who have assaulted no one.101
 
The British occupation was undoubtedly a tyrannical oppressor, but one that relied upon 
locally placed collaborators.  It was though the division of brother against brother that the 
British Empire ruled, and according to al-Nadim, “if we stay on this path of enmity and 
opposition, then the foreigner will take us as a tool to carry out his commands.”102
As to the issue of religion, al-Nadim reminded all the dwellers of Egypt that their 
fathers had lived together as neighbors and brothers, prospered together, and never let 
anyone come between them:  “If it is said that the commonality of religion bound them, 
then we would say that the honor of independent nationalism is preferable to the 
degradation of co-religionists.”  No matter the supposed bonds of a common religion a 
person could not rely on the promises of an alien invader, for “the foreigner will entice a 
man among us until he has achieved his ends and then sell him off once he has gained all 
he wanted.”103
Al-Nadim, regardless of his true feelings, was often cautious in his assessment of 
the British occupation and its administrators.  That was certainly the case when the issue 
of choosing a new Prime Minister came up in January 1893.  After the removal of 
Mustafa Fahmi for reasons of ill health, so al-Nadim claims in al-Ustadh, the khedive 
was presented with a list of replacements approved beforehand by Cromer.  The Khedive 
saw this as an attempt to interfere in his prerogative and took exception to it.  As a result 
he appointed Mustafa Riad Pasha to the position of Prime Minister.  The fascinating 
                                                 
101 Ibid., p. 531 
102 Ibid., p. 531 
103 Ibid., p. 532 
 54
aspect in all of this was al-Nadim’s description of Cromer’s behavior during this 
altercation:  
 
Let us not forget what does credit to Lord Cromer in this matter, he had 
been difficult, and he had made the matter hard, and he had pushed his 
government to accede to his opinion, and he sent out frequent messages 
regarding this matter, and he had gotten angry, and he did what no Consul 
before him had done, but when he saw the firmness of the Khedive’s mind 
and his insistence on preserving his rights, and his refusal of all foreign 
interference in the concerns of his country, he gave up his objections and 
agreed to the [appointment of Riad Pasha as Chief Inspector], and we shall 
not forget him for this, nor shall we be stingy in our praise.104   
 
It is imperative to remember that above all else al-Nadim was concerned with 
empowering the Khedive, in whom he had put all his hopes and all his faith for a strong 
and independent Egypt.  Upon those occasions when the British were accommodating to 
the Khedive he could be generous in his praise, just as he could be scathing in his 
denunciation, when the Khedive’s will was thwarted.  In the very same article in which 
he expressed his thanks to Lord Cromer for his actions, al-Nadim urged his fellow 
countrymen to treat all foreigners in Egypt with courtesy and kindness; for he says: “ 
 
..They did not take an inch of land from us through war, nor did they enter 
our land by force, but through treaties between our rightful government 
and theirs … so any action harmful to them is an affront to that same 
government and contrary to its works.105   
 
Ever present in al-Nadim’s mind were the consequences of the 1882 Urabi revolution, 
which he describes as “disastrous for the country, and ending in what the Egyptian did 
not wish for,” mainly the British occupation106 Again he urged his countrymen to remain 
calm and thoughtful and above all else to trust the Khedive and leave the politics to him 
and his government.  He also spoke out against those who “enter gatherings, and call 
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themselves Egyptians, then curse England and belittle its deeds, and move people’s 
minds against her …” and labels them enemies of Egypt, its people and King.  His 
representation of the British occupation changed in accordance with the needs and 
requirements of Khedival politics. 
In March 1893, when the Khedive was coming out the worse off in his contest 
with Cromer over government appointments, the tone of the articles had changed, as did 
the portrayal of the British Empire.  The portrayal grew negative and the assessment of its 
accomplishments full of sarcasm:   
 
Was not the entry of England into India for the purpose of installing an 
ordered government and the creation of a civilized society, and it claims it 
to this day even, as it has placed around the throat of every Indian a noose 
with which to lead him wherever it pleases...107
 
As for those Egyptians who might be deceived that the English would treat non-Muslims 
with any respect or consider them as equals: “The sight of the Brahmas shows 
[otherwise] for everyone that evil fate has placed under the tyranny of the English [will 
suffer], since they consider none but the English as human (equals).”108  As to the 
maintenance of British political maneuvers and intent in the East:  
 
The English excel at removing weapons form the hands [of the indigenes] 
and reducing their wealth, and removing their sons from the significant 
projects and jobs, and this requires it to use tyranny under the guise of 
constitution.”  This has been allowed to happen because the Easterners had 
been blind: “England’s politics of reducing peoples (nations) had been 
hidden from many Easterners, but it has been revealed by its 
capriciousness and its oath breaking.109   
 
There is little doubt that this change in the portrayal of the British was related directly to 
the political tribulations of the Khedive, for although the immediate political 
developments were not spelled out they were implied: “They call the Egyptians visits to 
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their king religious radicalism, and they ascribe lies to the Islamist journal that they 
fabricate, and they falsely attribute to them speech never said by any Egyptian…”110 The 
conclusion of this article was a sarcastic thanks to England for all it had taught the 
Egyptians of good behavior and manners, of recognizing the good from the bad, and of 
differentiating between the foreign and national authority.  It also contained an acerbic 
assurance that after eleven years of occupation the lessons had been learnt and the 
Egyptians were now qualified to take care of their own affairs.111
In a smartly written appraisal of certain British statements regarding public 
servants in Egypt, al-Nadim pointed to one of the inherent problems in the nature of the 
British occupation, and the source of Egyptian hope for eventually sovereignty.   
 
They [the English] are under the impression that the [government] workers 
fall into two groups, those friendly to the English, and those friendly to the 
government, or the Khedive…but that would mean that there is opposition 
between the goals of the National Government, and the English.  But the 
English deny this in front of Europe, and claim it is only an advisor to the 
Egyptian government on matters of reform.   
 
Britain’s advisory role was moreover open to the judgment and interference of the 
European powers. The Consul General was constantly overstepping the limits of British 
influence as set by the 1882 agreement between Britain and the Ottoman Empire.  
Egyptian nationalists long pinned their hopes of limiting these British infringements of 
national sovereignty on the terms of the Anglo-Ottoman agreement and the influence of 
its other European signatories.  This, as we shall see, was, a powerful and consistent 
theme in the words of Mustafa Kamil, who managed to rouse serious apprehension and 
concern in British circles. 
The following description of the British Empire also is worthy of translation and 
exposition for its remarks on the relation between British business and British 
imperialism:  
                                                 
110 Ibid., pp. 697-698 
111 Ibid., pp. 698-699 
 57
The English are the British Nation owners of great lands and large 
colonies and massive wealth which has become famous for its rich 
individuals and their fair business dealings which begin in the Eastern 
kingdoms with loans and the purchase of property, and end with forced 
intervention and occupation (taghalub), with the excuse of spreading 
civilization, ending barbarism and the spreading of European learning 
among the Easterners.  With this hidden political agenda it entered many 
Indian kingdoms, and imperially controls much of the coast of Asia and 
Africa and has colonized Islands in the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, and 
its political agenda spread until it entered Egypt…(May 23, 1893)112
 
Having entered Egypt nominally to support the Khedive and to create a modern ordered 
government, al-Nadim claimed that they initially enjoyed the support of the Egyptians.  
In the last analysis, however, having fallen prey to the lies of outsiders (the same Syrians 
he had attacked previously) whom they had favored over the Egyptian, the British had 
fostered Egyptian hatred: “If England would calculate the affection of the Egyptians 
before those rented ones (Ujara) had opened their journals, and their rejection of it after 
they opened it, it would notice that they had lost greatly and that those rented ones count 
against her rather than for her.”113
Whether for his continued attacks on the Levantines and other foreign elements 
that were promoted for service by the British in the Egyptian government, or for his 
occasional attacks on the British themselves, it became expedient for the Khedive to 
banish al-Nadim once again.  Thus, on June 13, 1893 al-Ustadh published its last issue. 
The decision to banish him seems to have been a sudden one, for al-Nadim himself had 
vehemently denied in previous issues that he was to be banished.  Indeed he had blamed 
those very same “hired ones” for having circulated these baseless rumors.  The only 
indication that something was seriously amiss came in a “Thanks and Salutation” letter to 
his subscribers written in the last issue.  This letter actually went well beyond just 
expressing his thanks and carried an explanation as to whom, and what, he believed were 
behind his newest banishment:  
 
                                                 
112 Ibid., pp. 933-934 
113 Ibid., pp. 935-936 
 58
It did not please certain western persons to see the awakening of the 
Easterner and his willingness to compete with Europeans and emulate 
their free deeds and words, and they saw this as harmful to their personal 
plans. Knowing that al-Ustadh was among the leading journals advising 
ways of reform and success, they incited some English journals in Egypt 
and in England, like the Gazette, and Progres, and The Times, and the 
Daily News, and the Muqatam, against al-Ustadh in an eruption of 
enmity… 
 
The Muqatam was the only one among these papers published in Arabic.  It was owned 
and edited by two brothers of Syrian descent with very close ties to the British Agency.  
In fact whether it received a financial subsidy from the British Government was the 
subject of several unanswered inquiries in the House of Commons. 
 
…They hurled false and baseless accusation of religious intolerance 
against it, and they assaulted it with accusations that it hated the deeds of 
all Europeans, and that it denigrated those who emulated them (the 
Europeans) seeking to incite peoples against them…It is well known that 
people differ in their customs…and warning an Easterner that he has 
customs that he should preserve, does not mean that it is defaming 
Europeans and inciting people to hatred of their deeds.  But the corrupter 
will lie to achieve his ends, so they falsely said that the editor (of al-
Ustadh) was an incendiary revolutionary, despite the fact that he was 
dedicated to calmn and composure and called…and never incited anyone, 
other than those vengeful journals (that is). Let people know that their 
antagonism is for personal ends. 
 
All that remained was to thank those who had come to his defense: 
 
…. Most of the Arabic journals in Egypt, especially al-Muayyid, al-
Ahram, and al-Watan, and some of the French journals in Egypt and 
Europe… defended al-Ustadh, and revealed the evil intent of those 
[vengeful] journals, for which they deserve thanks and praise. 114   
 
He would then continue in his thanks naming the Khedive Abbas and Prime Minister 
Mustafa Riyad as well as the consuls of France and Russia for defending  al-Ustadh.  In a 
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sense al-Nadim’s downfall was indicative of the fate of any small player caught up in the 
games of the great powers. The journal was a worrisome irritant to the British, and hence 
a source of delight to their competitors.  The end result was the termination of al-Ustadh 
and the renewed banishment of Abdallah al-Nadim from Egypt. 
AL-LIWA (THE STANDARD) 
 
It was not long after the banishment of al-Nadim that one of the men he had 
inspired, Mustafa Kamil, launched his own journal in 1900.  Al-Liwa agitated for 
Egyptian nationalism, independence, and the departure of all foreign troops from Egypt.  
Kamil was a fiery orator who excelled in his chosen career, attracting many admirers and 
adherents.  His political speeches constantly featured in the journal when it was 
established and helped expand his audience and his influence.  Even speeches and 
interviews given to European audiences were often translated and transmitted in al-Liwa.  
Kamil was also a prolific letter writer who corresponded tirelessly in the attempt to 
promote the Egyptian nationalist cause.  These speeches, interviews, and letters are an 
excellent source for attempting to understand Kamil’s views of the British and their 
Empire.  Many of these fortunately were collected and published by his great admirer and 
biographer, Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i, in 1939.115  An even more comprehensive 
collection, Awraq Mustafa Kamil, was compiled and edited by Yuakym Rizq Murcus 
under the auspices of the Center for Modern Egyptian History and Documents.116  This 
collection encompassed a great many if not all of the known letters, speeches, and articles 
of Mustafa Kamil. 
Early on in his career Mustafa Kamil rested his hope of achieving Egyptian 
sovereignty on the French and, to a lesser degree, other European nations.  It was in the 
competition and fears existing between rival European nations that he believed Egypt’s 
salvation rested.  If the European nations were made to see the threat that a Great Britain 
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in possession of Egypt was to their own ambitions then they would apply pressure on it to 
withdraw.  In a letter published on September 15, 1896, the 14th anniversary of the 
English occupation of Egypt, in the French newspaper La Clair he wrote:  
 
Fourteen years have passed and a people that call themselves the world’s 
civilizers have oppressed Egypt! When a person reflects--- the English 
have spent all this time destroying Egypt’s prosperity (binyan), battling 
Europe and European civilization on the shores of the Nile, reducing the 
influence of France and its dignity, and oppressing the Egyptians, all this 
while the countries of Europe have done nothing about the occupation, ---
he would think that Europe had weakened and that it had no more 
presence today.  The 14th of September is not only a mourning memorial 
for Egypt… but also a memorial of shame and embarrassment for 
European politics and European civilization in general, and France’s 
specifically.”117
 
Written when Kamil was twenty-three years of age, it was typical of his brash and 
aggressive style.  It clearly revealed his aims and aspirations, and his constant attempts to 
push Europe and France especially to help oust Britain from Egypt. 
What becomes starkly apparent from the analysis of Kamil’s speeches, articles, 
and letters, is the great weight and trust he was putting in the power of international 
agreements and promises.  He was not naïvely assuming that the agreements alone were 
enough to move Britain, but it had to be pressured, cajoled, and even shamed into 
respecting them.  That goal could only be accomplished by addressing European public 
opinion and the British people actively and directly, for apathy in this as in all else, meant 
failure. Kamil believed strongly that only by challenging the British occupation and by 
actively promoting independence could anything be achieved.  The greatest enemies to 
the nationalist and the greatest allies to the British occupation were apathy and inactivity.  
Challenging the British was the only way to get their respect, however grudgingly.  The 
following excerpt from a speech delivered to a crowd in Alexandria demonstrates his 
assessment of British attitudes:  
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Do not think, brothers, that your work on behalf of our country will result 
in belittling and contempt from the English, no and then again no, for the 
Englishmen who has contempt for an Egyptian who loves his country and 
defends it honestly and loyally would be showing contempt for himself 
and his own kind, because he and his countrymen are among the first of 
Nations in working to advance their nation:  And, they are not content that 
it be happy internally only, but they try their utmost to expand [Britain’s] 
colonies and extracting the good from them for its (Britain’s) benefit and 
for no other” (Jan 1896).118  
 
Kamil was arguing that jealous nationalism was no stranger to the British, but rather the 
absence of it, and the absence of active challenge was what made them believe that a 
nation could be colonized.  He continued this promotion of activism by explaining to his 
audience:  
 
Will the sons of England agree to have their honor used as a lowly tool, to 
possess a free land and the enslavement of a free nation (umma)?  Would 
the British nation (umma), which is jealous for its position and its respect, 
let it be said that it has no honor or respect of its publicly given word and 
honest agreements?  I do not believe so, and I believe all of you (his 
audience) agree with me on this.119   
 
In a sense Kamil was seeking to address Europe as an equal, as a product of modern 
civilization, and to deny Europeans the chance to reduce him to something less than they 
were.  It must be recalled that both al-Afghani and al-Nadim, who stood as inspirations to 
Kamil, had bitterly remarked that the Europeans and especially the English, could do 
what they did because they had reduced the Muslims to being less than them, and not 
quite fellow humans.  Accomplishing this goal required the Egyptians to address Europe 
and England directly and not through intermediaries, however well intentioned.  
Egyptians had to make Europe as a whole aware that the time for guidance had passed: 
 
Advising the English nation as to what Egyptians expect of her, and what 
would do her honor, cannot happen unless there are Egyptians residing 
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and speaking out throughout Europe, of the truth of Egyptian affairs, and 
of Egypt’s hopes and desires, so that they may increase her supporters, and 
that Egypt will have champions among the European nations who will aid 
her when she asks the English nation to force its government to withdraw 
from Egypt.120   
 
It is interesting to note the distinction that Kamil drew between the “English” nation and 
the “English” government.  He had made a very useful distinction that his predecessors 
had failed to make.  The British government occupied Egypt, and the British nation was 
the one that needed to be awakened to the dishonor that their government brought upon it.  
Hence he could openly criticize the British government or its actions, yet praise what he 
saw admirable in the English nation, and more importantly address it directly.    This 
attitude was made even more abundantly clear when he says  
 
Should we say these things to the English nation and make it understand 
that we do not hate the English but hate the occupier since he occupies us, 
even had he been the closest person to us, because we are a civilized 
nation who wish to rule ourselves.121   
 
This theme was picked up again in a speech presented in French to a gathering of 
European residents in Alexandria on April 13, 1896.  Here, Kamil elaborated on a 
favorite theme of al-Nadim’s:  “Is our struggle against the English nation? No, our 
struggle is not against her, but against a group of individuals who work to perpetuate the 
occupation indefinitely, for personal reasons…”122 Kamil believed his struggle to be with 
a very specific imperial faction, and that made him even more eager to speak to the 
English nation directly. 
Kamil also firmly believed that the British occupation withheld proper education 
from Egyptians and impeded their efforts to establish a proper system of education as part 
of a studied imperial policy to foil Egyptian independence: 
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Nation advance and progress only with education and in the presence of 
great educated men, who are full of wisdom who can lead us and guide to 
what is good and elevating for the nation, so what have the occupiers done 
to that end?  Can they say that they have elevated the nation and produced 
men capable of dealing with its functions and guiding it.123   
 
Having posed the question as he did, he condemned the British no matter the answer.  
Had they not, as he claimed, created such a class of men, then they had obviously failed 
in their task to guide Egypt.  Had they succeeded, they would then be doubly damned 
since that would mean their guidance was no longer necessary and they were in breach of 
promise and agreement by continuing the occupation.   
This issue of higher education was of paramount importance to Mustafa Kamil 
and even drove a wedge between him and Saad Zaghlul, the man who some years after 
Kamil’s death became the very symbol of Egyptian nationalism.  When Lord Cromer 
appointed him Minister of Education, Zaghlul abandoned Kamil’s pet project of an 
Egyptian university, drawing his ire and condemnation.  This condemnation became even 
more scathing when Zaghlul delivered a laudatory farewell speech, on the occasion of 
Cromer’s final departure from Egypt.124  The appointment of Zaghlul and his 
abandonment of the University project confirmed Kamil in his opinion that Cromer 
sought to stifle Egyptian national goals by curtailing advanced education:  
 
People have now understood and perceived clearer than before, why Lord 
Cromer chose for the Ministry of Public Education, the son in law of the 
Prime Minister  (Mustafa Fahmy Pasha) who is loyal to [Cromer’s] ideas, 
and a servant to his policies. They have also understood why the English 
newspapers, and those biased in favor of the English, have thrown sand in 
our eyes, saying that this new minister is of the nationalist party. [In 
reality] his circumstances and his actions indicate his strong bias towards 
the Government… Those who used to respect the minister as a lawyer, are 
extremely sorrowful at his present (circumstances), and fear dreadfully for 
his future, and overwhelmingly prefer his past, for as a minister he is now 
standing on the edge a frightening and huge precipice.125  
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Kamil believed strongly that the British were out to undermine the nationalist movement.  
In this case they were seeking to confuse public opinion, or to placate it, by claiming to 
have appointed an Egyptian nationalist to this position that the nationalists had attached 
so much weight to, when in reality Zaghlul was their own man. 
On April 13, 1896, in a speech given in French to a mostly European audience, 
Mustafa Kamil accused the occupation and its minions of using fair and foul means to 
hinder his efforts on behalf of Egyptian sovereignty.  In this speech he outright accused 
the pro-British government of targeting his brother, Ali Fahmy Pasha, an officer in the 
Egyptian army, in order to pressure him to remain silent.  Ali Fahmy had been subjected 
to a court-martial on charges of desertion prior to the Sudan campaign, a charge denied 
by Fahmy and Mustafa.  Kamil saw this as a form of political persecution that he refused 
to bow to:  
 
Those who sought to defend the English occupation believed that they had 
stopped me forever. They believe (bi sathja) that the recent persecution 
(Ijhaf) of one of my brothers weakens my strength, reduces my will, and 
will decrease my struggle for the happiness of my country.  They have 
misjudged…nothing will stop me but death—from describing the 
tragedies of Egypt and its pains, and calling everywhere for its sacred 
rights, and demanding its freedom and independence.126   
 
The degree of British involvement with Ali Fahmy’s court-martial is difficult to 
determine, but the story reveals much of the anxieties felt by those who opposed the 
British.  Most of the government jobs to which many of the Egyptian middle class aspired 
to were in reality controlled by the British and not the Egyptians.  Through these means 
the occupation was able to reward those it deemed loyal with appointments, while 
excluding or firing from jobs those they judged troublesome.  Opposing the British then 
could very well mean the loss of one’s livelihood. 
With regard to the Sudan campaign, Kamil’s opposition was clear and 
unequivocal.  His opposition did not stem from any doubt that the Sudan belonged to 
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Egypt, but rather out of the belief that the Sudan campaign was a contrived and fabricated 
crisis created by the British to continue their occupation of Egypt.  In the same April 13 
speech Kamil remarked:  
 
The presence of the English at the head of our army is reason enough for 
its failure…. Their presence at the head of the army creates a deep chasm 
between us and the Sudanese, that will put off for a long time the 
reconciliation of those very same people who had once been the Khedive’s 
subjects.127  
 
 The Dongola campaign was designed in Kamil’s view with the evil intent of claiming 
that Egypt was insecure and hence the occupation remained necessary.  To support his 
views he cited the fifth clause of the Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 1887, which allowed the 
British to postpone their withdrawal from Egypt if it coincided with a threat to its 
security. From this clause he deduced: “The issue of the Sudan was calculated to create 
disturbances and to find new threats.  It is simply part of an English policy, that 
fabricated [those threats] in the first place.” He insisted that “if England were truly and 
honestly concerned with returning the Sudan to Egypt, then it would depart from Egypt 
that alone would assure the return of Sudan to Egypt.”128  As to the repeated British 
allusions to religious prejudice and intolerance, Kamil again dismissed those as nothing 
but attempts by the British to frighten Europe into acquiescing in support the British 
occupation.129  The reality was that Egypt’s progress had been hindered by Britain for its 
own interests.  Britain had also curtailed and reserved for its own profit the opportunities 
for business and trade in Egypt, that should have been available to all European nations.  
Kamil concluded his speech by proclaiming:  
 
Once we are rid of this administrative system set up by Great Britain for 
its own profit…then on that day the progress of Egypt will be great.  Once 
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our trade is rid of the ills that the English occupation causes, then golden 
horizons will be opened for you and us.130
 
Ever aware of the less than philanthropic nature of European interests in Egypt, Kamil 
reminded his European audience of the opportunities for profit from which the English 
occupation was excluding them.  The same could be said of Egyptian industries that 
according to Kamil could revive to the benefit of Egypt and its foreign residents once rid 
of the British occupation.  Whether by appealing to Europe’s conscience, Britain’s pride 
and self-esteem, or simply the collective greed of international merchantmen, Kamil 
sought to promote the cause of British withdrawal and Egyptian sovereignty.   
With the passage of time Kamil’s tone became even more acerbic and his 
characterization of the British and Europeans in general significantly harsher.  In a speech 
given in 1902 to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of Muhammad Ali’s rule over 
Egypt, there was no more questioning of Britain’s bad faith, but stark statements of its 
perfidy:  
 
…Western politics is based on breaking promises and treaties, and British 
civilization demands the sovereignty of nations through these means, and 
the British politician claim they did not present these promises and treaties 
except for the benefit of the simpleminded, and that the intelligent and 
wise do not believe in political promises…so the Egyptian has found out 
that England has conquered his country to put him in chains of humiliation 
and bondage and not to place on his head the crown of freedom and 
independence.131
 
The ultimate disappointment, though, occurred in 1904 with the signing of the Entente 
Cordial between France and Great Britain.  The manner in which France had acceded to 
the British position in Egypt had a tremendous impact on Kamil, who had rested much of 
his hope for Egyptian independence on the French support of British withdrawal.  This, 
however, did not end his agitation for independence, a goal he remained faithful to 
despite what appears to be a change of course on his part away from independence. 
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Unable to rely on French assistance to oust the British from Egypt, Kamil 
attempted to strengthen the nationalist hand by heavily promoting Pan-Islamism and 
Ottoman claims of suzerainty over Egypt.  The Entente Cordial had for all intents and 
purposes granted England carte blanche in Egypt.  Temporarily isolated, Kamil saw the 
Ottoman Empire and Pan-Islamism as a likely new sponsor for his cause.  The possible 
implication of admitting the sovereignty of an Ottoman Sultan over Egypt was a matter of 
much less importance than the reality of British occupation and control.  That he 
remained primarily a committed nationalist is certain and can be shown by his promotion 
of Parliamentary and Constitutional reforms in 1907.  The British actually attempted to 
capitalize on his support for these reforms to drive a wedge between him and the Sultan. 
The British did not have to worry about Kamil for much longer, as his health 
progressively deteriorated.  This speech given in Alexandria on October 22, 1907 was 
among the last he delivered prior to his death and is an evocative masterpiece from a 
purely literary standpoint:  
 
The English politicians thought that if they agreed with France over the 
issue of Egypt they could close the page on this dangerous issue, and all 
voices would be silenced and all hope would die…But they made a big 
mistake…They made a mistake because the isolation that we find 
ourselves in now has breathed into us a new spirit that has guided us to the 
truth that no people can rise without, and no nation can have life 
without…and that is that nations do not rise except on their own, and do 
not achieve their independence except by their own efforts…132   
 
On this point Kamil accepted no compromise.  There could be but one goal that any true 
nationalist could aim for and that was total independence.  Those who stood against this 
firm stance, or even advised compromise with the British, could only be described as 
enemies of nationalism:  
 
Sirs, none of you is ignorant of the fact that the nationalist movement has 
bothered those lovers of imperialism among the English, so they fought it 
in Danshawi and were disappointed. [They fought it] by increasing the 
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number of occupying troops and failed. [They fought it] by accusing 
(Egyptians) of religious intolerance and failed, making the world laugh 
long and hard, and they are now fighting us with traitors and 
deceivers…and they will fail…133
 
Egypt had to rely on the strength and the unity of its own sons and daughters to gain its 
independence; there could be no acquiescence in their fight for independence. Kamil 
urged Egyptians to be like the Irish and the Poles, who had shocked the entire world as 
even the least among them clung tenaciously to his nationality.134  He was scathing in his 
contempt for those he considered traitors and he could not believe that the English did not 
regard these tools with any less contempt:  
 
Anyone who believes that the English have any love for traitors is making 
a huge mistake, yes they use them for there own ends, but they revile them 
to the utmost, because a people that bring up their sons to believe that 
owning lands and those upon them, is a right of his kind, counts treason as 
the greatest of crimes.   
 
Once again Kamil returned to the theme that had occupied him since his youth: the need 
to stand up to Europe and England specifically, and to force them to acknowledge 
Egyptians as equals.  Those who did not work to that end were to be despised and 
condemned because “to be lax (to be forgiving) over the issue of nationalism is to murder 
it, and to put an end to it…”135
 This attitude put Kamil in direct conflict with the school of thought championed 
by Muhammad Abduh.  Collaboration could not be condoned nor forgiven, even should 
those collaborating truly have a nationalist vision.  He remarked, that those who believed 
that Great Britain would allow the reform efforts to reach a point when they could 
energize Islamic society and challenge its hegemony were truly deluded fools: 
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I confess that it never occurred to me even once that I would be capable of 
defeating the English policy with this kind of exceptional [political] talent. 
Despite all my undoubted enmity for the English I do not see them having 
been suddenly turned into small children that such a laughable ploy would 
succeed.136
 
To Kamil any reliance on British good intentions was beyond naïve, and simply 
foolhardy, for only “the simpleminded can believe that the English, despite wishing to 
remain in Egypt, are willing to give its people a [true] constitutional government.”137
AL-MANAR (THE LIGHT HOUSE) 
 
 Nowhere can we more clearly see the divisions within Egypt and the resulting 
differences in perception of the British occupation, than when contrasting Mustafa 
Kamil’s and Rashid Rida’s opinions.  Rida had become the first among Muhammad 
Abduh’s disciples.   Despite his earlier association with the clearly anti-British al-
Afghani and al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, Adbduh had arrived at an accommodation with the 
British occupation and established good relations with Cromer.  These good relations go 
someway in explaining his pupil’s perceptions of the British. Rida’s portrayals were 
tempered by his mentor’s influence and his assessment of Britain’s attitude to what he 
saw as true reform.   
 The organ through which Rashid Rida publicized his opinions was a weekly 
publication by the name of al-Manar.  This was launched in March of 1898 with the 
encouragement and help of Muhammad Adbuh. Al-Manar attempted to elaborate 
on and publicize Islamic reforms along the lines advocated by Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani and Abduh.  In effect though it was the post-exile conciliatory spirit of 
Muhammad Abduh that infused it rather than the more bellicose and rebellious 
spirit of al-Afghani.   
Rashid Rida was an avowed Islamic reformer and a believer in the Islamic Umma.  
Because of his attachment to the concept of true reform, he regarded the Ottoman 
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attempts at creating and promoting a pan-Islamic identity with great suspicion.  Due to 
his suspicion of the Ottoman Sultan’s enmity to true reform, Rida took what can only be 
described as a non-confrontational stance towards the British occupation of Egypt prior to 
1906, despite believing that the British harbored ill will towards Egyptians, Muslims, and 
Easterners in general. 
Rida in fact often remarked critically on Mustafa Kamil’s articles and speeches 
denouncing his brand of nationalism as thoughtless and reckless.  He also attacked Kamil 
for his strong French leanings as well as for his ties to the Khedive and the celebration his 
frequent celebration Muhammad Ali’s line. The very concept of nationalism as we shall 
come to see was anathema to Rida.  This goes some way in explaining his support for the 
British despite his strong Islamist leanings.  
 Rida regarded the ideas of nationalism as a western stratagem introduced into the 
East in order to weaken the Muslim peoples and then to assimilate Muslim lands: 
 
 The Franks know for certain that the strongest bond among Muslim is 
based on their religion…the Franks have greedy ambitions in the homes 
and lands of Islam so they have directed their attention to spreading those 
failed ideas among the notables of the Muslim religion…so that they 
would abandon this sacred bond…for they know, as we know, as do all 
the wise, that Muslims know no nationality but their religion…they have 
helped them rebel against the religious bonds…that cannot be replaced 
with those national bonds that they foolishly and stupidly exaggerate and 
inflate in importance and respect, for they are like those who demolish 
their house without having another habitat so that they have to live outside 
exposed to the elements..138  
 
The house of which Rida spoke was the Muslim Umma as represented by the Ottoman 
Empire with the Sultan, who had donned the mantle of Caliph, at its head.  Despite his 
disillusionment and distrust of the despotic sultans, the empire itself was a project that 
Rida thought well worth preserving. Nationalism was among the most dangerous of 
threats to the Ottoman Empire, and to the bonds that united the Umma.  To Rida, power 
rested not in the creation of modern states, but rather in the reaffirmation of the bonds of 
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Islamic fellowship and the adherence to the Caliphate, albeit a dramatically reformed 
Caliphate. 
 When remarking on the Boer war Rida warned his fellow Egyptians in the 
strongest terms:  
 
We say truly that although bitter to the tastes of Egyptians who suffer 
under the weight of the English presence, that it is to the benefit of the 
Ottoman Empire for the English nations to triumph after its setbacks, 
because its repeated humiliation would cause a change in Europe and an 
imbalance of power.  This would give the advantage to Russia, the natural 
enemy of the [Ottoman] Empire, which would not be satisfied unless it 
wiped the [Ottoman Empire’s] name off the map.139
   
Rida’s real goal was not the simple preservation of the status quo.  Rather he sought 
nothing less than the complete reform of the Empire and an introduction of some form of 
representative government and the end of despotic rule.  This should hardly be surprising 
given that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was the idol of his youth, and Muhammad Abduh the 
mentor of his adulthood.  We can see this clearly when he took the seemingly 
contradictory step of supporting the Anglo-Egyptian government in the Taba territorial 
dispute, against the Ottoman Empire: 
 
All wise Muslims prefer the British government over all other countries, 
and if they perceived that any of their lands were to come under a foreign 
Sultan, and they had a choice in the matter, they would choose Great 
Britain over any other. 
  
Had he stopped there, it could have been argued that his preference for Great Britain was 
for one European occupier over another, but his next statement reveals that not to be the 
case. 
 
The reformers among them [Muslims] believe that it is not possible to 
carry out any reform work that would resurrect Islam and benefit Muslims 
in any Muslim lands except in Egypt and India.  Furthermore there is no 
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freedom for Muslims to preach their Lord’s dictated book and the 
teachings of his chosen prophet except in those two lands.140
 
This concluding statement is of paramount importance for it reveals the reasons at the 
very heart of his early support for Great Britain.  The relative freedom of speech 
guaranteed early on by the British was crucial to the hoped-for spread of the reform 
movement.  Rida had traveled to Egypt to a great extent because of his conviction that 
reform efforts could not be freely carried out under direct Ottoman rule, and had he had 
any doubts those were quickly dispelled when the first issue of al-Manar was banned and 
the copies confiscated by the Ottoman authorities in Syria.  Rida was arbitrarily accused 
of having defamed the Sultan by the Ottoman authorities and only British protection 
allowed him to continue his work. As for the Egyptian Khedieval family, he expressed 
nothing short of derision and contempt for them, for they were in his view the worst 
example of despotic rule, without even the excuse of religious precedent to give them 
legitimacy or respect: 
 
…It is a mark of our departure from proper tradition in this age and these 
strange days that we hold celebrations in the houses of God almighty, 
memorializing princes and sultans and the tyrants among rulers 
   
With regard to the accomplishments of Muhammad Ali and his descendants, he was yet 
more scathing as he facetiously comments: 
 
To the credit of Muhammad Ali are listed three major accomplishments.  
Creating a government in Egypt that was a prelude to the entry of 
foreigners and its eventual conquest as well as warring with the Ottoman 
Empire and exposing its weakness to the wilderness (for all to see). 
 
To that end a Pan-Islamic movement promoted by the Sultan and initially supported by 
the Khedive could not but arouse suspicion on the part of Rida.  Indeed he shared the 
Sultan’s goal of a strong Umma and a powerful Islamic universality, yet it was to be a 
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reformed Umma with representative government and a constitutional Caliphate.  The 
return to Ottoman or Khedival despotism would have meant the end of the dream of 
reform, and hence the stagnation of Islamic society and its continued relegation to second 
class status.   
 This attitude of tolerance for the British occupation was limited though, and 
gradually eroded as the occupation persisted and reform was stifled.  The death of Abduh 
in 1905 was also to have an impact, for without Abduh’s moderating influence, Rida 
became more impatient with the pace of reform, and much more critical of the British.  
The end of the First World War found him heavily involved in anti-imperial agitation 
both in Syria and in Egypt.  Rida wrote a brief review of Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 
1922 for an episode of al-Manar.  It is important not so much for its historical content, 
but for its revisionist nature.  The British featured as the villains of the narrative, even 
from the very beginning of their occupation.   
THE DIARIES OF SAAD ZAGHLUL 
 
The primary sources for the analysis of Zaghlul are his recently published nine 
volume memoirs.  This is an impressive collection that spans the period between 1901 
and 1920.  The entries in these diaries are relatively consistent, especially given the long 
time period that they cover.   Yet, the level of detail he provided varied wildly from the 
extremely detailed and introspective entries to the vague and uninformative.  The amount 
of material though is more than sufficient to develop a very strong impression of Saad 
Zaghlul, the man and politician.  These diaries exonerate him of many of the failings that 
British and Egyptian critics have leveled against him, but in their honesty can also 
condemn him.  Zaghlul was no stranger to criticism and was well aware that history could 
prove a harsh judge.  To that end he noted in his journals, “Woe to me should any read 
these journals after I am gone.”  
While Rashid Rida for all intents and purposes became the intellectual heir to 
Muhammad Abduh, it was another of his protégés, Saad Zaghlul who attempted to carry 
out his political vision.  The previous chapter dealt with the history of Zaghlul’s 
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involvement with the British and his evolution to become what some have labeled “the 
father of his country.” What we will be doing here is gradually following his evolving 
perceptions of the British and their policies in Egypt.  This, as we shall see, is very 
closely tied to his perception of the state of the Egyptian nation and the Egyptian people.  
This sort of approach at times seemed to belittle the achievements of his own people and 
created serious rifts between him and the Nationalist Party.  This rift was further 
aggravated by a personal animosity between him and Mustafa Kamil.  This has become a 
serious issue in the historiography between Zaghlul’s detractors and defenders.  The 
allegations generally leveled at him, notably by the author Abd al-Khaliq Muhammad, 
were that he collaborated with the occupation to weaken indigenous Egyptian education 
reform movements and that he was complicit in the British campaign of intimidation and 
prosecution against the Nationalist Party and its partisans.  In attempting to refute any 
wrongdoing, or pettiness, on the part of Zaghlul in his dealings with the Nationalist Party 
while a government minister, Abd al-Atheem Ramadan, the noted Zaghlul scholar and 
editor of his memoirs, has attempted to demonstrate that Zaghlul’s actions, no matter 
what the appearances, were always judicious and in keeping with the letter of the law.  
His arguments are for the most part convincing and appear to be supported by the 
evidence he presents.  What remains in doubt was how much Zaghlul’s personal 
animosity towards the nationalist leading figures such as Mustafa Kamil and his 
successor Muhammad Farid drove him if not explicitly to facilitate, then to refrain from 
impeding their harassment by the government, through his ministries. 
 Zaghlul’s diaries indicate that he was well aware of the accusations leveled 
against him by the Nationalist Party, just as he was aware that the British had not wanted 
an independently minded or assertive minister of education when they appointed him.  In 
January and February of 1907 Zaghlul had his first confrontation with Dunlop the 
supervisor of education, over the promised raises for teachers.  It was Zaghlul’s belief 
that only by properly compensating the teachers could you hope to have them carry out 
their jobs or as he succinctly pointed out: “We must improve the situation of the 
employees, so that we might tempt them to work for us, and open the door of hope in 
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front of them.”141  Zaghlul was pointing out only as an Egyptian could the growing 
resentment of his countrymen over low wages and austerity measures, which could only 
lead to their further alienation and support of the Nationalist Party.  When this reasoning 
failed to sway Dunlop, Zaghlul retorted: 
 
Do not think that I was appointed here to sign everything placed before 
me, I am a man with opinions and a will, and any person who thinks 
otherwise is wrong.  If Lord Cromer appointed me to this job thinking 
otherwise, then he has made a great mistake.  I will have a care for nothing 
when it comes to what is just, and if justice is to be denied, then I will 
return to the practice of law…142
 
If the memoirs are to be believed, Zaghlul was clearly suspicious of British motives in 
appointing him minister of education and did not believe them to be beyond underhanded 
action.  In the end the argument was resolved to his satisfaction. However, that would not 
be his last confrontation with Dunlop or Cromer, as he would clash with them again when 
he continued trying to exert his authority and to introduce changes long sought by the 
Egyptian reformers.   
 Despite this incident Zaghlul was grateful to Cromer for his appointment and 
regarded his efforts in Egypt with some gratitude. This is made quite clear when one 
reads Zaghlul’s diary entries on Cromer:  “I am not thinking of myself but of my country 
and its good, for we shall lose with your departure something that cannot be 
compensated.”143  This comment was made despite the fact that Cromer’s last report on 
the state of Egypt was hardly complimentary to the Egyptians and upset even the very 
moderate among them.144  Zaghlul demonstrated his genuine appreciation of Cromer 
when he attended his farewell party and publicly praised him, knowing full well that he 
was opposing the will of his countrymen and injuring their sensibilities.145
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 The departure of Cromer and the arrival of Eldon Gorst to replace him as British 
Agent did not make Zaghlul’s position any easier.  On 10 January, 1908 he wrote: 
 
On the one hand, I feel that the English are not pleased because …. I 
oppose their desires, since I follow principles that might not match their 
goals.   
On the other, his highness (the Khedive) has no confidence in me, for I am 
a friend of Muhammad Abduh, whom he hated….146
 
Zaghlul’s was in fact in an untenable position.  He was deeply suspicious of the Khedive 
and the radical nationalists led by Mustafa Kamil, yet frustrated and disillusioned with 
the British administration, which he had gradually come to see as a hindrance to reform 
and independence, rather than a partner.  The following extract from his journal is 
particularly revealing of this increased frustration: 
 
The conversation switched to the topic of the English administration and 
the fact that it choose to appoint only those with feeble minds, (for it fears 
those who are intelligent), and thus [by its actions] weakens the forces of 
independence.147
 
Those in the English administration, who claimed that the Egyptians were not ready or 
capable to take over governance independently, had actively worked to make it so.  It was 
indeed their own policies that had kept those of intelligence and ability from truly 
participating in the administering of their own countries affairs. 
 To exacerbate matters, Zaghlul and many of his colleagues believed that the 
English administration in Egypt was not fully competent: 
 
We then spoke of the English and their inability (weakness) to administer 
[the country] and how they would issue orders to the (moudereen) regional 
administrators and later deny any personal responsibility for any 
[negative] consequences that occurred [from the execution of those 
orders]. 
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It seems that even among the reformers of the Muhammad Abduh school, who believed 
in collaboration towards independence, the departure of Lord Cromer in 1907 had 
allowed them to fully express their nationalist sentiments.  Without Lord Cromer at the 
helm they were now much more willing to voice their criticism of the English 
administration.  Even more significant was the nature of the criticism, and the accusations 
of incompetence leveled against the English. What we see emerging is a picture of an 
alien administration that was incapable or unwilling (or both) to communicate with the 
Egyptian populace. This was starkly demonstrated upon the death of Mustafa Kamil 
when students, despite orders form their headmasters, flooded the streets to participate in 
the burial procession.  These incidents occurred predominantly in schools with English 
headmasters, as the Egyptian students refused to heed their admonitions.148   
 Although Zaghlul’s remarks upon the character and accomplishments of Mustafa 
Kamil were mostly demeaning, and despite the fact that he was genuinely surprised and 
resentful of the level of popular support Kamil’s radical nationalist sentiments 
engendered, he was quick to take advantage of the situation.  He recognized this as a 
golden opportunity to advance his own more gradualist nationalist goals.  Given the 
inability of the English headmasters to control their students Zaghlul proposed increasing 
the number of Egyptian administrators in public schools.  The Egyptians nationalists, 
radical and moderate, had long believed that the control of their schools and education 
system was the first step towards true independence.  As he cleverly commented to 
Dunlop, there was no need for the English to feel slighted by this move, for it was not 
“due to their lack of qualifications” but rather in keeping with the government’s stated 
goal “of training nationalists, and making them understand that the government wants to 
turn their affairs over to them whenever possible.”149  As can be surmised from his earlier 
statements, Zaghlul no longer believed that the English administration had any intention 
of preparing the nationalists for self rule.  Nevertheless, he was perfectly willing to utilize 
any method at his disposal to wrest whatever concession the he could from them. 
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 Despite the few successes he managed to achieve, Zaghlul grew increasingly 
pessimistic over the cause of educational reform, the reform from which he believed true 
independence would spring.  In a conversation with a colleague in the ministry, Mustafa 
Pasha, he would note: 
 
We are in agreement that the awakening of learning will slumber in this 
period, for as long as both authorities (The Khedive and the British) are 
agreed on extinguishing it, they will likely sooner or later succeed in their 
efforts, to the great detriment of the nation. 150
  
As Gorst’s policy of reconciliation with Abbas Hilmy advanced, the trust of Zaghlul and 
the reformers in the goodwill of the British further dissipated. As he would acidly 
commented at one point, the British in Egypt seemed to lose no opportunity to foster 
divisions among the Egyptian elite. 
 
It occurs to me that he [Gorst] feels that the newspapers are opposing me, 
and that I am upset with them, and he then wished to expose me to the 
criticism of the nation, so that I may be weak in his hands [as in easily 
run].151  
 
It was becoming increasingly clear that Britain’s policy in Egypt was not predicated on 
reform and eventual independence, but rather on the maintenance of the status quo.  This 
again brings to mind Mustpha Kamil’s admonitions to the collaborator reformers that 
Britain would allow reform only so far, but never to a point when it could challenge 
British hegemony.   
Zaghlul returned to the theme of fostering divisions and creating tensions among 
Egyptians on many more occasions, yet never more significantly then upon the 
appointment of a Christian Copt, Boutrus Ghali, as Prime Minister (Rais al-Nuthar): 
“Boutrus is qualified, and I like him, but I fear this will not sit well with Muslims, and 
this is an underhanded policy on the governments (Gorst’s) part that has no honest 
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intent.”152  Zaghlul came to believe that it was the intent of the British to alienate the 
Khedive from his people by this appointment for, “the newspapers loyal to the occupation 
hint that the appointment of Boutrus was the Khedive’s decision, and make [themselves] 
blameless in it.”  He believed that this was intended to weaken the Khedive to such a 
great extent that he would have to place all his reliance on the British if he wished to 
maintain his throne.153  Although a harsh critic of the Khedive, Zaghlul greatly feared the 
concentration of even more power in the hands of the British. 
This deteriorating situation made Zaghlul consider resigning many times.  The 
first mention occurred in January of 1910.  Nevertheless he remained in the government 
until 31 March, 1912 (wazir al-Haqaniyya).  The turning point for Zaghlul was the 
appointment of Lord Kitchener to replace Gorst in 1911.  Despite his suspicions of 
Gorst’s intentions towards Egypt, Zaghlul had managed to build an acceptable working 
relationship with him, and due to his need for the income from his job, he had remained 
in the government.154  Not long after the appointment of Kitchener, however, Zaghlul 
found himself in an untenable situation.  Both Kitchener and the Khedive had agreed 
upon the appointment of one Husayn Muharam to the ministry of war (wakil Nitharat al-
harbiya).  Zaghlul refused to condone this appointment for he believed Muharam was a 
crook.155Since both Kitchener and the Khedive were insistent upon this appointment, and 
he was adamantly opposed, there remained nothing for him to do but resign.  Days prior 
to his resignation he had a conversation with Kitchener in which he recorded expressly 
being told: “The English government helps those who are loyal.”  Zaghlul responded: “I 
am (loyal), and if there is a fault with me it is my excessive honesty.  You might say I am 
dumb and harsh, but dishonest, never.”156 His position deteriorated even more when he 
refused to resign without cause, but insisted on writing an official letter of resignation in 
which he indicates that he resigned over a disagreement with the Khedive.  This greatly  
embarrassed and angered both the Khedive and Kitchener.  The first set his minions to 
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attack Zaghlul’s integrity in the Press, and the second denied him his pension, hence 
additionally exacerbating his financial situation.157Their dissatisfaction with Zaghlul 
lingered and he found himself unable to find another job with the government even after 
approaching Kitchener in an attempt to smooth things over.  Part of the problem as he 
saw it, was his hesitation to abase himself before either of these two men. In a very 
honest entry in his diaries he noted: 
 
I have studied the [possibility of placating] either the Khedive or 
Kitchener, and I have foreseen that attaching myself to either would have 
its evils; though the evil from the latter I judge greater.  The Khedive is 
primarily concerned with enriching himself, and is not concerned should 
others benefit or get hurt.  In the long run his actions might not affect the 
greater public good. He seeks personal gain in all things, but he gains but 
little by these means, and hence he causes little damage.  Kitchener, 
though, works to subjugate the entire nation by passing laws that destroy 
its rights and denigrates its hopes.  For that purpose I lean towards 
befriending the former over the latter.158
 
Kitchener in Zaghlul’s view was very much the despot, and unlike the Khedive a very 
potent one.  His power was all but absolute and “Said (the then Prime Minister), and all 
his colleagues [in the ministry] were in Kitchener’s hands, much like chess pieces, and 
they [the English] could find no one more obedient to their will.”159  Despite all the ill 
thoughts he harbored towards Kitchener, financial constraints drove him to approach the 
Agent and ask him to consider him for a post in the government.  He even went so far as 
to admit to Kitchener that he had made mistakes in the past, although as the dialogue 
unfurled Kitchener interrupted him, and thus we are left wondering what he meant 
exactly by “mistakes.’160Was his mistake in retiring early, or was it in not acceding 
immediately to Kitchener’s will?  This entry, and the manner in which it is interpreted, 
complicates our picture of Zaghlul considerably.   Reconciling the image of Zaghlul as a 
principled nationalist with an apology rendered to a “despot” casts some doubt as to the 
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quality of his character.  All of this, however, depends on the readers’ interpretation of 
the circumstances and the intent of the apology.  From the context, and the manner in 
which the whole incident was reported in the diary, it seems that Zaghlul was driven by 
his need for a job to approach Kitchener, so he left his apology intentionally vague.  His 
hope might have been to appease Kitchener with an apology while not categorically 
abandoning the grounds for his earlier opposition and resignation.  Ultimately though this 
led nowhere and by the end of October 1913, barely three weeks after  “the apology,” he 
was convinced that no good would come from the British, at least while Kitchener 
remained Consul-General.161  Despite what he thought were now great odds against him 
he decided to run for a seat in the Legislative Assembly, and to do so independently, 
seeking neither British nor the Khedive’s support.162   
 Circumstances worked to Zaghlul’s advantage and he appeared to be in a position 
to win in both the Cairo districts for which he nominated himself.  This drove both 
Kitchener and the Khedive to send envoys to him, each attempting to draw him to their 
side.  He remarked sarcastically to Mustafa Pasha, Kitchener’s Envoy: “I praise God for 
this situation I now find myself in, for both the parties that had agreed to drive me out of 
the government, are now seeking my friendship…. I assure you I will not be the 
Khedive’s man, nor the occupation’s, but the man of truth..”163Zaghlul decided to rely on 
neither power, and much as the British feared, it seemed he also arrived at some 
understanding with the Nationalist Party, now led by Mustafa Kamil’s brother Ali Bey 
Fahmy Kamil.  At this crucial juncture Zaghlul did not give the full details in his journal.  
He does though mention that Ali Bey’s younger brother, Sabri, visited him, and solicited 
a donation for the Mustafa Kamil school.  Saad mentioned that for the first time ever he 
contributed to the school and agreed to meet with Ali Bey.164The significance of this 
event cannot be overestimated.  Given the level of dislike he had harbored for Mustafa 
Kamil and his Nationalist Party, this apparent reconciliation indicates an entirely new 
phase in Zaghlul’s political life.  Kitchener in turn seemed to have been quite perturbed 
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that Zaghlul might become a member of the opposition, loyal to the Khedive or some 
other anti-British faction.  Zaghlul received another indirect message from Kitchener this 
time through Muhammad Ahmed, who reported to him more of the Commissioner’s 
concerns.  Zaghlul’s response was much the same as on the previous occasion: “I have no 
ties with the Khedive…but I am not the occupation’s man either, I am the man of the 
people.”165
 In the end Zaghlul won both the districts he ran in, Sayyida and Boulaq.  
Although he could only accept the seat from one of these districts this was a significant 
show of popular strength.  For the first time, he served his country as an elected, rather 
than appointed official.  Another indirect message arrived from Kitchener this time via 
Rushdi, who reported that Kitchener feared Zaghlul would take over leadership of the 
Nationalist Party, and if that occurred, he (Kitchener) would have to deport him from 
Egypt.166  This was the first time that Zaghlul was threatened with exile. 
 In his first meeting with Kitchener after the election, he reported being told that 
the Agent desired the Legislative Assembly to function properly for it was his creation. 
Kitchener added that he had gone against the wishes of his countrymen, and the opinions 
of such notables as Cromer and Gorst when creating the Assembly, for they had thought 
it too great a concession to the Egyptians.  Zaghlul responded that this was a strange 
thing indeed that “they think this a great matter, while we count it as nothing.”167
 Kitchener had developed a strong distrust of Zaghlul and continued to oppose his 
appointment to ministry positions even after his own departure to join the war cabinet at 
the commencement of the First World War.  Indeed despite McMahon’s apparent 
acquiescence to Sultan Husayn’s desire to have Zaghlul placed in the ministry of Awqaf, 
word reached Zaghlul that Kitchener, had vetoed that appointment from London.168 
Zaghlul commented on this occasion that he was “ proud to have the enmity of a man 
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such as Kitchener…”169His relationship with McMahon during the war seemed to have 
been quite a bit friendlier, since he described him as a man of intelligence and a friend.170   
The war years were difficult for Zaghlul, as the Legislative Assembly was 
suspended and he feared becoming redundant and forgotten.  Then in August 1915 the 
government began a series of arrests and to persecutions of all those who had opposed it, 
especially members of the Nationalist Party.  This situation and the seeming arbitrary 
arrests truly upset Zaghlul and created a rift between him and sultan Husayn.  Yet the 
blame in his opinion lay squarely at the feet of the English who “made Egypt a 
protectorate and did not give the nation a voice in the decision.  Then they expected the 
nation to applaud them! And they are angered whenever they see anything different!” 171  
Once again he was caught between what he perceived as a despotic sultan and a self-
deluded dictatorial occupation. 
 The departure of McMahon and his replacement by Sir Reginald Wingate made 
little overall impact on Zaghlul.   He did observe though that Wingate appeared at his 
reception in full military uniform and that the attendance was so great as to make him 
suspect that few had seen its like before.  Wingate himself was gracious and charming, 
especially as he knew many of those who came to receive him.  This hardly reassured 
Zaghlul who noted: “What I fear most for my country are these people and this sort of 
friendliness (al-inass).”172It was what hid behind the smiles and the uncertainties facing 
Egypt after the war that worried him deeply.  A dialogue he reported having with 
Wingate expressed these concerns: “At first you were occupiers, then you became 
protectors, and I do not what you will become next?”  Wingate sought to end this line of 
questioning by reiterating that Britain was “Egypt’s friend.”  Zaghlul’s rejoinder was 
both a statement of fact and an expression of frustration, “you are friends by force, and 
not by choice.”173  These feeling were exacerbated by Zaghlul’s observation that the 
government seemed determined to deny the Egyptians any say in the conduct of their 
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affairs.  The committees established to determine cotton prices, and to administer the 
purchase of provisions, had had no Egyptians on them, despite dealing with matters vital 
to Egyptian livelihoods.  To make matters worse these committee members were 
imported directly from England, visited Egypt but briefly, and failed to consult with any 
Egyptians. 
 These concerns for what was to come next were very much behind the decision by 
Zaghlul and some of his fellow Egyptian notables to consider forming a delegation, 
which they hoped could present Egypt’s demands for independence to the British 
government directly.  Those were the origins of the wafd, the Egyptian delegation sent to 
Paris, and what would later become the first Egyptian political party to control 
parliament.  These early discussions were carried out in November of 1918, and for the 
remainder of that year Zaghlul and his allies busied themselves collecting signatures of 
support on a referendum authorizing the wafd to negotiate on behalf of the Egyptian 
people.  The British military authority could hardly ignore these actions. Threats were 
issued to all the notables to refrain from signing the referendum, and orders were sent to 
the different regional administrators to seize those letters that had already been signed.174
   In fact Zaghlul writes that the Egyptian ministers had informed him in mid 
January 1919 that Wingate personally saw no reason to deny the wafd’s request to attend 
the Paris Peace Conference.  Wingate had assured the ministers that when he himself 
arrived in Paris, he would recommend to his government that the wafd be granted 
permission to attend.175  Zaghlul and his colleagues, however, were under no illusion as 
to their position with regard to the military authority.  They were fully aware that they 
were liable to be arrested at any time under the martial law provisions.  On 6 March, 
1919 they were summoned to the Savoy Hotel and categorically ordered by General 
Watson, commander of the British troops in Egypt, to desist from their actions or face 
stiff penalties.176  Two days later Zaghlul and his colleagues were arrested and 
transported to a military prison in Malta by the end of March.  The news that reached 
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them in Malta of the popular demonstrations in Egypt gave them heart and hope.  Though 
greatly displeased by any barbaric acts of violence, which he deemed counterproductive, 
Zaghlul commented:  
 
The imperialist party had thought that Egypt could be swallowed (taken) 
simply by banishing some of its sons, but they were mistaken in their 
belief.  The country demands its independence from one end to the other, 
and holds nothing but hatred for those who wish to consume her.177
 
Zaghluls’s release from Malta did not soften his attitude toward the British but rather 
sharpened his determination to gain his country’s independence.  The quotatation above 
marks the end of this narration, for no matter what future compromises he was forced to 
make this remained his enduring perception of the relationship between the British 
Empire and Egypt. 
 The initial appointment of Zaghlul to the government by Cromer had been an 
attempt to appease more moderate nationalist sentiment.  Zaghlul was seen as a person 
who possessed sufficient nationalist credentials to appease those nationalists, yet at the 
same time bent toward collaboration with the British administration.  As a matter of fact, 
Cromer saw Zaghlul at the time of his appointment as a possible antidote to Mustafa 
Kamil’s brand of radical nationalism.  This gamble seemed to have worked well while 
Mustafa Kamil remained alive and the standard barer of the nationalist cause, but upon 
his death he left a vacuum that Muhammad Farid his successor as leader of the 
Nationalist Party simply could not fill.  Saad Zaghlul after his alienation from the 




Even among many of those Egyptians who collaborated with the British, the 
desire for Egypt’s independence was never abandoned.  They might have believed in a 
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gradual progression towards that goal, but many still thought they would see marked 
advancement towards it in their own lifetime.  This was hardly in keeping with what the 
British had envisioned: indefinite British tutelage.  It is hardly surprising then that with 
time even the most accommodating and collaborative nationalists began to lose patience 
with the pace of political reform. Egyptian attitudes toward British occupation had 























Consul-Generals, Agents, and High Commissioners: 
A Special Breed 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the most prominent of the British 
administrators with whom rested the real power for the governance of Egypt from the 
period shortly after the occupation in 1882 through 1922.  This will be done through short 
biographical essays that will review various published biographies covering the lives of 
these individuals.  The essays will not break significant new ground, but rather attempt to 
make these figures known to those readers whose background is not in English imperial 
history.  This is absolutely necessary, as the next chapter will be dedicated to revealing 
these administrator’s perceptions of the reformers and nationalists active in Egypt during 
this period.178  The assumption here is that the reader can best understand how these 
characters formed their perceptions by better understanding their life and background.  
That assumption in turn rests on the belief that our background helps inform our 
perceptions, just as our perceptions govern our actions.  But, for the purpose of this 
project it is not sufficient to provide a descriptive biography of each administrator.   It is 
necessary to demonstrate exactly how the personal traits and experiences of each of these 
individuals affected the development of events in Egypt. 
The order of presentation will be chronological and relatively straightforward.  It 
begins with Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, since it was during his tenure as Consul-
General and Agent that any real consideration of a prompt British withdrawal from Egypt 
disappeared and the Anglo-Egyptian government took root. After Cromer both his 
successors to the post of Agent, Eldon Gorst and Horatio Herbert Kitchener will be 
presented in some detail.  Henry McMahon and Reginald Wingate the first two High 
Commissioners, will then follow.  This study concludes with Field Marshall Edmund 
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Henry Hynman, Viscount Allenby on whose watch the Egyptian wafd would rise to 
prominence through its demands for Egyptian independence. 
EVELYN BARING, LORD CROMER 
 
Evelyn Baring was born in June 1841 in Norfolk, not far from the town of 
Cromer.  The Barings were originally merchants of German descent and had migrated to 
England in 1717.179  In 1762 his grandfather founded a banking house, Baring Bros & 
Co., which became very successful and made the family quite wealthy.  Evelyn was the 
sixth child, born to his father from his second wife.  He was his father’s eleventh child.  
At the time of his birth his father was already quite advanced in age and died when 
Evelyn was only seven.  His mother, who was 30 years younger than her husband, 
expected her children to be independent from a very early age, and provided very little in 
the way of nurturing guidance.180  His earliest schooling was at home, then in a small 
school near Norwich that was apparently not of the highest quality.  From there he moved 
on to a preparatory school for the Royal Military College at Woolwich, and then on to 
Woolwich at the age of fourteen.181 At the age of seventeen he received his commission 
to the Royal Artillery and was stationed in Corfu.  This education in general seems hardly 
to have been on a par with what was expected of most upper class gentlemen.  Indeed it 
was sorely lacking, since “he had left Woolwich with no knowledge of the classics, with 
little more than a nodding acquaintance with French and German, and with a smattering 
only of mathematics.”182
 In 1861 Baring journeyed back to England, going part of the way through 
European Turkey.  What he found “wherever the Turk was supreme,” in the way of 
“squalor, desolation and the absence of almost every trace of civilization,” made him 
question seriously the wisdom of supporting the Turkish Empire.183These early 
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impressions seem to have stayed with him as he grew older and likely influenced his 
attitude towards the Turks and Turko-Egyptian elite in Egypt. 
 In 1862 he was granted a position on the staff of Sir Henry Storks, Lord High 
Commissioner of the Ionian Islands.  In Corfu he met and formed a mutual attachment 
with the lady who became his future wife.  This chance meeting changed the course of 
his life, as he was then driven by an ambition to succeed so as to make marriage 
possible.184  He and Ethel Errington had to wait almost fourteen years before they were in 
a position to get married.  This thought did not preclude his continued relationship with a 
mistress in Corfu, with whom he had a child in 1863.185
 Politically Baring was at that time a liberal and a leftist.  Hence, when England 
decided to cede Corfu to Greece in 1864, he was very much in support of this decision.  
This, though, left Sir Henry Storks as well as Baring temporarily without employment.  
He took this opportunity to travel to the United States, which was at the time still in the 
grips of its Civil War.  He visited the union frontline and observed some of the fighting 
first hand.  From there he traveled to Canada before returning to work, now in Malta, 
where Storks had been appointed Governor and Commander in Chief.  In Malta, Baring 
had his first taste of indigenous opposition to British rule, and this greatly moderated his 
liberal and leftist leanings.  He claimed that, “a few agitators who strutted on this 
miniature political stage represented very imperfectly the views and true interests of the 
mass of the population.”186  He long lived by those words.  Much of his later relations 
with the Egyptian nationalists were always colored by his belief, no matter what the 
reality, that they did not represent the mass of the population.  When Storks was asked to 
head a commission to Jamaica to investigate violent disturbances that had occurred on the 
island, Baring accompanied him. After the completion of that mission he received an 
appointment to the Staff College. 
 In 1869 he graduated from the staff college, and was assigned to the 
Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office.  He became involved in the 
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cause for reform of the British army until 1872.  That year Lord Northbrook, former 
Undersecretary of State for War, and Baring’s relative, accepted a position as Viceroy to 
India.  Baring took leave of the army in order to become Lord Northbrook’s private 
secretary.187  After four years in India, he returned to London and finally, thanks to his 
improved financial circumstances, married Ethel Errington.  Not long afterwards the 
thirty-six year old Baring, on the strength of his performance in India was offered a post 
on the Egyptian Commission for the Public Debt.188  Now a major, he resigned his 
commission and moved to Egypt with his new bride.  He almost immediately clashed 
with the Khedive Ismail over the setting up of a commission of inquiry into the state of 
Egyptian finances.  His refusal to condone Ismail’s behavior, a man whom Baring 
regarded as evil, led him to resign his post and return to England in 1879.189  Soon after 
Baring’s departure, Ismail was deposed by his suzerain the Ottoman Sultan and replaced 
by his son Tawfiq.  Salisbury then offered Cromer the post of Controller-General in 
Egypt with the princely salary of 4000 pounds per year.190  By May of 1880 Baring felt 
that the controllers had accomplished enough for him to be able to move on, and he 
accepted an offer from the new Indian Viceroy, the Marquees of Ripon, to act as the 
finance member on his council.  His colleagues in Egypt lamented heavily his loss.191
 His job in India was initially complicated by his inability to get along with Lord 
Ripon over the issue of a new taxation law. These initial difficulties gave way though to 
what became a firm friendship and good working relationship.  Due to the Suez Canal’s 
importance for British rule in India, when Britain decided to send troops to crush the 
Urabi revolt, the British government demanded that troops be sent from India at Indian 
expense.  Both Ripon and Baring objected strenuously, fearing the Government of India 
would then incur a budget deficit.192 In February of 1883 Ripon and Baring were 
blindsided by a huge outcry raised by the Anglo-Egyptian community, over a change in 
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the law allowing Indian magistrates the right to try Europeans in their courts.  Ripon 
refused to back down, and Baring commented as a result that “[t]he Ilbert affair has 
raised Ripon 100% in my estimation…He is firm and determined not to yield.”193This 
unyielding attitude to approaching opposition was evidenced throughout Baring’s Egypt 
career.  It allowed him to accomplish much, but it was also one of the root causes behind 
a great deal of the future Egyptian bitterness towards the British. 
 Shortly thereafter, in May of 1893, Cromer was offered the post of Consul 
General in Egypt.  The newly minted Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in Cairo in September of 
that same year.  His initial mandate was to straighten out Egyptian affairs so as to allow 
for the withdrawal of British troops.  These British promises of early withdrawal 
eventually became a running joke.  By 1891 “all the important administrations [were] 
subject to British influence…”194
Just as Baring, now made Lord Cromer, thought all was settled to his satisfaction 
the Khedive Tawfiq, a weak and complacent man, died unexpectedly.  This brought his 
young 17-year-old son Abbas Hilmy II to the throne.  The relationship between these two 
men remained antagonistic throughout Cromer’s tenure in Egypt.  As aptly noted in 
Roger Owen’s biography of Cromer, “any assertion of Egyptian independence was seen 
immediately as an effort to undermine [Cromer’s] own authority.”195 Cromer effectively 
weathered all challenges to his authority and forced Abbas to accede to his authority.  
This remained the case through 1907 and the end of Cromer’s tenure in Egypt.  He 
departed only reluctantly and left behind him an Egypt that had changed dramatically 
under his guidance.   
Cromer materially improved the existence of many of the Egyptian population 
and presided over a great expansion of the Egyptian economy.  His practice of strict 
economies finally brought the Egyptian budget under control and even produced a 
surplus by the 1890’s. He, also, did much to alleviate social injustice in Egypt by 
stamping down on slavery and ending the corvee labor, among other things. His 
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abolishment of the system of forced labor was of incalculable worth to the poorest of 
Egypt’s land-working peasants. He, also, opposed greater British and Egyptian 
involvement in the Sudan, since he saw such an involvement as an intolerable burden on 
Egypt’s budget.  Another major development under Cromer’s watch was the introduction 
and maintenance of press freedoms in Egypt.  These freedoms were maintained even after 
the growth of the anti-British nationalist publications.  This liberal attitude towards the 
press was preserved only at his insistence, for it was rapidly reversed under his 
successors. If for nothing other than his championship of the freedom of the press, 
Cromer should have earned a bit more than unequivocal demonization by the nationalist 
press. 
What Cromer failed in, however, was realizing the extent to which times and the 
people had changed.  His acknowledgment of such change when it came was often 
grudging as he aimed to preserve the status quo.  An entire generation had come to age 
during his tenure. This generation, especially those from the professional classes, had 
learned and absorbed many of the principles of European liberalism. Cromer’s despotic 
benevolence was anathema to them, as was his dismissal of their demands for greater 
participation in Egyptian governance.  A new class of nationalists, many of whom were 
educated in Europe, had emerged.  For them, the strident nationalism of the likes of 
Mustafa Kamil meant much more than Cromer’s accomplishments and his continued 
admonishments for patience.  Egypt and its people had imperfectly and unevenly 
advanced, but they had advanced, something that Cromer acknowledged only partially.  
This was certainly to the detriment of Britain’s future relationship with Egypt and sowed 
seeds of future unrest. 
SIR ELDON GORST 
 
For decades, Eldon Gorst had been Cromer’s right hand man in Egypt.  He was 
personally chosen by Cromer to succeed him upon his retirement in 1907, as His 
Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General in Egypt.  Gorst’s appointment came at the end of a 
 93
period that has been described as the heyday of British rule in Egypt.196In reality, along 
with inheriting a position that was invested with great prestige and power by his 
predecessor, Gorst inherited the festering resentments of the Egyptian intelligentsia.  To 
compound matters, the Danshawi incident of 1906 and its aftermath had sorely damaged 
Britain’s image and standing among the peasant, Fallaheen, class.  As a result of an 
altercation between a British hunting party and some Egyptian farmers, a British officer 
was struck on the head and subsequently died from sunstroke.  The punishments meted 
out to the farmers were so severe and shocking that much of the goodwill among the 
peasants towards the British administration evaporated.  The complaints of the Egyptian 
nationalists against British rule now had greater resonance than ever before.  Only with 
great self-delusion could the British now call their opponents and detractors in Egypt a 
minority. It was against this background of growing nationalist opposition that Gorst took 
over the administration of Egypt.  
 Eldon Gorst, it could be said, was born into the Colonial Office.  At the time of 
his birth in 1861 his father, John Eldon Gorst, a provincial gentleman from Lancashire, 
was serving a stint as colonial official among the Maoris of New Zealand.  Tragically, he 
began his life much as he ended it in the midst of strife between an indigenous population 
and the British Empire. In 1863 this was the Maori rebellion against the increasing 
encroachment of white settlers.  In 1911 the year of his death in office, it was in the midst 
of increasing Egyptian nationalist resentment and agitation against the British occupation. 
On the earlier occasion young Eldon Gorst and his family barely survived the turbulence. 
 Upon returning to England John Gorst was called to the bar in 1865 and became a 
successful barrister.197In 1866 he re-entered public life, this time as the Tory Member of 
Parliament from Cambridge.  His career within the Tory Party was extremely stormy 
filled with equal successes and failures. 
 Eldon began his education at local day schools, first in Kensington then in 
Worthing, then back to the private Kensington Grammar School. His early childhood was 
marred by a “pelvic abscess [that] was misdiagnosed as some sort of spinal 
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trouble.”198After various very painful and ineffective treatments he was fitted with an 
iron shield to protect his back.  To make matters worse from a young boy’s perspective, 
in 1875 at the age of fourteen he began attending Eton while still wearing the shield.  He 
was also very openly intelligent and ambitious which did not endear him to his upper 
class peers.  He remained somewhat isolated from his classmates throughout the time he 
was at Eton and those years “contributed to a sense of emotional distance that did not 
lessen as he grew older.”199  
 From Eton he went up to Cambridge.  He later noted that nothing he had learned 
in Cambridge would be of any practical use to him in his career, other than the practice of 
self-discipline and concentration.200After considering the home civil service, and 
mastering both German and French for those exams, and after contemplating the study of 
law, he moved away from both these possible career paths towards conservative politics.  
Briefly, he took a position as honorary secretary for National Union of Conservative 
Associations, but was not too pleased with the volatility of political life.201  At this point 
he began preparing for the Diplomatic Service examinations.  In the meantime, he took 
the position of secretary to Lord Randolph Churchill the new secretary of state for India, 
a very valuable learning experience.  In 1885 he took and passed his exams, earning a 
first.  Subsequently he was attached as an unpaid honorary clerk to the Eastern 
Department of the Foreign Office pending overseas appointment.  Gorst favored being 
appointed to the Consulate General in Egypt, induced by what he judged to be the good 
living conditions, adequate future compensation, and room for advancement.202He got his 
wish in the autumn of 1886 and was posted to Cairo. 
 The most pressing issue facing Egypt at that time was staving off bankruptcy, and 
a position working on Egyptian finance was an excellent venue for advancement.  For a 
person with as much ambition as Gorst the challenge of helping right Egyptian finances 
was a golden opportunity.  Hard work and dedication quickly brought him to the notice of 
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Baring who mentored and encouraged him.  He also took the time to begin learning 
Arabic and in this, by western accounts, he became well versed.  By 1890 his work on 
Egyptian finances had brought him recognition in both the public and the political arenas. 
 Always seeking further opportunities, Gorst, with the encouragement of Cromer, 
began submitting articles on Egypt to The Times.  By special arrangement his identity 
was kept secret by the newspaper, but he and other specially chosen correspondents 
worked to control the flow of information from Egypt to England.  Cromer sought to 
control all aspects of Egyptian affairs and Gorst became a valuable asset in this effort.   
This led Cromer to push for the appointment of Gorst as Financial Advisor to replace 
Milner, and he was ultimately successful in getting him appointed as under secretary of 
finance and controller of direct taxes.203  Now in control of the Egyptian government’s 
revenue collection, Gorst quickly repaid Cromer’s trust by increasing British control and 
choking off all dissent.  British control of Egypt was all but ironclad. 
 Gorst, though, differed slightly in style from Cromer in that he was willing to 
invest some time and effort in smoothing over relations with the Khedive and pashas of 
Egypt.  He by no means intended any lessening of British control over Egypt, but rather 
thought to use intelligently the Egyptians themselves as tools to further that control.  As 
he noted in 1893: 
 
My own view is that we ought to decline to incur the responsibility of 
recommending to the Khedive this or that minister.   I should leave the 
choice to him absolutely, at the same time warning him that he would be 
held more or less responsible for the selections, and that the only thing we 
must insist on would be that the man chosen would work cordially with us.  
If we took up this line, the Khedive I fancy would be pleased at the idea of 
appointing his own ministers, and at the same time his influence would be 
on the side of making them go along with us:- and as there is no doubt that 
if Effendim [Abbass] wishes it, any minister will get along with us.204
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This more subtle form of control was markedly different from both Cromer’s and 
Kitchener’s bullying methods.   Unfortunately, when Gorst finally had the chance to 
implement it, he was not afforded the time to see it carried out fully. Just as detrimental 
to that kind of plan was the almost insurmountable amount of bitterness towards the 
British that had accrued under Cromer’s iron handed policy. 
 The next step for Gorst came when Cromer moved to take control of the Egyptian 
interior ministry.  To his great advantage, Gorst coupled his burning ambition for success 
with a patient approach.  In 1894 he had supported the endorsement of Nubar pasha for 
the post of Prime Minister, and when Cromer was ready to effect changes to the interior 
ministry he was well prepared.  Utilizing his knowledge and familiarity with Nubar, he 
designed a reform plan for the Ministry of Interior agreeable to Cromer and the newly 
appointed Egyptian Prime Minister.  This landed him later in that same year the post of 
advisor to the interior ministry.205
 Now effectively in charge of the interior ministry Gorst initiated a series of 
changes, most notably the reform of the Egyptian police force.  This was removed from 
under the supervision of the army and made independent.  It was then subject to 
supervision by a new “English Inspectorate” at the ministry.  Gorst hoped to reform the 
Egyptian police and raise their standards by introducing an English Inspectorate.  The 
Inspectorate also provided oversight to counteract any potential abuse in the new force.206  
This, among other reforms, gained him a significant degree of public attention in Egypt, 
England and Europe in general.  His reputation as a competent and able administrator 
was significantly enhanced.207
 It is important to note that Gorst’s greatest difficulties were with his fellow 
Englishmen.  Gorst had been labeled an outsider even back in Eton and was never able to 
shed that characterization.  Even his outward appearance would differ from his fellow 
Englishmen as he took to wearing a Stambouli coat and Tarboush, symbols of Eastern 
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and Ottoman officialdom.208His difficult relationship with many of his fellow English 
officials proved quite detrimental to the execution of his later policies when appointed 
Consul-General.  In the interim, though, he gained a powerful enemy in the person of 
Kitchener whom he described, accurately, as both duplicitous and false.209  To make 
matters worse, his relationship with Cromer soured, leaving him in an awful position. 
 Once again, though, Gorst’s patience and competence paid off.  Restored to 
Cromer’s good graces, he was appointed financial advisor in 1898, a huge step forward.   
The appointment came along with some advice from Cromer, who indicated that it was 
time he settled down and also improved his image among other Anglo-Egyptian officials.  
His new prospects allowed him to fulfill the first requirement by marrying a well-
dowered young lady by the name of Evelyn Rudd.  This marriage by all accounts was not 
a great success.  Gorst also attempted to repair his relationship with his fellow officials, 
but it seems his success in that arena was also limited. 
 When circumstances opened the way for Anglo-French reconciliation in 1904 
Gorst played a prominent role in the negotiations over Egypt.  The Foreign Office was 
impressed enough to offer him a post as an assistant under secretary.  Gorst seized upon 
this golden opportunity and eagerly accepted this position.  By now recognized as one of 
England’s leading experts on Egypt he was well on his way to prominence.  In 1907 
Cromer’s seemingly unending tenure in Egypt finally came to an end, and Gorst returned 
to Egypt, having been handpicked and promoted by Cromer to succeed him as Consul-
General. 
 The situation in Egypt upon Gorst’s return was extremely unstable.  The 
Danshawi incident and its aftermath had soured relations with much of the Egyptian 
populace.   The Nationalist party had gained prominence and popular support rendering it 
a force to be reckoned with.  In addition to that Gorst commented that as Cromer’s 
position and his health had worsened his oversight had slackened.  Hence, he found 
Egypt in a state of “administrative anarchy.”210  This he moved quickly to repair and 
                                                 
208 Ibid., pp. 52, 53, 55 
209 Ibid., p. 56 
210 Ibid., p. 143 
 98
reform.  Armed with what appeared to be a British government mandate to liberalize the 
Egyptian political scene, and driven by his personal belief in the superiority of a more 
subtle approach Gorst set to work.  His first step was to improve relations with the 
Khedive Abbas Hilmy II, a former friend.  This quickly paid dividends, as Abbass 
distanced himself from the Nationalist Party and began earnestly working with Gorst.  He 
then encouraged the appointment of Butrus Ghali a Copt to the post of Prime Minister 
and the reappointment of Saad Zaghlul to the ministry of education.  Both appointments 
were intended to provide him with competent and collaborative administrators, who 
could at the same time weaken the Nationalist Party. 
 Gorst’s liberal experiment was hardly radical, as he resisted all calls for the 
creation of a constitutional government for Egypt, and much like Cromer, had absolutely 
no use for the nationalists.  Ultimately three factors derailed this experiment.  The first 
was the opposition of the Anglo-Egyptian officials to his reforms, and this has been 
greatly undervalued as a cause.  The second was the assassination of Butrus Ghali, which 
made compromise with Egyptian nationalist all but impossible.  The third was of course 
his own early death, which ruined any chances that the prior two causes could be 
rectified.  Toward the end Gorst grew extremely disillusioned with Egyptian officials in 
general.211He thought them men of little vision or understanding of self-sacrifice.  It 
seemed that much like his mentor, Cromer, Gorst regarded Egyptians as capable and 
praiseworthy only as long as they carried out British instructions. 
 Gorst’s character, his skills, and his experience presented England with probably 
its best opportunity to avoid the violent post-war transition.  Even had he lived, there 
would have been no guarantee of success since, many of the problems he needed to tackle 
seemed intractable; but with Kitchener as his successor there was no chance.  It must be 
stressed that Gorst’s intent was never really to loosen British control over Egypt, much 
less prepare Egypt for independence in the near future.  In that he did not differ from 
Cromer.  What he did realize, however, and what Cromer steadily downplyed was that 
nationalism had arrived in Egypt and was there to stay.  To that end he went about 
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finding ways to deal with the Egyptian nationalists, whether by co-opting them, 
weakening them or controlling them.  Under Gorst the method of ruling Egypt and the 
Egyptians was to change but certainly not the allocation of power.  It was a great 
testament to Gorst’s personal ability that he was indeed genuinely mourned by at least a 
number of prominent Egyptians, and that Abbas Hilmy II rushed to England to visit his 
“dear friend” on his deathbed. 
HORATIO HERBERT KITCHENER 
 
 Kitchener was born in 1850 in County Kerry, Ireland, where his father had, at a 
very advantageous price, purchased an estate bankrupted by the potato famine.  In Ireland 
the Kitcheners were part of an alien colonizing elite whose presence was made possible 
by the British dominance over Ireland. The Kitcheners were originally farmers from 
Hampshire and East Anglia, but Horatio’s grandfather had gained wealth in the tea trade 
and raised his branch of the family to gentility. His father, a career army officer, had 
recently retired since, military life had proved too rigorous on his wife’s health.   
 His father was a martinet, but a loving if undemonstrative parent.  He was a 
“disappointed and frustrated man,” having failed to reach any great rank in the army.212  
He would assuage this disappointment somewhat with his son’s great success, a success 
he attempted to help along.  For all his disappointment at being denied an army career he 
was a very successful estate manager, and improved the income and value of his Irish 
estate.  His new affluence did not alter many of his strongly held notions though, and one 
of those was a dislike for schools.  As a result his children were home schooled.  This 
resulted in some awkward gaps in their education and social skills, gaps they had to face 
when their mother’s health necessitated a move to Montreux in Switzerland.  Despite the 
change of climate she passed away shortly after the move.  His father remarried within 
two years and departed for New Zealand with his new wife, leaving the children behind 
at school in Montreux.  Whereas in Ireland the children had been an elite of sorts, in their 
new environment they were regarded as backward and provincial.  Kitchener worked 
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extremely hard at school as he attempted to address all his deficiencies, and acquired 
decent command of French and some German.  Socially, though, he remain on the 
fringes.  All Horatio’s efforts yielded dividends though as he passed the entrance exams 
and got accepted to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1868 and graduated in 
1870. 
 Upon graduation he joined his father, who was separated from his wife, in 
Brittany.  This was during the Franco-Prussian war and as an ambitious but as yet non-
commissioned young soldier he attached himself to an ambulance unit of the French 
Second Army.  He thus gained his first invaluable experience in real battle. His action, 
though, caused him some trouble as his commanders in England later took him to task 
severely for thoughtlessly jeopardizing England’s neutrality in the conflict.   His daring 
though was equally, if unofficially, praised by those very same commanders.  In any case 
this episode did not affect his commission and he was posted to the School of Military 
Engineering at Chatham.  He remained there until 1873, when he was assigned as ADC 
to Brigadier General George Greaves on a mission to observe Austrian army maneuvers.  
During this stint he improved his German in order to read the German military 
engineering manuals. 
 After all this excitement returning to England to serve at Aldershot was not to 
Kitchener’s liking and he managed to get seconded to special service in Palestine.  He 
joined a mission funded by the Palestine Exploration Fund that sought to map Palestine in 
an attempt to provide scientific evidence to support the biblical narrative.  This mission 
suited both his religious and professional inclinations.  The result was a map of Palestine 
for which he received considerable acclaim.  Based on his success in Palestine he was 
dispatched to survey Cyprus, newly acquired by Great Britain from the Ottoman Empire.  
It was during his posting in Cyprus that the Urabi revolt broke out in Egypt. 
 Despite his best efforts, and the advantage of some knowledge of Arabic acquired 
while in Palestine, Kitchener could not secure employment with the British forces 
dispatched to Egypt.   Determined to see action, he took a spectacular risk.  With a 
carelessness that would typify his early career, he took a week’s sick leave and 
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unbeknownst to his superiors joined the Mediterranean fleet.  On arrival he even 
persuaded the commander of the fleet to allow him to undertake a reconnaissance 
mission.  When his request for extended leave was denied, as he suspected it would be, 
Kitchener was conveniently absent. He reappeared only after the last scheduled ship to 
Cyprus had departed.  His act of insubordination allowed him to remain and witness the 
bombardment of Alexandria, but he was refused permission to go ashore with the troops.    
 Kitchener eventually managed to smooth things over with his superior in Cyprus 
and completed the survey work, but he was determined to return to Egypt where he 
believed he would find the best opportunity for advancement.  He received his desired 
appointment in 1883 and was made a major in the Egyptian army and promoted to 
Captain in the British Army.  He was given the task of training a new cavalry unit for the 
New Egyptian Army.  He excelled at his task despite lack of formal cavalry training but, 
not surprisingly, “ruthless and uncontrolled ambition made Kitchener unpopular in 
Cairo.”213  
 The disaster that struck Britain in the Sudan as a result of the Mahdi uprising 
presented Kitchener with yet another opportunity. Dispatched to the Sudan to carry out 
surveys of the roads and communications he managed to distinguish himself and enhance 
his military reputation.  He volunteered to continue working in the Sudan reconnoitering 
and reporting to Gordon on the disposition of the tribes of Suakin, Dangloa and 
Khartoum.  Gordon, who had been sent to evacuate Khartoum, was a hero in the eyes of 
Kitchnener and a man he sought to emulate.  Although they had never personally met 
they communicated regularly and Kitchener made enough of an impression on Gordon 
for him to write: “If Kitchener would take the place [Sudan] he would be the best man to 
put in as Governor-General.”214
 When a relief mission was finally dispatched to the Sudan, under Lord Wolsely, 
with whom Kitchener had clashed in his early days in Cyprus, he was assigned as the 
intelligence officer to that expedition.  The expedition failed in its task of relieving 
Gordon but Kitchener gained additional praise and prestige, including that of his 
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commander Lord Wolsely.  Now a confidante of Lord Wolsely they bitterly complained 
to each other over what they saw as Gladstone’s betrayal of Gordon in delaying to send 
aid.  More important to Kitchener than his commander’s praise though was the last letter 
written to him by Gordon that stated:  “If you would take up the post of Governor 
General …it would be well for the people, and you have no difficulty you can’t 
master.”215  This belief in their own self-worth and the righteousness of their actions 
marked both these men.  Useful as this might be in times of crisis, when combined with a 
rigidity of perception, it made such men incapable of dealing peacefully with determined 
political opposition.  
 Now something of a popular hero in England, Kitchener in 1886 was made in 
1886 Governor General of the Eastern Sudan and the Red Sea Littoral and given the rank 
of Colonel.    The Governor Generalship was no more than a glorified title, since the 
British only retained a small foothold in the Sudan.  This placement though gave 
Kitchener the opportunity to continue to confront the enemy, much to the discomfort of 
the politicians in Egypt and England who wished no further entanglements in the Sudan.  
During one such confrontation Kitchener was seriously injured, adding yet another 
chapter to his growing legend.  In 1888 he had gained enough stature that he was made 
Adjutant General of the Egyptian Army.  Despite this wave of acclaim, steadier heads 
such as Cromer remained cautious about him: “Kitchener possesses many good qualities 
but he is headstrong and wanting in Judgment,” additionally he followed a policy that 
would win him “the maximum amount of glory.”216In that respect Kitchener associated 
his own desires with what was correct action. This assessment by Cromer did not harm 
Kitchener’s prospects and he was made Sirdar of the Egyptian Army in 1892.  Having 
incurred widespread resentment for his rapid rise, he was determined to succeed and dealt 
ruthlessly with anyone who opposed him or failed to meet his expectations.217
 As Sirdar of the Egyptian Army he oversaw between 1896 and 1899 the re-
conquest of the Sudan.  This was completed at the battle of Omduran.  For this victory 
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and the conquest he was granted a peerage and the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan. 
His governing style was personal and autocratic, and although quite ambitious on paper 
his accomplishments in the postwar period were relatively few.  It was left to Reginald 
Wingate, his second in command, who succeeded him as Governor-General, to arrange 
for the proper administration and improvement of the Sudan. 
 Kitchener left the Sudan in 1900 to go to South Africa where war had broken out 
with the Boers.  He acted as Chief of Staff to Lord Roberts the Commander in Chief of 
British forces in South Africa.  It was Kitchener who devised the strategy to destroy Boer 
resistance and end the war.  His promotion of extremely harsh measures to end the 
conflict stood in stark contrast to his willingness to deliver very reasonable terms to the 
defeated enemy.  That surrender finally came about in 1902.  Implacable and vicious to 
his enemies, Kitchener was apparently gracious and magnanimous in victory, at least to 
his European opponents.   
 At the beginning of the South Africa campaign Kitchener had consented, 
pending the end of the conflict, to take up the position of Commander in Chief of the 
Indian Army with an eye towards its reorganization.  This task was effectively completed 
in 1910 and he next pinned his hopes on being named Indian Viceroy.  Having failed in 
that endeavor, he focused his energies on succeeding the now gravely ill Sir Eldon Gorst 
as Consul-General in Egypt.  In 1911, days before the death of Gorst, he was named the 
new Consul-General.   
Kitchener will likely remain best known during his tenure as Consul-General of 
Egypt for passing the five-fedan law, an attempt to limit small farmer bankruptcies.  This 
applied to all farmers whose landholding measured five fedans (a unit of land 
measurement) or less.  He also reformed the legislative assembly, with an eye not to 
increasing Egyptian effective participation in government, but rather weakening all 
opposition to him.  Generally the three years that he remained in Egypt were relatively 
calm, other than supposed assassination plots by the radical nationalists.  This though was 
a calmness induced not by any talent on Kitchener’s part, but rather by the absence of any 
true nationalist figure after the death of Mustafa Kamil capable of marshalling broad 
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support.  The Nationalist Party founded by Kamil was divided, weak and incapable of 
adequately carrying on the fight.  In addition Gorst’s policy and his friendship with the 
Khedive created a division between the Khedive Abbas and the nationalists.  This 
division could not be healed quickly and the element of trust was now absent.  This lack 
of nationalist leadership was a blessing for Kitchener, but one he would not bequeath 
undisturbed to his successors.   
Kitchener immediately reversed Gorst’s policy of neutrality with regard to 
Egyptian internal affairs and supposedly the “change was immediately and immensely 
welcome[d].  People of all ranks and classes felt that they had once more direct access to 
supreme authority.”218  Ronald Storrs, the author of these lines, was Kitchener’s secretary 
and hence not the most impartial of judges. This policy essentially called for the direct 
intervention in disputes between the various Egyptian elites and the Khedive. This 
change of policy was very likely motivated not by genuine concern for the Egyptian 
individual (never Kitchener’s strong suit), but was due to his desire to aggrandize 
himself.  It might be even more accurate to say that he was motivated by the need 
constantly to compete and to win. In this case, competing against his old nemesis the 
khedive Abbas Hilmy II made winning even more desirable, especially as it had the 
added benefit of farther weakening the nationalist movement.  Kitchener, regardless of 
Storrs’ laudatory claim, was no king Solomon. Much more importantly though, 
Kitchener’s autocratic attitude, obsession with control, and the inability to deal with any 
form of dissent, completely alienated many Egyptians, including Saad Zaghlul.  
Kitchener was quite narrow-minded when it came to achieving whatever goals he set for 
himself.  He did not hesitate to run roughshod over any opposition, even if it had merit.  
Edward Cecil a one-time ADC to Kitchener, and a prominent Anglo-Egyptian official in 
his own right, remarked that should anyone wreck Kitchener’s plans, then he “would 
even [go] (whatever others might think) very far to remove such an obstacle.”219An 
assessment of Kitchener’s character made when Cecil had first worked with him paints a 
very unfaltering picture of the man: “He used to have little consideration for anyone, and 
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was cassant [curt] and rude.  He was inclined to bully his own entourage, as some men 
are rude to their wives.”220  Cecil later modified his view of Kitchener, excusing his 
earlier behavior as “deformed” by the stress of the military campaign, but the earlier 
assessment cannot be dismissed. If this was the treatment he subjected his fellow soldiers 
and Britons to, then one can only imagine his treatment of the Egyptians, especially the 
elite of whom he had a tremendously low opinion.  In holding this attitude towards the 
Egyptian elite Kitchener was not necessarily unique, but where others were subtler, his 
bullying nature caused great damage to Anglo-Egyptian relations.  Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in his treatment of Saad Zaghlul.  Kitchener managed to accomplish what 
all the anti-British Egyptian nationalists had failed to; he drove Zaghlul out of the 
government, and into the opposition.  The British had great opportunity to rue this event 
in 1919, when Zaghlul successfully rallied his countrymen to the cause of independence.  
SIR HENRY MCMAHON 
 
Whatever Henry McMahon’s natural abilities and previous accomplishments, his 
appointment to the position of Egypt’s Consul-General was very puzzling.  McMahon 
had spent his entire career in India and was relatively unfamiliar with Egypt and had no 
knowledge of the Arabic language.  That such an ill-equipped person was appointed as 
Egypt’s Consul-General, or what was now styled High Commissioner after the 
declaration of the British protectorate over Egypt, cannot help but elicit some 
puzzlement. 
 His early education was at Haileybury from which he proceeded to a crammer, 
Wren, in preparation for taking the India Civil Service exam.  Upon failing the ICS exam 
McMahon entered Sandhurst in 1881.  After Sandhurst he was appointed to the Kings 
Liverpool Regiment, which was then serving in India.  He spent very little time as an 
active soldier before joining the Indian Political Department in 1890.  McMahon 
remained in this department until he was unexpectedly appointed High Commissioner of 
Egypt.  Early on he gained a solid reputation for his work as a specialist demarcator, 
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having helped establish the borders between British India, China and Tibet.  He was 
responsible for drawing the borders between British India and Afghanistan as well as 
Afghanistan’s borders with Persia. Between 1905 and 1911 he was appointed the Agent 
to the Governor General of Baluchistan.  From 1911 until his transfer to Egypt he held 
the post of Foreign Secretary to Lord Hardinge the Viceroy of India.221Overall his record 
in the Department indicated that he was a man of some ability and accomplishment but it 
was hardly a record that would make him an immediate prospect for Egypt’s new High 
Commissioner. 
 The impetus behind the appointment of McMahon came from Kitchener, who had 
known him from India.  Kitchener upon becoming Secretary of State for War had 
attempted to continue running Egypt by proxy, and indeed to exact additional pay for his 
efforts.  Six months into the war though this situation could not continue and Kitchener 
settled on McMahon as a temporary replacement.  His appointment was indeed officially 
seen as temporary, as indicated by the following internal Foreign office minute: 
 
The reason why Sir H. McMahon is drawing only 6460 pounds instead of 
7600 pound is that Lord Kitchener on becoming S of S for War made it 
clear that this was only a temporary arrangement and that he remained de 
jure Agent and Consul General and would draw the same salary as if he 
were on leave.222
 
If regarded cynically it could be assumed that Kitchener sought to find a temporary 
replacement for himself whose chances of brilliant success were unlikely.  Hence, he 
chose McMahon, a person who would have little chance to replace him permanently.  
Whatever his motives were, the long wait before finding a replacement, was extremely 
detrimental to McMahon’s chances of success.  Egypt had already been declared a 
protectorate well before his arrival and was being governed under martial law.  It had 
taken on the aspect of an armed camp and operational staging ground, where the military 
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authority in reality superseded all other.  McMahon’s authority for all intents and 
purposes had been fragmented. 
 To make matters worse, other more qualified claimants to the post, such as 
Graham and Wingate had been passed over, leaving them quite bitter.  Both these men 
would actively denigrate McMahon.  In Egypt itself Lord Edward Cecil, the Financial 
Advisor became McMahon’s chief advisor, and in effect became the most powerful 
official in Egypt.223This was certainly not to McMahon’s advantage and gave him a 
reputation for weakness. 
 McMahon was also unable apparently to form any kind of congenial relationship 
with Sultan Husayn Kamil whom he treated with utter neglect.  The Sultan being quite 
friendly to the British and a favorite of Cromer’s was extremely displeased with this 
treatment and the lack of any considerable dialogue with the High Commissioner over the 
future of his country.  As for his relations with Egyptians in general McMahon was quite 
fortunate in that during his time in Egypt, the Egyptian nationalist movement was 
relatively dormant.   
McMahon’s dismissal when it came was quite abrupt, almost to the point of being 
discourteous, leading many to remark that he had been treated disgracefully.  Overall his 
tenure was too short and his authority too contested for him to leave any lasting imprint 
on the Egyptian psyche. What is of tremendous importance though, with regard to 
McMahon’s tenure was his inability to control internecine feuding and jockeying for 
position among the Anglo-Egyptian officials.  This, compounded by the military 
authorities intrusion into the Commissioner’s previously exclusive realm of authority, left 
McMahon’s successor in an extremely unenviable position.    
SIR FRANCIS REGINALD WINGATE 
 
 Born into a family with no wealth, influence, or connections Reginald Wingate 
had to climb his own way to the top.  He attended the Royal Military Academy, 
Woolwhich, and was then assigned to an artillery battalion first in India and then in 
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Aden.  By 1883 he was attached to the Egyptian army as an infantry officer and would 
from then on receive regular distinctions.  He served on the staff for several of the Sirdars 
in various military administrative capacities until finally being appointed Egyptian Army 
Director of Intelligence in 1887.  In 1889, while still Director of Intelligence he handled 
the civil administration of the Egypt-Sudan frontier district, at the behest to the Adjutant-
General.224He was involved in the 1896 Dangola Campaign and the Battle of Omdurman 
in 1898.  He also accompanied Kitchener to Fashoda after Omdurman, and it was at his 
urging that Kitchener raised the Egyptian rather than the British flag in face of the French 
expedition.225 This was a brilliant diplomatic gesture that possibly helped avoid a fight 
with French troops who would have been likely barred by their pride from withdrawing 
in the face of a blatant British advance.226 The following year he had the distinction of 
winning the final battle of the Sudan wars, as it was his flying column that cut off and 
surrounded the Khalifa, putting an end to the war.227For this he was awarded the title of 
Pasha by the Khedive and promoted to Adjutant general of the Egyptian army.  He 
returned to the Sudan that same year to succeed Kitchener as Governor-General and 
Sirdar.  His first major challenge was in the form of a mutiny by several of his Sudanese 
battalions. These battalions, which were officered by Egyptians, were still smarting from 
Kitchener’s austere economics and pay cuts.  Troubled also by rumors that they would be 
shipped to South Africa to fight the Boers, they seized munitions from the armory and 
mutinied. After publicly cashiering some of the Egyptian officers he demonstrated 
leniency to the rank and file.  He “approved a compromise whereby the windows of the 
armoury would be left open one night and under the cover of darkness, almost all the 
ammunition was returned.”228  Wingate showed both firmness and intelligence in dealing 
with the issue. As a result of this mutiny Wingate delivered a somewhat damning 
indictment of Kitchener’s leadership, for in his opinion it was attributable to “much 
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mismanagement of officers for sometime past,” and that it was “injudicious treatment to a 
great extent which gave rise to this trouble.”229  In 1913 he attained the rank of General, 
and in 1916 the post of General Officer Commanding in the Hijaz.  Wingate was from the 
outbreak of the First World War an active promoter of the program of Arab Revolt and of 
al Sharif Husayn. 
 As dissatisfaction grew with McMahon’s handling of Egypt, the British 
government made contact with Wingate about the possibility of becoming High 
Commissioner.  Wingate had actually been one of the prime causes of this dissatisfaction 
with McMahon, having continuously slighted him to London and the Foreign Office.  
Regardless of his political maneuverings, Wingate had to his credit administered Sudan 
well, and had had a lot of experience in Egypt.  He was in fact the antidote to McMahon. 
To that end Grey offered him the job of High Commissioner to Egypt. 
 In accepting this new posting Wingate was faced with numerous challenges.  The 
administration of Egypt was vastly larger and more complex than that he had headed in 
Sudan.  It was also, as previously noted, extremely dysfunctional and filled with 
competing factions.   The civil administration was also still subjugated to the needs of the 
military, which was now under the command of General Allenby.  Wingate could do little 
regarding the military needs but he moved quickly to try and control his administration.  
In this he was not particularly effective.  He had been very conscious prior to his arrival 
that the Financial Advisor, Edward Cecil, was a threat to his authority.   Although Cecil 
left Egypt, his rivalry with Wingate would have serious consequences for the latter.  In 
direct contrast to Wingate, Cecil came from a noble and very well connected family.  His 
uncle was the new Foreign Secretary in the Balfour government, and his brother Lord 
Robert Cecil, was Parliamentary Under Secretary to Balfour himself.230  Wingate now 
had enemies and detractors in high places. 
To exacerbate matters the British government had reneged on its promise not to 
make demands of Egypt, and was requiring financial assistance as well as men for the 
labor corps.  These developments, especially the forced labor corvee, created an 
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atmosphere of resentment among all classes of Egyptians.  This resentment was to be 
harnessed brilliantly by the new nationalist leadership. The situation also emboldened the 
nationalists to believe that their contribution to the British war effort must be rewarded by 
the grant of major political concessions.  No longer was political enfranchisement simply 
a demand but a right earned.  Yet Wingate was only partially aware of all these changes. 
As for Sultan Husayn Kamil, the war situation did not allow Wingate the 
opportunity to take advantage of their friendship to improve the political situation in 
Egypt.  He could give Sultan Kamil no concessions or promises with which to strengthen 
his position vis-a-vis the Egyptian nationalists.  Any opportunity to rectify the situation 
was lost permanently when Kamil died in 1917 and was succeeded despite Wingate’s 
objections, by his brother Ahmad Fuad.  With sultan Fuad, Wingate had abysmal 
relations.  For his part Sultan Fuad resented the tight noose of British control and formed 
common cause with the nationalists. 
Sultan Fuad immediately attempted to introduce changes to the cabinet by 
nominating to it Saad Zaghlul and Abd al Aziz Fahmy.  Wingate initially recommended 
to the British government the desirability of approving Zaghlul’s appointment as he 
thought it best not to alienate him.  By December of 1917 Wingate had retracted his 
support for this appointment, having gradually become seriously concerned with the 
potential post-war nationalist demands.  To the Sultan and Prime Minister Ruchdi’s 
requested changes the British government sent a categorical refusal.  This sort of 
response was exceedingly unfortunate, and could not have been better designed if the 
government’s intent was to push the Sultan and the nationalists closer together in 
opposition to the British.  Second thoughts about Zaghlul’s appointment and the manner 
in which the situation was handled came far too late.  Wingate could then only anticipate 
with dread the post war actions of the Egyptian nationalists now headed by Saad Zaghlul. 
When Zaghlul finally approached Wingate to inform him of the Egyptian intent to 
form a delegation to travel to London in order to present their case for independence, he 
responded quite moderately.  Although unable to give Zaghlul an official answer he 
recommended to the British government that the proposed deputation,  the wafd, be 
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allowed to carry out its plan.  He also made repeated requests, in vain, for the government 
to send him an outline of guidance about Egypt after the war.  No policy, though, seems 
to have existed and the government refused to allow the nationalist deputation permission 
to travel despite Wingate’s repeated recommendations to the contrary. 
Wingate was given no clear instructions, and his advice and assessment of the 
situation were repeatedly ignored.  Nevertheless, the British government blamed him for 
failing to control Egyptian nationalist sentiment.  He was most especially faulted for 
having received Zaghlul and the deputation in the first place.  This according to London 
had encouraged the nationalists in their ambition.  Blind, uncertain, and seemingly 
obtuse, the government in London chose to blame Wingate for the rising tide of 
nationalism, deluded in its belief that all that was required was a strong man to place the 
nationalist genie back in the bottle.  To that end when Wingate traveled to attend the 
Paris Peace Conference the British government took the opportunity to send General 
Allenby, now titled Supreme Commander in Chief and High Commissioner, to Egypt.  In 
Allenby London thought they had found their strong man. 
In the end nothing hurt Wingate and, through him that chances of finding some 
non-violent compromise to the situation in Egypt, more than his inability to command 
respect and confidence in London.  His naked ambition, combined with his undisguised 
lack of social refinement, indicative of his humble origins, destroyed his chances to form 
the necessary network of political support in London.  Without this network of 
supporters, and beset by wellborn and well-placed enemies such as the Cecils, Wingate 
was all but crippled.  This is not to say that Wingate could have averted the outbreak of 
violence in the best of circumstances, for he also had failed to accurately assess the full 
extent and scope of Egyptian nationalist feelings.    It must be acknowledged however 
that if Wingate fell somewhat short of the mark in his assessment of the situation, he was 





FIELD MARSHALL EDMUND HENRY HYNMAN, VISCOUNT ALLENBY 
 
Regarded as a failure with the 3rd Army on the Western Front Allenby was 
dispatched in 1917 to the Levant and placed in command of the Egyptian Expeditionary 
Force.  In the Levant he recorded great advances against the Ottoman Turks, culminating 
in the capture of Syria and Palestine.  In 1919 as dissatisfaction with Wingate was 
mounting in London, Allenby was chosen by the government to restore order in Egypt.  
Allenby prior to this had been the Military Administrator of Palestine.  This post was 
hardly an easy one, as the administrator was faced by Arab anger at the Balfour plan and 
Zionist agitation for its rapid implementation.231  This military administrative experience, 
however, was hardly sufficient to prepare him for what was to come. He was designated 
Special High Commissioner to Egypt and in him were vested all the military and civil 
powers.  Allenby, who possessed absolutely no civil administrative experience, was thus 
given all the tools for success.  This was in sharp contrast to Wingate, who while having 
possessed both military and civil experience had never been granted such powers.  By 
March 25, 1919, the date of Allenby’s arrival in Cairo, General Bulfin, his deputy 
commander, had managed by ruthless and forceful measures to restore a semblance of 
order to most parts of Egypt.  The situation was hardly ideal, though, and the country was 
relatively ungovernable.  The British Army’s repressive measures could at best be 
deemed a temporary solution.  Of this situation General Bulfin was well aware as he 
communicated to London the urgency of opening communications with the 
nationalists.232  Allenby, absolutely convinced of his ability to cow the Egyptians and to 
control the situation in Egypt, consented to listen to nationalist demands.  He also 
recommended to London that Zaghlul and his fellow prisoners be released and allowed to 
proceed to Europe.  London was horrified at this suggestion, which echoed Wingate’s 
earlier recommendations, believing that the Egyptians would take advantage of this 
appearance of “softness.”  In reality, despite all the second-guessing and potential 
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perceptions of his actions, Allenby took the only option open to him.  Barring the 
enforcement of military rule in the face of a hostile Egyptian population, and without any 
effective local collaborators, there was no choice other than dialogue with the 
nationalists. 
 Having given Allenby great authority and freedom of action, London was 
compelled to accept his recommendations, however unpalatable.233  Zaghlul and his 
delegation were thus released from Malta and allowed the freedom to travel to France.  
The release, however, was greeted by many Britons, especially those residing in Egypt as 
an act of weakness and a concession to Egyptian violent intimidation.  This faction 
believed that the Egyptians had to be taught a lesson and that general Bulfin had shown 
the way, by calming Egypt through the use of force.  Yet this faction ignored Bulfin’s 
own injunctions of the impracticability of expecting to hold a hostile Egypt without a 
massive influx of British troops. In any case, with Zaghlul out the country and the 
violence having abated, Allenby might have falsely believed that the popular support for 
the nationalists was not as strong as previously reported.  He thus urged the quick 
dispatch of the Milner mission, without success, so as to take advantage of Zaghlul’s 
absence. 
 When the Milner mission finally arrived in Egypt, it met with negligible success. 
Boycotted by the majority of Egyptians and hostilely received by the nationalists, it 
accomplished very little.  Later negotiations with Zaghlul and the wafd that had been 
invited to Britain for that purpose also met with failure.  In its final report the Milner 
Mission recommended that the Protectorate be abolished and that a negotiated treaty 
govern future relations between Egypt and Great Britain.  Allenby was in agreement of 
the Milner reports’ conclusions but like London had no intention of negotiating such a 
treaty with Zaghlul and the wafd.  He hoped instead to negotiate with a more pliant 
Egyptian government and colluded with the King Fuad to weaken the wafd, a course of 
action regarded with great apprehension by Lord Milner.234 Sultan Fuad then appointed 
and an old British collaborator Adly Pasha Yakan as the new Egyptian Prime Minister.  
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Adly had little time to consolidate his position for Saad Zaghlul returned to Egypt in 
March of 1920, now more obdurate than ever. Quickly denouncing Adly as a traitor 
Zaghlul effectively rallied his countrymen against the new Prime Minister. 
 In July it was decided to dispatch an Egyptian delegation headed by Adly to 
London, and containing members of the wafd.  Allenby accompanied this delegation and 
remained with it for three fruitless months.  It was his belief however that the British 
should immediately proclaim Egyptian independence and iron out the details later, a 
point of view rejected by his government.  Ultimately Allenby’s time was wasted and the 
treaty negotiations failed over issues concerning the Sudan, the placement of a British 
garrison, and the control of Egypt’s foreign affairs.  Adly, no matter how 
accommodating, could not, in the face of his countrymen’s opposition, agree to what 
would amount to only partial independence and the continued presence of alien troops on 
Egyptian soil.  Adly’s return to Egypt empty-handed led to his resignation and left the 
country once again without a government.  Allenby meanwhile continued to press his 
opinion that the Protectorate should be unilaterally abolished and independence granted 
Egypt without a treaty.  Now also impatient with Zaghlul he ordered him to desist from 
all political activity.  Upon Zaghlul’s refusal, Allenby had him deported in December 
1922.  The Egyptian reaction was predictable and violence broke out nationwide.  To this 
Allenby reacted with large numbers of troops in the streets.  Finally Allenby won his 
point and unilaterally declared Egypt’s independence.  The sultan Fuad was now restyled 
king Fuad and Sarwat Pasha formed a transitional government.  A commission was set up 
to create a constitution for Egypt.  In March a neutral government was formed headed by 
Yahya Ibrahim Pasha.  In that same month Zaghlul was unconditionally released and 
returned to Egypt in September.   
 The first elections for the new Parliament took place in January of 1924.  The 
wafd won 179 of 211 seats.  Zaghlul was as a result elected Prime Minister.  Negotiations 
though between Zaghlul and the British remained deadlocked.  On 19 November 1924 
the murder of Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army shattered that deadlock.  
Allenby blamed Zaghlul directly for the murder and subsequently backed by British 
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troops delivered the Prime Minister with a list of ultimatums.  The terms as drafted by 
Allenby went far beyond what the British Government had intended and certain clauses 
were clearly a form of petty vengeance.  Zaghlul, badly shaken by what had happened 
agreed to the majority of the demands.  This was not sufficient for Allenby, who 
threatened direct force should all his conditions not be met.  Zaghlul incapable of taking 
that final step, resigned.  Ahamad Ziwar Pasha succeeded Zaghlul and acceded to all 
Allenby’s conditions, an act of political suicide that rendered all pro-British elements in 
Egypt unpalatable to their own people.  London moderated the terms of the ultimatum in 
an attempt to rectify some of the damage that Allenby’s actions had caused, but this 
proved too little too late.  The next election, despite all its opponents’ efforts brought the 
Wafd Party another majority in parliament, if a slim one.  Allenby requested the 
prorogation of Parliament, a request that delighted King Fouad.  With Allenby firmly 
behind him the King dissolved parliament and prepared to rule autocratically.  Although 
instrumental in bringing about this monarchist coup, Allenby would not remain in Egypt 
long enough to see its outcome.  He left the country on June 14, 1925 having received the 
news of his removal in April through a Reuters news report rather than a personal 
communication. 
 It has been remarked by Allenby’s detractors that he was dispatched to Egypt to 
use his muscles, and instead he decided to use his brain.  This, they claim, was greatly to 
the detriment of the British position in Egypt. In reality, Allenby demonstrated a degree 
of understanding of the situation in 1919 that far surpassed that of his superiors.  It must 
be noted that General Bulfin, Allenby’s deputy commander, was in perfect agreement 
with his superior.  Bulfin had applied force in order to stabilize the initial situation, but he 
understood that long-term stability could only be brought about by negotiation.  Allenby 
had in fact done as well as could have been expected in that situation. The moderation (or 
what those who had dispatched him saw as weakness) that characterized Allenby’s early 
period as High Commissioner did not however outlive the murder of Sir Lee Stack.  The 
death of Stack, Allenby’s friend, elicited an understandable and very human reaction.  
Allenby immediately assigned the blame to Zaghlul.  He then sought redress by forcing 
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Zaghlul and his fellow nationalists to sign an agreement unpalatable to them, by the 
threat of violence to their persons. His handling of Zaghlul and the Egyptian nationalists 
subsequent to the murder, although seen as decisive and firm by some, notably many of 
the British in Egypt, was not that salutary for long-term Anglo-Egyptian relations.  
Although, when the matter is considered impartially, it could also be argued that 
Zaghlul’s fearful acquiescence to Allenby’s demands, only reinforced the belief held by 
some that force could solve intractable issues. If Allenby’s reactions to Stack’s murder 
were understandable at the time, his support of King Fuad’s naked power grab cannot be 
so easily excused.  With Allenby’s tacit approval, the king dissolved parliament, and 
basically restored personal rule.  These actions severely damaged Egyptian democratic 
development and reflect quite badly on Allenby’s legacy in Egypt.  In the final analysis, 
circumstances seemed to control the men rather than the other way around. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The interactions among a small number of individuals often dramatically affect 
the manner in which events unfold.  The intent here was to demonstrate just how much 
the British Agents and High Commissioners, who for all intents and purposes ruled 
Egypt, affected the course of Anglo-Egyptian relations.  This was in part an exposition of 
their character traits, their strengths and weaknesses, especially in the area of personal 
interactions.  This was done on the premise that these personal interactions were critical 
in the fostering of peace with the natives, or alternately creating the potential for great 
strife.  Kitchener’s clash with Zaghlul was a prime example. Personal interactions were 
also highly important within the British Administration in Egypt and the Foreign Office 
in General.  Here, Wingate’s tale is a perfect example of what happened to those who 
could not fit in and earned the enmity of too many of their colleagues.  All these 




Anglo-Egyptian and British Administrations: 
Perceptions and Reactions 
 
The decisions made by the British government in London were based on several 
factors.  The personal prejudices and opinions of the various officials in London were 
certainly a matter of consideration, but these were usually given substance by the reports 
submitted from the Agency in Cairo.  The reports, letters and comments from the Consul-
General and a host of other Anglo-Egyptian officials helped inform the decision makers 
on the courses of action available to them.  During Cromer’s tenure as Consul-General 
and Agent this was a relatively straightforward affair, as he was held in enough high 
esteem so as to dominate all other voices. Cromer was the primary source of information 
on Egypt.  Among his successors in that post, only Gorst and Kitchener retained some of 
that aura of authority. That authoritative voice was lost during the Agencies of 
McMahon, Wingate and Allenby, and the voices reaching London multiplied. As a result, 
decision makers sought those views that best pleased their own conceits and prejudices, 
with disastrous results.  Policymaking became reactive, shortsighted, and in many cases 
based on faulty information.  Towards the end of Wingate’s tenure in 1918, this became 
most egregious and costly.  The High Commissioner, as the Agent’s of the protectorate 
were termed, no longer stood as the authority of record on Egypt but rather as an 
authority.  The intent of this chapter is to examine carefully the information that was 
relayed to London concerning the various factions, figures, and events in Egypt, and to 
attempt to analyze how they shaped policy and events.  In effect it is an attempt to 
ascertain just how the perceptions of the men on the spot, when heeded, helped determine 
the course of Anglo-Egyptian affairs.  
 One of the striking aspects of all the diplomatic and consular correspondence is 
how well aware and sensitive the British diplomatic staffers worldwide were to any 
events that could affect the Empire.  They were fully cognizant of the global nature of 
British interests and the consulates in various countries would often route unsolicited but 
possibly relevant information through the Foreign or Colonial Office to each other.  In 
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this manner they were able to keep track of the subject peoples over whom they presided 
no matter where they traveled. In addition they were extremely sensitive to the 
international impact of events in the Empire and monitored those closely through the 
press and local informants.  This certainly held true in Egypt’s case, which due to the 
multiple foreign interests involved, would receive careful and considerable attention.  
The Foreign Office records reflect this attention and concern. 
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF JAMAL AL-DIN AL-AFGHANI 
 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had had past dealings with the British in India, but in the 
Egypt occupation era he first came to their attention on the 18 July, 1883.  A letter from 
the Indian Foreign Secretary was forwarded to His Majesty’s Secretary of Sate for 
Foreign Affairs in August, 1883 and gave “an account of one Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din who 
is at present conducting an anti-British periodical at Paris.”235  Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, 
whose proper full name was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, had attracted some attention at the 
Residency in Hyderabad, when his periodical first came to its notice.  The original letter 
was written by Syed Husein Bilgrami to Mr Cordery the Resident in Hyderabad, and 
forwarded to C. Grant (the Indian Foreign Secretary) contained the following: 
 
I think it is possible that the enclosed account of an ill affected individual, 
who is now carrying on his work in Paris, is worth forwarding to you, as it 
may be desirable at some point or other to be acquainted with his 
antecedents.236   
 
Although the author of the letter misidentified the name of the periodical he remarked 
that “its circulation might do harm in parts of India, e.g. Delhi.”   In a postscript he also 
indicated that “the knowledge of who this man is might be useful to Major Baring as it is 
to Egypt that he is now going.”237
                                                 




 Presented here are portions of that letter containing al-Afghani’s supposed 
antecedents and the Resident’s recommendations, as well as analysis and commentary: 
 
About 3 years ago a man came here [Hyderabad] from Egypt alleged that 
he had been turned out of the country by the orders of H.H. the new 
Khedive Tewfik Pasha, for preaching doctrines distasteful to the 
authorities.238
 
On this account the letter writer was indeed correct.  Prime Minister Mustafa Riaz Pasha 
ejected al-Afghani from Egypt in 1879, at the behest of the Khedive Tawfiq.  Mustafa 
Riaz had been the person originally to invite al-Afghani from Istanbul to Cairo in 1871, 
as he was attracted to his reform message.  Al-Afghani’s preaching’s against despotism 
however, raised the ire of Tawfiq and led to his banishment. 
 
I gathered from his conversation that he was a free thinker of the French 
type, and a socialist, and that he had been got rid of by the authorities in 
Egypt for preaching the doctrine of “liberte, fraternite, egalite, to the 
students and masses of the country. 
 
Al-Afghani and his followers would have understood what the writer referred to as 
socialism, as simply a reflection of the social mores of Islam.  This was also the case 
when discussing equality and fraternity that the reformers argued were inherent to Islam 
and its origins in Arab tribal society. 
 
I found him to be a well informed man for a Herati (he is a Herati by birth) 
though rather shallow in his acquirements.  He could “hold forth” in 
Persian and Arabic with great easiness (sic) and purity of idiom.  He 
talked a little French and he used to say that it was his purpose to go and 
make Paris his headquarters for some time in order to get justice out of the 
Khedive from the French. 
 
In addition to the listed languages it is reasonable to assume that he also had some 
knowledge of Urdu having spent a considerable time in India.  He might also have had 
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some knowledge of Turkish having resided in Istanbul.  Yet Arabic was the closest to a 
lingua franca in the Muslim world and therefore became his main medium of mass 
communication.  Al-Afghani’s command of several various languages, however, made 
him able to extend the reach of his message to many areas of the Muslim world where the 
British had a presence.  This made him even more troublesome to the British. 
 
I also understand from Colonel Clark that he was the author of a violently 
anti-English article in the periodical “habla” that used to be published in 
London.  H.E. the late minister gave him a couple of thousand rupees to 
enable him to leave the country; but I know that he did not leave the 
country but continued there a rather retired life in the city spending his 
time in teaching and philosophical discussions.   
 
It is quite plausible that these funds were provided not simply as a courtesy or out of 
friendship, but as a means to speed al-Afghani out of the country.  His presence in any 
location seemed perpetually to make local officials uncomfortable and eager to aid him 
on his way by whatever means they could. 
 
When however the ___(unintelligible word) in Egypt made a stir in the 
papers, the Sheikh Jamal –ud- Din (for such was his name) suddenly 
disappeared from Hyderabad and I was given the impression that he was 
gone to Burmah.  I felt quite sure however that he was gone to no such 
place and that either Cairo or Paris was his destination. 
 
Why Burma was advertised as a possible destination seems unclear except as an attempt 
at misdirection by al-Afghani.  This attempt at obfuscation would not be overly 
surprising, as he trusted the British very little. 
 
Some months ago I was startled by having an Arabic periodical sent me 
from Paris, and on opening found that it was no other than the ____  
(unintelligible word) philosopher of Hyderabad.  Since then I have 




It appears that al-Urwa al-Wuthqa managed rapidly to achieve some international 
circulation, sufficient at least to attract British attention in Paris and India. 
 
It is printed on a double sheet of paper, and within the limits of the four 
pages it contains nothing that is not anti-English.  The paper in my opinion 
is not to be allowed into India, although fortunately there are not many in 
the country who can read Arabic.  It is certainly even less desirable in 
Egypt where even the lower orders will be able to read it, of this however 
the authorities is Egypt are the best judges. 
 
The reputed freedom of press established by the British whether in Egypt or India seemed 
to have finite limits.   
 
I may add that to my knowledge the man is penniless, and must therefore 
have some kind of support in Paris.  Whether he is or is not countenanced 
by the French government it is not for me to say, perhaps the relations 
between France and England may account for his existence in Paris. 
 
Possible French collusion with and support for al-Afghani were quite worrisome to the 
British authorities. They feared that the French were actively engaged in rousing Indian 
and certainly Egyptian sentiment against the British presence. 
 After translating selections from the periodical, the report concluded with the 
following menacing assertion: “Other numbers of the paper contain many words written 
in cipher, which it is difficult for me to understand.  Perhaps they have no difficulty for 
the initiated in Egypt.”  Given the very rich and allegorical nature of the Arabic language, 
especially in its local variations, this could certainly have been the case.  Unfortunately 
we cannot ascertain the validity of this claim, given that such communications depended 
in many cases on the shared knowledge and experience of individuals and not on cipher 
books or formulas that can be decoded. 
 Monitoring of al-Afghani continued on the part of the British Consulate in Paris.  
The next communication dated September 11, 1883 contained details regarding his 
associates and analysis of their background and actions.  One Mr. James Sauna described 
as a “small Egyptian Jew” was mentioned as being involved with al-Afghani in the anti-
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English campaign.  Mr. Sauna according to the letter writer “is intelligent and writes 
well, but it is seldom that his affairs are prosperous and he frequently borrows money 
from my informant...” Despite this insider connection the British were left to speculate on 
the sources for the periodical’s funding and in this regard they were quite fanciful: 
 
I have not been able to discern where comes the money which supports the 
paper.  Is it not probable that as one of the principle benefits of which 
English influence will bring to Egypt is to free the peasant from the money 
lender, and to reduce the present usurious rate charged to the unfortunate 
fellah, the Jew money lender interest should be hostile to Great Britain.239
 
Not sufficiently satisfied with this initial scenario the letter writer elaborates farther on 
possible sources of funding: 
 
As the small money lenders draw their resources from the larger ones, and 
they again from certain Bankers in Paris and elsewhere, the inference is 
not unnatural that Mr. Sauna [and the periodical] is supported by what 
may be termed the unavowable financial interests of certain Egyptian Jews 
 
Having singled out both the French bankers and the Jewish financial interests as possible 
sources of funding for the anti-British periodical, the author felt content to conclude his 
letter.  This sort of speculation is illustrative of a relatively high degree of concern 
engendered by the British occupation of Egypt. 
 Another correspondence from Paris even went so far as to claim that the 
periodical was in fact a creation of these Jewish anti-British interests and that the “reason 
why Jamal al-Din has been taken into the affair is that through his friends he is expected 
to distribute the paper in India, and those who are working this press consider that the 
easiest way to increase the desire of England to leave Egypt is to stir up trouble in her 
Indian Provinces.”240 This letter is of particular importance for two reasons.  First, in that 
it denied al-Afghani the initiative in founding the periodical, and second in that it 
correctly ascertained at least part of al-Afghani’s hopes.  He, indeed, had hoped to place 
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enough pressure on the British in India, in order to force them to withdraw from Egypt.  
Al-Afghani recognized the ability of the English to utilize the great divisions in India to 
divide and rule.  This made the task of ousting them from India extremely difficult. Egypt 
on the other hand had a relatively homogeneous population, the vast majority of whom 
were Sunni Muslims.  This in al-Afghani’s view made the task of ejecting the British 
more attainable, but also more desirable and pressing.  Egypt unlike India was in his view 
a Muslim country, and moreover it was close to the very heart of Islam, and the gateway 
to the Hajj for millions of Muslims. 
 Ultimately al-Urwa al-Wuthqa was banned in both India and in Egypt, and 
although it failed in its attempt to expel the British from Egypt, it certainly attracted their 
attention and caused them concern.  It also inspired an entirely new generation of 
Muslims with its message of Islamic reform and empowerment, most notably Rashid 
Rida on whom this periodical had great impact.  The British were able to suppress the 
distribution of the periodical but not before it had broadcast some of its ideology.  One 
puzzling fact, however, requires mention.  Muhammad Abduh had joined al-Afghani in 
Paris and worked as the editor of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa. Yet, no mention of him was made 
in the British correspondence from that period.  That part of Abduh’s past seemed to have 
been unknown, forgotten or simply ignored by the British who would later embrace him.  
BRITISH PERCEPTION OF MUHAMMAD ABDUH 
 
The British acceptance of Abduh was made clear in 1899 when he was appointed 
Grand Mufti of Egypt.  Cromer, who had clashed with the former holder of this position 
over desired changes to the religious court system, welcomed Abduh’s appointment: 
 
I have the honour to report that the proposed changes to Cadi’s Court of 
Cairo…excited so much opposition among the Moslem population that it 
has been thought desirable not to insist on its immediate execution.241  
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Cromer obviously had no intention to allow this challenge to his authority to go 
uncontested for long, despite the temporary setback.  His plans were to wait only until 
passions were quieted and his opponents were weakened. 
 
A commission will be appointed in the course of the next winter to 
consider the subject. At the same time the Mufti, who is the authoritative 
exponent of Mohamedan religious law, and who has been the principle 
opponent of the proposed change has been removed from his place. 
 
The Mufti’s clash with Cromer apparently had negative consequences on his career.  His 
successor, Muhammad Abduh, was introduced and described by Cromer as a person who 
“is believed to be animated with liberal sentiments, and it is hoped that he will aid in the 
cause of liberal reform.” 
Cromer returned to this issue in his annual report for 1899 and elaborated further 
on the incident: 
 
A commission has therefore been appointed under the presidency of the 
Minister of Justice, to consider the whole question of the reform of the 
Mehkemehs.  At the same time, the Mufti whose tendencies are retrograde 
and who had introduced an unnecessary degree of violence into the 
discussions on this subject was removed from his place.242
 
Although Cromer admitted that this “matter was wholly for the Egyptians to decide for 
themselves,” and that “no European or general interest was involved,” a commission 
containing one Englishmen, a Mr Corbet, the Procureur-General was appointed.  Despite 
his seemingly detached approach, there was in reality nothing during Cromer’s Agency 
that was “wholly for the Egyptians to decide.”  In fact one would be very hard pressed to 
find anything in the public domain that Cromer did not seek to control directly or 
indirectly. 
 As for Muhammad Abduh, the new Mufti, Cromer praised him in his report as a 
man of “education and enlightenment.” Abduh for his part became a crucial proponent of 
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many of the reforms that Cromer desired.  That is not to say that Abduh subordinated his 
will to Cromer, but that for the period preceding his death, his desires ran parallel to 
Cromer’s in most cases.  Both men were also equally animated by a dislike of the 
khedive Abbas Hilmy II and the hope of reducing his influence wherever possible.  For 
Abduh this was from a desire to end despotic rule in his country.   As for Cromer, it could 
be justifiably argued that he believed Egypt needed but one despot, himself.   
 The advantages to the British of having a collaborative reformer in the position of 
Mufti in Egypt, cannot be underestimated.  This is doubly true in the case of Muhammad 
Abduh who had also been Sheikh al-Azhar.  Al-Azhar the ancient university mosque in 
Cairo was the preeminent religious institution for the Sunni Moslem world.  Students 
were attracted to it from all over the world, including British India, the majority of whose 
Muslims were Sunni. Fatwas, or religious rulings, on various subjects issued by Sheikh 
al-Azhar and the Mufti of Egypt would be taken quite seriously even as far as India.  The 
implications of that influence were well recognized by the British and a series of 
correspondence between Simla and Cairo in 1912 over a fatwa issued by Abduh years 
previously demonstrate this. 
 In its efforts to encourage deposits in the Egyptian Post Office Savings Bank the 
Anglo-Egyptian government was stymied by the Islamic law that forbade usury.  Interest 
yielding accounts were believed to be usurious and hence un-Islamic.  The government 
then “prevailed upon Muhmmad Abduh to issue a fetwa approving of the Savings Bank 
scheme in every respect.”243 The Anglo-Indian government, likely facing similar 
problems with the Muslim population of India, was made aware of this fetwa in 1912 as a 
result of an article in the Pioneer newspaper.  Realizing the importance of such a fetwa, 
and the respect with which the Grand Mufti of Egypt and sheikh al-Azhar was held 
throughout the Muslim world, a request was made from the Government of India, 
Department of Revenue and Agriculture, that “the necessary action may be taken to 
supply the government of India with a copy of the fetiva (fatwa) said therein to have been 
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issued by the Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohamed Abdou (Muhammad Abduh) conveying his 
approval of the Egyptian Post Office Savings Bank Scheme.”244
 The issuing of this fetwa was not an insignificant matter and did not simply 
involve a proclamation by the Grand Mufti. As in the case of any legal decision it 
required a full explanation and justification with reference to law and precedent.  These, 
however, were exactly the sorts of challenges to Islamic society that the reformers such 
as al-Afghani and Abduh wanted to tackle.  Not by any means a repudiation of Shari’ah 
or Sunna (law and proper tradition), but rather a proper reinterpretation of the law based 
on reason and logic.  This was in essence the reopening of the gate of ijtihad (the practice 
of interpreting Islamic jurisprudence), and the denial of the claim that modern society 
was incapable and less than competent to interpret Shari‘ah.  The needs of the Anglo-
Egyptian government and the goals of the Islamic reformers, in this instance and in many 
others, dovetailed perfectly.  With this cooperation British interests were served not only 
in Egypt but in India and other parts of the empire where Sunni Muslims were prevalent.  
It is hardly surprising then that Abduh as noted earlier earned the praise of Cromer and 
was perceived as a man “of education and enlightenment,” who “is believed to be 
animated with liberal sentiments.” 
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF ABDALLAH AL-NADIM: 
 
 Abdallah al-Nadim’s return to Egypt, and his resumption of his former activities 
as a publicist, did not pass without remark by the British.  A letter sent to The Times and 
published on March 31, 1893, by a supposed 20 year resident of Egypt, noted al-Nadim’s 
resumption of activity as a publisher with great alarm.  Given Cromer’s ties to The Times 
and his constant manipulation of the news flowing from Egypt, it makes a great deal of 
sense to suggest that this article likely reflected his opinion on the situation.  The article 
titled “Egypt 1881-1893, A PARALLEL” perceived much that was alarming in the state 
                                                 
244 From Department of Revenue and Agriculture to His Majesty’s Undersecretary of State for India, 20th of 
June, 1912, FO 371/1363 
 127
of Egyptian affairs and pointed to some “striking similarities” between the state of affairs 
in 1881 and 1893: 
 
In the early months of 1881 there was in Egypt a young and inexperienced 
Khedive under the dual control of England and France.  His Prime 
Minister Riaz Pasha, infatuated with his own conceit, was subsidizing the 
native Press in order to keep them faithful to his autocratic policy…One 
Nedim was preaching an anti-European crusade.245
 
The author of the article was drawing attention to the prominent role Abdallah al-Nadim 
had played as the publicist of the 1882 Urabi revolution.  Particularly interesting, if 
seriously flawed, was his use of the word “crusade” to describe al-Nadim’s activities.   
The article continues by claiming: 
 
To-day—almost exactly 12 years later—we have again a young 
inexperienced Khedive.  We have as premier the same autocratic Riaz 
disgusting the country with his cruelty and his nepotism, still subsidizing 
the native Press against English control…[and] we have again the same 
Nedim preaching the same crusade. 
 
Clearly, al-Nadim’s articles in al-Ustadh had been judged anti-British and of concern.  
The author of this article was also quite explicit in pointing to the Khedive Abbas and his 
chosen Prime Minister Riaz Pasha, as the sources of al-Ustadh’s funding. 
 This did not prove the last time that The Times mentioned Abdallah al-Nadim and 
lamented his ability to publish.  In the May 28 issue of that same year a brief piece from 
The Times Cairo correspondent contained the following information on the “Egyptian 
Native Press:” 
 
The fact that the rabid utterances of the native Press continue unchecked is 
causing anxiety, and surprise is felt that England, who is responsible for 
the maintenance of order in the country has not authoritatively intervened 
to stop this source of danger.  The worst offender is the Ustaz a paper 
started by Abdallah Nedim shortly after his pardon and return from 
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banishment, to which he was sentenced as one of the most violent of 
incendiary orators during Arabi’s revolt.246
 
According to The Times’ Egypt correspondent al-Nadim’s behavior was as fully 
reprehensible in 1893 as it had been in 1882 and was bound to cause damage to the 
British position in Egypt: 
 
He has been for months past fully as violent as formerly in preaching 
sedition, and the impunity which he enjoys naturally leads the natives to 
believe that he has the approval of the Khedive or his Highness’s 
Ministers in his gross attack upon Europeans and especially the British. 
 
 
This article all but explicitly accused the Khedive and his government of being behind al-
Ustadh’s attacks on the British occupation. 
 These concerns, as expressed by The Times, appear to have been communicated 
quite clearly to the Khedive and the Egyptian government, for on the very next day, May 
29, The Times quoted a Reuters report on a warning delivered to al-Ustadh: 
 
A warning is given tonight by the Official Journal to the native newspaper 
Ustaz, which has of late frequently made violent attacks on the policy of 
the British Government in Egypt.  The Official Journal remarks that the 
Ustaz is a scientific and literary review, but that it has since a certain time 
been in the habit of publishing political articles, a course which is foreign 
to the principles on which the it was started; and the Ministry of interior 
therefore invites the proprietor to refrain from publishing further articles 
on political questions.247
 
This mild mannered admonishment in the Official Journal hardly suited the British and 
The Times correspondent in Egypt wrote a scathing response to what he regarded as a 
wholly inadequate action: 
 
Riaz pasha has given the mildest of warnings to the Ustaz for its 
incendiary publications.  The occasion was a good one for the Government 
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to show strong disapproval of attempts to incite Moslem feelings against 
Christians, yet, although the editor of the Ustaz is the same man who in 
1882 did his utmost to help the Alexandria Massacre, the official warning 
merely says that the programme of his paper being literary and scientific, 
he is invited to abstain from politics.248
 
This British indignation was not without effect, and on June 13, al-Ustadh published its 
last edition.  Whatever support al-Nadim might have enjoyed from the Khedive was not 
sufficient, it seems, to shield him from the effects of British displeasure. A June 21 article 
in The Times made the following assessment of the situation: 
 
The Government have granted Abdullah Nedim the editor of the seditious 
newspaper Ustaz, who was recently ordered to leave the country, 400 
[pds] compensation and 25 [pds] monthly whilst he remains abroad…As 
he has not now been formally sentenced to exile, the award seems to be in 
the nature of a bribe to procure his silence.249
 
Whether The Times correspondent claimed that the Khedive had bribed al-Nadim to 
remain quiet concerning the palace’s possible support of al-Ustadh, or simply to no 
longer publish, is not perfectly clear in this instance.  Previous inferences though, by The 
Times’ correspondent, appear to indicate that he believed that al-Nadim was bribed in 
order to stop him from revealing the Khedive’s ties to an anti-British publication such as 
al-Ustadh.  Whatever the reasons behind this compensation, al-Nadim left Egypt never to 
return and would no longer trouble the British and their allies in Egypt. 
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF MUHAMMAD RASHID RIDA 
  
One of the ways that Muhammad Abduh spread his message of reform and 
modernism was through a periodical, al-Manar, published by his disciple Muhammad 
Rashid Rida.  This journal was launched in 1899 and was immediately brought to the 
attention of the British Administration by Sir Nicholas O’Conor, the British ambassador 
to the Sublime Port.  The Ottomans had lodged a complaint with the Ambassador 
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claiming that al-Manar had insulted the Sultan; and Sir Nicholas had communicated with 
the Foreign Office, and with Cromer directly, to ask them to ascertain the truth of the 
matter.  Cromer immediately launched an enquiry and communicated his finding to the 
Foreign Office and Sir Nicholas: 
 
“Al-Manar” which is published in Arabic and in the form of a pamphlet, 
does not deal with political questions.  It confines itself to the discussion 
of religious and educational matters, and notably urges the desirability of 
improving the education of the Sheikh class.  So far as I can gather it does 
not attack the Sultan.  Common report does not in any way associate the 
Khedive’s name with this newspaper. 
 
As long as Abduh remained alive, al-Manar focused primarily on issues of reform and 
maintained a mostly pro-British tome.  Even after Abduh’s death, Rida chose to maintain 
an accommodating tone when speaking of the British, despite his suspicions regarding 
their good intentions towards Muslims.250  This allowed the British to ignore al-Manar 
and Rida himself, as they were not yet regarded as troublesome.  
 This all changed after the outbreak of the First World War.  Rida recognized that 
the demise of the Ottoman Empire was likely and hence looked towards an Arab 
Caliphate as a possible successor.  He wished to preserve the bonds of Islamic 
universalism and thought a Caliphate necessary to that end.  Rida, though, distrusted 
British absolutely by this point, and there were certainly those among the British that 
reciprocated those feelings of distrust: 
 
Rashid Rida is not sitting on the fence he has been an activist anti-British 
anti-Christian force and never lets and opportunity slip to do us some 
harm.  I cannot understand Sir R.W.’s attitude towards this ruffian.251
 
A note was scribbled by Robert Cecil the Assistant Foreign Secretary on the bottom of 
this damning letter that “opinions vary about Rashid Rida” and the necessity of obtaining 
further information.  Wingate’s tolerance sprang from his desire to utilize Rida and al-
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Manar to widen support for the Arab Revolt sponsored by the British Government.  The 
material published in al-Manar during the war was for the most part neutral in tone, 
which was very likely because of the high degree of press censorship practiced by the 
British authorities.  After the relaxing of press censorship, al-Manar featured several 
articles dealing with the history of the war from Rida’s perspective.  They demonstrate a 
clear clash between British views regarding the post-war Middle East and Rida’s.  It can 
be confidently stated that as of the publication of the Sykes-Picot agreement dividing the 
Middle East between the Britain and France, Rida had become unabashedly anti-British, 
and in general anti-European. 
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF MUSTAFA KAMIL 
 
Outside of Muhammad Abduh’s circle a completely different sort of individual 
was rising to the fore in Egyptian public life.  This new sort of assertive Egyptian, 
exemplified by the nationalist Mustafa Kamil, was never kindly perceived by Cromer and 
the British government. In May 1902 after a meeting held at Alexandria on the occasion 
of the 100th anniversary of Muhammad Ali’s arrival in Egypt, Kamil, one of the key 
speakers was thus described: “Mustapha Bey Kamil is the ordinary type of semi-
Europeanized demagogue.  He is a man of the worst character, and on his own merits 
would exercise but little influence.” 252In a couple of sentences Cromer had assessed, and 
dismissed, one of Egypt’s most prominent nationalists and political orators.  He chose to 
attribute Kamil’s entire success solely to the backing the Khedive Abbas: 
 
He derives his importance wholly from the fact that he is encouraged by 
the Khedive…and that his newspaper ‘The Lewa” which is violently pan-
Islamic and Anglophobe is notoriously supported by the funds that the 
Khedive provides. 
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This dismissive assessment was made despite the fact that The Lewa was one of the most 
widely circulated newspapers of the period, and despite Kamil’s demonstrable ability and 
his popularity among the younger generation of Egyptians.  Later, as British concerns 
over pan-Islamism grew, Kamil’s importance as its most able proponent in Egypt also 
increased in their perception.  This is directly attributed to their understanding of the 
meaning of Pan-Islamism.  According to Cromer: 
 
It is generally held to mean a combination of the Moslems throughout the world 
to defy and resist the Christian Powers.  There can be no doubt that this is the 
fundamental notion which the Egyptian Pan-Islamists have in their mind. 
 
Cromer believed that the rising tide of Pan-Islamism was dangerous and of concern to all 
Europeans because it could “not improbably lead to sporadic outbreaks of Moslem 
fanaticism in different parts of the world.”  Of its overall success though, Cromer was 
relatively skeptical, for he greatly doubted “the possibility of Moslem cooperation and 
cohesion, when once it becomes a question of passing from words to deeds.”253  
It is important to note that even early on, alternate assessments of Kamil were also 
available to London.  A letter in French sent from the British embassy in Vienna in July 
1902 to London presented a more complimentary picture of Kamil, while still noting his 
anti-English proclivities: 
 
Mustafa Kmail Bey, [is the] owner and editor of the daily Arabic journal 
al-Liwa published in Cairo.  [He is] 28 to 33 yrs of age, very intelligent 
and active, and speaks excellent French. He publishes articles in French in 
a number of European journals (papers), in addition to brochures, against 
the English domination of Egypt. 254  
 
This characterization was obviously quite different form the one provided by Cromer and 
drew a picture of man who is “very intelligent and active” as well as a “fluent French 
speaker.” Even more importantly the letter went on to refute Cromer’s assertion that 
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Kamil was personally without any influence: “Moustafa Kamel jouit dans le monde 
Musulman de beaucoup de credit et de consideration.”  Kamil according to this letter 
writer is a man “who enjoys in the Muslim World a great deal of credit (prestige) and 
consideration.” 
 Mustafa Kamil relied heavily prior to 1904 on the hope that the French could be 
encouraged to pressure the British in Egypt and cause their withdrawal.  The entente 
cordial obviously destroyed these early hopes.  But the ever-resourceful Kamil now 
turned for support to the Germans, the Ottoman Empire’s new allies.  By 1905 his 
movements and actions were being monitored more closely than ever by the British.  Mr 
Findlay, Councilor of the British Embassy in Egypt, dispatched in September 1905 a 
memorandum written a month earlier (August 18), to London, copies of which were then 
forwarded to the British consulates in Constantinople and Berlin, and the India Office, 
informing them of Kamil’s movements and activities.  In this memorandum he indicated 
a break from the past for Kamil and a new and worrisome collaboration: “Mustapha 
Kamel first had relations with the French through Daloncle, by whom he was apparently 
paid for anti-British articles - but these relations have ceased.255This cessation of 
relations was certainly a direct result of the entente cordial as were Mustafa Kamil’s 
subsequent actions: 
 
He now has relations with the German Consulate which I can’t make out, 
and perhaps is known only to himself.  Baron Oppenheim visited him at 
his house several times, and Mustafa Kamel paid him also several visits 
during the last winter.256
 
It was quite clear that these were much more than simply social visits.  This fact was 
underscored by Kamil’s trip to Germany: 
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Mustafa Kamel is now in Europe and the last letters received from him 
were from Germany.  He had gone there with the hopes of interviewing 
the German Emperor.   
 
To that end he supposedly was armed with a letter of introduction from the German 
Consulate and the Turkish Commiserate in Egypt.  The network of informants set up by 
the British in Egypt seems to have been spectacular, at least in 1905, if it allowed them to 
determine all this information with any degree of accuracy. This kind of network must 
have been an invaluable tool in monitoring all political activity in Egypt.  As for Kamil’s 
old sponsor Abbas Hilmy:  
 
Mustafa Kamel is not at present a favourite of the Khedive with whom he 
quarreled…He is however the favorite of the Turkish government who 
look up to him as a preserver of the Sultan’s influence among the 
Mahomedans in Egypt. 
 
 By the time this memorandum was forwarded, Mr Findlay felt better able to comment on 
the German relationship with Mustafa Kamil since he reported: 
 
El Alem El Islami (The Muslim World: a Pan-Islamic publication) is 
edited by Mustapha Kamel and probably inspired by Baron Oppenheim of 
the German Agency.257
 
On this note someone, probably in London, appended the following comment: “This was 
an appreciable indicator of German methods.” This comment in itself is an even more 
appreciable indicator of rising British concern with German policy. 
 Kamil’s actions continued to attract British concern.  In December 1905 when the 
European powers pressured the Ottoman Sultan to allow the Macedonian reforms “to 
pass unnoticed” Cromer reported to the Marquis of Lansdowne that the leaders of the pan 
Islamic movement were quick to take advantage of the situation.  The pan Islamic 
journals according to Cromer had publicized the possibility of the Sultan calling on all his 
subjects to come to his aid.  “By far the most important of these papers is the “Lewa” 
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which is edited by Mustapha Kamel Pasha, [who] as a consistent, and unscrupulous 
opponent of the British policy in this country, is well known to your lordship.”  In what 
could only be described as an expression of very wishful thinking Cromer added: “The 
influence possessed by this man had been for some years steadily on the wane,” and then 
more realistically “but he has the reputation – more especially among the ignorant classes 
– of being an uncompromising supporter of the rights of the Caliphate, and this reputation 
has given considerable weight to his writings on the present occasion.”258
 It was another event, known as the Danshawi incident, that undeniably 
demonstrated Mustafa Kamil’s true standing among the populace, and especially the 
students.  An altercation between a British shooting party and some Egyptian peasants led 
to the accidental death of a British officer. The Egyptians involved in the altercation were 
subjected to brutal and excessive punishments that enraged the Egyptian public. It can be 
confidentially said that Kamil and his newspaper truly expressed the sentiment of Egypt 
and the Egyptians on that occasion.  The British, however, thought otherwise and the 
reports dispatched to London sought to lay the blame for the general Egyptian 
indignation primarily on Mustafa Kamil’s al-Liwa and other nationalist and pan-Islamic 
publications: 
 
The first violence of the press campaign is over.  It was lead by the 
“Lewa” (Mustapha Kamel)…It is my firm conviction there would have 
been no agitation to speak of over the Denshawi case if the leaders of the 
pan-Islamic movement had not hoped to gain the support of a party in the 
House of Commons.259
 
That Mustafa Kamil and the nationalists sought the support of the Labour Party in the 
House of Commons cannot have surprised anyone.  But that Mr Findlay the author of this 
report could have assumed that the Danshawi incident would have otherwise passed 
without significant outcry shows that the Agency was clearly getting out of touch with 
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Egyptian sentiment.  The British seemed unwilling to admit just how popular Mustfa 
Kamil was among a significant portion of the Egyptian population. 
 The British were absolutely correct, though, in claiming that Kamil took every 
possible advantage of the Danshawi incident, even traveling to London to face the lion in 
his den.  Whatever they wrote of him by this point, the British kept very close watch over 
him.  While on his way back to Egypt after publicizing the Danshawi incident in Europe, 
his return was anticipated by the following communication on the September 15, 1906 
from Mr. Findlay to London: 
 
I am told that Mustapha Kamel who is due to arrive here in about a week’s 
time, and is contemplating holding an open air meeting in Alexandria, and 
perhaps, also in Cairo.  If he were permitted to do this, there would be 
serious risk of a disturbance.260
 
The fear was that he would stoke the passions of the crowds, which might in turn threaten 
European lives or property.  Mustafa Kamil never called for or preached violence, but his 
oration was passionate and the British would say intentionally inflammatory. 
 Kamil continued to grow as an irritant for the British, especially when he 
launched an Anglo-French newspaper to trumpet his views.  From the very beginning of 
his tenure as Agent, Cromer had very skillfully manipulated the news coming out of 
Egypt, even going so far as to have several of his protégés anonymously placed on The 
Times payroll.  An endeavor such as the proposed Anglo-French newspaper was a direct 
challenge to Cromer’s control of the flow of information.  Cromer speculated in a letter to 
Lord Grey: 
 
I understand that the English portion of the “Egyptian Standard” is to be 
managed by an Irish Nationalist of considerable journalistic experience 
and polemical skill, but I have not yet learnt the gentleman’s name.261  
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One of the constant concerns expressed by the Colonial and Foreign offices was of an 
active and effective collaboration between Britain’s resentful subject peoples.  The 
connection of “The Standard” with an Irish nationalist could not have been too pleasing 
to Cromer.  His concern, though, was not too great since he was convinced that Mustafa 
Kamil and his fellow nationalists were deluding themselves: 
 
The selection has been dictated by the idea which, however erroneous, has 
laid firm hold of the mind of the Nationalists, that they have succeeded in 
enlisting the sympathy and active support of a powerful sector of the 
English public opinion, and that an editor of this kind will best know how 
to consolidate and farther excite the sentiments in question. 
 
The confidence Cromer exhibited of his nation’s support of his policy in Egypt 
was overwhelming.  This can be seen by his dismissal of the idea that the Egyptian 
nationalists had managed to gain any effective support in England.  Based on this 
confidence he fully indulged in his designs for Egypt, regardless of Egyptian nationalist 
concerns. Tragically, for long-term Anglo-Egyptian relations it meant that their 
resentment of the British would fester and grow. 
 Mustafa Kamil remained an irritant for Cromer and his successor Eldon Gorst, 
speaking out against British policy in Egypt at every opportunity.  His also founded one 
of the first Egyptian political parties since the British Occupation, al-Hizb al-Watani, (the 
Nationalist Party).  He would not however live to see an independent Egypt, dying from 
an illness in February 1908, barely two months after the foundation of the Nationalist 
Party.  Perhaps, for a nationalist who spent his entire short adult life in conflict with the 
British, no better praise could be delivered than the discourteous words of his enemies.  
Upon his death Ronald Storrs, at the time Gorst’s assistant, wrote home the following 
words: 
 
…Mustafa Kamel Pasha—Caramel Pasha the French called him—died 
this week and was accorded a slap up funeral.  Though he was a charlatan 
of the first order, discreditable in his private life and bakshished up to the 
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eyes by all parties, it was evident that he had a great hold over the town 
effendis.262
 
Though insulting to him in life and discourteous in death, the British did not forget him.  
Kamil and his movement had made a powerful impact on the British psyche. Until 
Zaghlul rose to the position of nationalist leader, Kamil’s name was always used when 
the Anglo-Egyptian administrators wished to draw attention to a troublesome nationalist. 
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF SAAD ZAGHLUL 
 
There were certain prominent Egyptians who, for various reasons, shared the 
British distaste for Mustafa Kamil, and prominent among those was Saad Zaghlul.  Yet it 
can be convincingly argued that Zaghlul received his first ministry appointment, as 
minister of education, because of the outcry made by the nationalists, and especially 
Kamil, over the Danshawi incident.  On the occasion of this appointment Cromer wrote 
to Lord Grey: 
 
As this appointment constitutes in some respects a new departure and as it 
has attracted much attention in Egypt, it may be desirable that I should 
place you in the possession of the main facts…263
 
This was certainly a new departure and one that only circumstances on the ground forced 
Cromer to put into practice: 
   
In proposing Zaghlul’s name to the Khedive I was however influenced by 
another consideration of wider scope.  The freedom of thought and speech 
enjoyed by this country under the present regime, combined with the 
undoubted intellectual awakening which is taking place, has had the 
natural results in creating in the minds of educated Egyptians the desire to 
see the higher offices in the Administration, filled as far as possible, by 
men of true Egyptian origins… 
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This fact alone would hardly have moved Cromer to such a concession had it not been 
combined with Egyptian nationalist agitation and the bad publicity aroused after 
Danshawi: 
 
The reproach most frequently urged by the “patriotic” press is that we 
have maintained for so long existence of a system under which the 
ministers are little more than dummies… 
 
Cromer actually did not contest this characterization, but in fact confirmed it with his 
next statement: 
 
I am fully aware of desirability, from all points of views, of rendering the 
Egyptian Ministers a real working factor in the Administration.  But it is 
of the last important that the utmost care should be exercised in the 
selection… 
 
If in fact the Egyptian Ministers had to be rendered a “real working factor,” then they 
were obviously at that point non-entities, having been gradually reduced to that point by 
Cromer.   As far as the British were concerned the only real function of the Egyptian 
Minister was to rubberstamp all British decisions.  Now faced with the prospect of 
reversing that absolute British domination, even if a little, Cromer cast about for a 
specific type of Egyptian: 
 
For the moment, the number of those who could, with safety to the true 
public interest, be invited to occupy positions of this nature is very limited.  
It does not, in my opinion, extend far beyond the members of the 
particular school of thought called into existence by the late Moufti, 
Sheikh Mohamed Abdou. 
  
Cromer went on to explain his reasoning: 
 
…[T]he object that which Sheikh Mohamed Abdou and his successors 
have in view is the moral and intellectual improvement of the Egyptian 
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people, and to be accompanied[?,accomplished] gradually and without 
running to extremes in any direction. 
 
This sort of reform program appealed tremendously to Cromer, as it posed no threat to his 
immediate control of Egyptian affairs.  His close and fruitful collaboration with Abduh 
reinforced his good opinions of that particular school of thought. Of their program he 
wrote: 
 
Their object is to reform the Moslem institutions by the introduction of 
Western ideas without shaking the main pillars upon which the 
fundamental pillar of Islam rests. 
 
Of their chances of success, though, Cromer was more pessimistic.  He followed the 
above description with this dampening statement: “I must candidly admit that is very 
questionable whether a policy of this description is ever likely to meet with any degree of 
success.” 
It is important to understand that Cromer and his successors intended this reform 
program to take a very long time even under the best of circumstances, which would in 
reality allow British control to continue indefinitely.  Abduh’s successors, though, had no 
such notion, and the problems between them and the British came to a head when the 
British themselves were seen as obstacles to true reform.  At that time though, Cromer 
looked toward Abduh’s successors for collaboration: 
 
Of this school Saad Zaghloul is one of the leading representatives.  It is to 
be hoped that the wise and moderate doctrines which it professes will be 
found to stand satisfactorily the practical test of time. 
 
In the end one could argue that “the practical test of time” proved neither the British nor 
the Egyptians particularly wise or moderate.  However, at the time this letter was written 
Cromer had this to say about Zaghlul: 
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Both as a barrister and on the Bench Zaghloul Bey, has earned the 
confidence and respect of all who have been brought into contact with 
him.  His marked talents, unquestioned integrity, and high character in 
private life have secured him a distinguished place in the opinion of both 
his countrymen and of foreign residents in Egypt.264
 
Zaghlul’s antecedents were well known to Cromer for several reasons.  Zaghlul was a 
former government employee, a disciple of Muhammad Abduh, and the son-in-law of 
Fahmy Pasha.  Fahmy Pasha had held the position of Egyptian Prime Minister for a 
significant portion of Cromer’s tenure in Egypt, and was seen as reliably pro-British.  
Fahmy also enjoyed good relations with Cromer personally and his son-in-law must have 
been known to the Agent.  Irrespective of this, Zaghlul’s appointment had an immediate 
salutary effect on Anglo-Egyptian relations: 
 
The appointment of Zaghloul Bey has been received been received with 
great pleasure and approval by all classes of Egyptian society.  Even the 
most uncompromisingly hostile among the native papers have been 
constrained by the popular feelings to express their approbation of the 
measure.265
 
This was certainly true, as even Mustafa Kamil published an article in al-Liwa, 
expressing his cautious approval for this new appointment.  Although this approval did 
not long endure it was definitely a significant mark of success for Cromer’s policy.  
Cromer appeared even further vindicated in his decision when a letter written to one his 
subordinates by “a leading member of the legislative council, a man of some talent and 
capacity,” spoke of the appointment “as having obliterated in the minds of the Egyptians 
recollection of the Danshawi incident.”266Cromer in agreeing with this assessment was at 
best naive and at worst self-deceptive.  The Danshawi incident was to a great extent 
ingrained into the minds of the Egyptian populace as an instance of British brutality and 
injustice.  That fact that he was likely correct in his assumption that it only became a 
                                                 




national issue due to the outcry created by the nationalist press was immaterial.  
Danshawi was no more likely to be forgotten by the Egyptian population than the Alamo 
was to be forgotten by the people of Texas.  
 For his part Zaghlul looked up to Cromer and regarded him as a mentor and a man 
worthy of emulation.  He attended Cromer’s farewell gathering in 1908 and delivered a 
valedictory address praising Cromer’s accomplishments, despite the political risk implicit 
in praising the Khedive Abbass Hilmy’s bitter enemy.  Indeed, accusations were made 
that the Khedive had frightened away many of the possible native participants with 
threats.267Cromer repaid Zaghlul’s compliments with very high praise: 
 
Unless I am much mistaken, a career of great public usefulness lies before 
the present Minister of Education, Saad Zaghloul Pasha.  He possesses all 
the qualities necessary to serve his country.  He is honest; he is capable; he 
has the courage of his convictions; he has been abused by many of the less 
worthy of his own countrymen.  These are high qualifications.  He should 
go far.268
 
In a sense this was a foreshadowing of things to come, although hardly in the way that 
Cromer expected.  These very same traits of honesty, ability, and conviction made 
Zaghlul incapable of compromising with Kitchener, the Consul-General in 1912, over 
what he saw as a matter of principle. The consequences of that confrontation with 
Kitchener sent Zaghlul down a very different path from the one likely imagined for him 
by Cromer in 1907, but he undoubtedly went quite “far.” 
 Cromer’s immediate successor, Eldon Gorst, had no cause to regret Cromer’s 
decision to appoint Saad Zaghlul to the Ministry of Education.  Whatever difficulties he 
might have created in his new post were apparently compensated for his committed 
support of Gorst’s program for Egypt.  This was made clear by his stance with respect to 
Gorst’s proposal to approve an extension to the Suez Canal Company’s lease agreement.  
Although Gorst’s proposal failed in the Egyptian General Assembly, Zaghlul supported 
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Premier Butros Ghali’s efforts to persuade the Assembly to accept it “with convinced and 
unquestioning loyalty.”269
 When Butrus Ghali, the first ever Egyptian Copt premier, was assassinated in 
1909 Zaghlul, was transferred from the ministry of education to the ministry of justice.  
Given the turbulent aftermath of Butrus’ assassination, Gorst’s placement of Zaghlul at 
the head of the Ministry of Justice was certainly a pointed show of confidence in him.  
Zaghlul was extremely active and assertive in administering of his post.  While both 
Cromer and Gorst had worked well enough with him despite this, Kitchener, Gorst’s 
successor was a completely different matter.  Less than a year after Kitchener had taken 
over as Consul-General he and Zaghlul clashed irrevocably over the appointment of 
Husayn Muharam, a palace favorite, to the Ministry of War.  Zaghlul objected on 
principle to Muharam, believing him to be dishonest, and would not retreat from his 
stance despite the desires of both Kitchener and the Khedive.  This led to his resignation 
form the government on bad terms.  The relationship between Zaghlul and Kitchener was 
poisoned form that point onwards.   
Both Cromer and Gorst managed to work with, and even appreciate, Zaghlul’s 
determination to exert himself in his office.  Both found ways to reach accommodations 
with him without forcing him to compromise on his convictions.  Kitchener was unable, 
and maybe even incapable of replicating his predecessor’s accomplishments.  All three 
men came from relatively similar social backgrounds, had relatively similar educational 
experiences, and all had chosen to join the British Army.  All were strongwilled, 
determined men who possessed conviction in the inherent rightness of their views.  All 
these similarities make Kitchener’s inability to reproduce their success in that arena even 
more puzzling.  Kitchener, it must be remarked, differed in one major aspect.  He had 
from early in his career often acted with a brash disregard to the consequences of his 
actions.  His insubordination on the eve of the British invasion of Egypt, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, is an excellent indication of this.  This disregard for the 
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consequences also seemed to typify his behavior with regards the Saad Zaghlul and the 
Khedive Abbas Hilmy II. 
 Ronald Storrs, Kitchener’s personal secretary, wrote of his former boss: 
“Kitchener was free of the uglier blemishes, grave or comic: he had no rancor, and no 
snobbishness, but he could be petulant.”270Appropriately enough this remark was made in 
the context of Kitchener’s treatment of Zaghlul after his resignation.  Mustafa Pasha 
Fehmy the ex-Premier sent Kitchener a note “requesting for his son-in-law Zaghlul Pasha 
the position…of Controller of Egyptian students in France.”271  Storrs commented that 
after he gave his opinion to Kitchener that Zaghlul was indeed appropriate for the job, the 
latter remarked: “He [Zaghloul] is more trouble than he is worth.”272
 Zaghlul did not actually  remain in private life long but ran for, and won, a seat in 
the newly constituted Legislative Assembly.  He immediately assumed a position of some 
prominence in the Assembly.  “A president and Vice President of the Chamber had been 
appointed by the government.  The initial business of the house was to choose an elected 
Vice President to officiate with his nominated colleagues.”273Zaghlul was elected Vice 
President by 65 out of 79 recorded votes.  The author of the report alleged a “powerful 
press campaign – had been in progress in favour of Saad Pasha Zaghloul and of the 
odium attached to anyone opposing him.”  It must also be said that Zaghlul enjoyed a 
great deal of popular support and was a force in his own right.  Much to the discomfort of 
Kitchener and the Egyptian Government he was certainly not kindly disposed to them: 
 
On February the 2nd Saad Pasha Zaghlul took an opportunity, afforded by 
a debate on the competence of the Assembly, to make a statement of 
policy in which he disclaimed all desire to place himself in systematic 
opposition to the Government. As, however, he was at the time holding 
daily meetings in his house to organize that Opposition and he was in 
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constant communication with the Palace as to the best means of upsetting 
the Ministry, his statement was received with some skepticism.274
 
In his diaries Zaghlul denied being in any way controlled by the Palace but, as noted 
previously, he found it preferable to work with the Khedive than with Kitchener.  
Kitchener in his opinion was the much more dangerous of the two, and he chose to 
oppose him and his chosen government with all the means at his disposal.  The report 
concluded with this shrewd assessment of Zaghlul’s abilities: 
 
Saad Zaghlul was the dominating personality throughout the session and 
he has all the makings of a successful demagogue.  Able and eloquent he 
was able to sway the house by his speeches…His weak points are intense 
egotism, an ungovernable temper, and a domineering manner, which 
militate against sustained popularity…275
 
As far as it went, this was characterization of Zaghlul was not very far off the mark.  He 
did indeed find it difficult because of his “domineering manner” to sustain his popularity 
among fellow politicos.  It failed, however, in one respect.  It did not account for his 
ability to maintain popular support and affection.  
 The contest in the Assembly was not merely between the Egyptian Government 
on one side and the Khedive Abbas and the opposition on the other.  It swiftly became a 
contest between the British authorities and the opposition, a contest essentially between 
Kitchener and the brief Zaghlul-Khedive alliance: 
 
They [the British authorities] have to incur the odium of scraping together 
a reluctant majority to support unpopular Ministers and forcing measures 
down the throat of the Chamber, where a defeat for the government 
becomes a defeat for them.276
 
Combine this with the fact that Kitchener had the sensitivity of a battering ram when it 
came to dealing with any opposition, and disaster seemed inevitable.  The situation was 
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finally artificially and temporarily resolved by the outbreak of the First World War and 
the suspension of the legislative assembly in September 1914. 
 When Egypt was designated a British Protectorate and placed under martial law at 
the outbreak of the war, internal political activity was temporarily suspended.  The 
departure of Kitchener also improved the possibilities for some sort of reconciliation 
between the British authorities and Saad Zaghlul.  McMahon, Kitchener’s replacement, 
now styled High Commissioner, had no previous personal history with Zaghlul and hence 
bore him no enmity.  Their relationship, however, was extremely limited, as were 
McMahon’s relations with Egyptians in general.  The necessities of the war, his 
unfamiliarity with Egypt, and the convenience of military rule, meant that McMahon was 
mostly isolated from the native population.  Hence he did not contribute much to the 
British perceptions of the Egyptian political scene.  As stressed in Chapter Three, though, 
he left behind an administration in relative disarray from which multiple voices clamored 
for London’s attention. 
 Sir Reginald Wingate his successor, on the other hand, was a veteran of Egyptian 
politics.  He wished to engage the Egyptians who were progressively more restive but 
lacked guidance from his government.  By December 1917 the Egyptian government of 
Rushdi Pasha wished to change its makeup, by replacing two of Kitchener’s appointees. 
Rushdi, possibly at the behest of the new Sultan Fuad, proposed that Saad Zaghlul and 
Abdul Aziz Fahmy replace Hilmy Pasha and Fathy Pasha respectively.  This was in the 
context of a larger proposal for the devolution of power from the British to the Egyptian 
Government. Wingate communicated Rushdi’s proposal to London and requested to be 
informed of Britain’s future policy in Egypt: 
 
In the circumstances I feel difficulty in making recommendations on 
proposed ministerial changes without some indication from you as to our 
future policy in Egypt of a more definite nature than I have yet received…  
 
Two things are particularly striking about this communiqué.  First is the hesitant and 
uncertain approach adopted by Wingate, in sharp contrast with Cromer for instance 
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whose communiqués were more likely to contain an account of his action rather than a 
request for advice.  The other striking aspect is the fact that even as late as December 
1917 the British government had still not developed a concrete policy with regard to post-
war Egypt! 
 As to the proposed appointment of Saad Zaghlul to a ministerial post Wingate had 
this to say: 
 
Saad Zaghlul is well known.  He left the Cabinet of Mahomet Said after 
quarrelling with his chief and subsequently in 1914 as Vice President of 
the Legislative Assembly led a bitter attack against the British Agency and 
his former colleagues.  He is now getting old and probably desires income 
while Rushdi might prefer to place [the] most effective speaker in the 
Assembly under obligation to himself.277
 
Wingate reduced Zaghlul’s resignation, which was due to a disagreement with the 
Khedive Abbass Hilmy and Kitchener over a matter of principle, to simply a quarrel with 
his chief.  This is either excessive coyness on the part of Wingate or a perfect example of 
lack of proper historical background information.  In either case it was a horrendous 
oversimplification of a crucial assessment.  The comment regarding Zaghlul’s advanced 
age and desire for an income, purely speculative as it might have been, was quite accurate 
if only a part of a much bigger picture.  On the basis of the information at his disposal 
and on his perceptions of Zaghlul, Wingate wrote that he “should not be strongly opposed 
to either of these nominations of themselves…”278 R. Graham appended further 
commentary and analysis to Wingate’s report.  In his assessment of Saad Zaghlul, 
Graham closely echoed Wingate and added the astute observation that “there is no doubt 
that the inclusion of Zaghlul and Fahmy in the Ministry will strengthen its position in the 
country.”279It seems quite apparent that at least from the perspective of the most 
knowledgeable authorities on the subject, Zaghlul was not yet deemed incorrigible in 
December 1917.  The Egyptian nationalists, however, were not content to wait upon the 
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pleasure of the British government for answers on the future of their country, and the 
British insistence that they patiently wait for the end of the war was not well received. 
 Barely eleven months after Premier Rushdi’s proposals were presented to 
Wingate a delegation headed by Saad Zaghlul visited Wingate at the Agency in order to 
present their own program for the future of their country.  Wingate described the incident 
and the delegation thus: 
 
I have received a visit from three Egyptians, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, Abdel 
Aziz Bey Fahmy, and Ali Pasha Saharwi, all of whom will be known to 
you as politicians of advanced views.  They came to advocate a program 
of complete autonomy for Egypt…they disowned the methods of Mustafa 
Kamil and Mohammad Farid though agreeing with their principles.  They 
profess gratitude and friendship with us and stated their desire to go to 
London in order to put forward their demands. 
 
It is striking just how much Kamil’s memory still bothered the British even ten years 
after his death.  Despite their disavowal of all anti-British sentiment Wingate could 
apparently only repeat the refrain from before: “I…warned them repeatedly that they 
must exercise patience having regard to [the] many important preoccupations of His 
Majesty’s Government.”  Wingate was fully aware of the inadequacy of this response, for 
it had already proven highly ineffective, but without a clear indication of the British 
Government’s intent, his ability to deal properly with Egyptian demands was limited.  To 
that end he repeated previous requests to London for directions: “I should be glad to have 
any instructions His Majesty’s Government consider it desirable to give me.”280
 Wingate received his response from London and although it contained a set of 
instructions it had little indication of the British Government’s plans for Egypt: 
 
No useful purpose will be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to come 
to London and advance immoderate demands that cannot be 
entertained…His Majesty’s Government would always be ready to listen 
with sympathy to any reasonable proposals on the part of the 
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Ministers…But the proposed visit of the two ministers would not be 
opportune at the moment.281  
 
London seemed incapable of grasping that the more moderate Ministers were growing 
impatient.  In reality they could not afford to wait any longer upon London’s 
convenience. Egyptian public opinion was aroused in favor of Saad Zaghlul and his 
fellow nationalists.  Of this the British Government seemed completely oblivious, neither 
well inform nor prepared for the situation.282 Imperious instructions from London that the 
Egyptian Ministers should be patient were totally inadequate.   
 Arthur James Balfour, the Foreign Secretary at the time, appears to have placed 
his trust in Lord Robert Cecil, the Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, than 
the man on the ground, High Commissioner Wingate.  Another delegation, this time 
comprised of 14 prominent Egyptians and led by Zaghlul, visited Wingate Cecil informed 
Balfour: 
 
The only men among them that have ability are Zaghul, Adly and Sidki 
who have already been described and Mahomed Mahmoud, the ex-
governor of Bahria, and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid formerly editor of the 
“Garida” and a powerful speaker and writer. 
 
Despite admitting the abilities of these Egyptians, Cecil then made the assertion that 
those were all “disappointed and disgraced men.”283It becomes crucial then to ask, in 
whose eyes exactly were they disgraced?  That they were disgraced men in the eyes of 
Cecil and many of the British meant nothing in Egypt, where they had a powerful hold on 
their countrymen’s minds and hearts. 
 Wingate’s report to London on Egyptian public opinion, written on November 20, 
contained a considerably more level-headed and realistic analysis of the situation in 
Egypt: 
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You are well aware of the Egyptian politician as a class and with the 
vagueness and inconsistency of their programmes.  At the same time it 
should be recognized that they are voicing the sentimental aspiration of 
the small native educated class, aspiration which…appeal to the 
susceptibilities of a considerable section of the Moslem population.284
 
This report indicated that the British government was definitely made aware that at least 
its High Commissioner believed in the relevance and importance of Zaghlul’s Egyptian 
delegation.  Yet Cecil’s letter from the 24th paid scant heed to Wingate’s warning.  
Indeed, handwritten at the end of the printed document was the following comment: 
“Sir R Wingate seems deplorably weak at a moment when such weakness is calculated to 
create serious embarrassment for us at the Peace.”285
 Of equal importance to Wingate’s accurate assessment of the Egyptian support for 
the Nationalists was his opinion of their intentions: 
 
…it should be noted that their views have been expressed with remarkable 
frankness, and there has been no apparent disposition to engage in secret 
agitation or revolutionary propaganda.  There are so far no signs whatever 
of a militant spirit, nor of attempts to excite religious fanaticism or anti-
European feelings. 
 
Wingate also suspected that the Egyptian nationalists were for the most part posturing for 
the home crowd and that they in reality sought more of a “change of form than of system 
in the present Government of Egypt.” He believed that what they desired most, or would 
eventually settle for, were concessions that gave them “the appearance of increased 
political responsibility without eliminating the British element in the 
Administration.”286In November 1918 this could possibly have been true of at least a 
portion of the nationalist camp.  Although, given Zaghlul’s history of wanting to wield 
effective power, that assessment was doubtful in his case.  Regardless, the subsequent 
British actions assured the end of any real chance for compromise. 
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 To understand the increasingly counterproductive decisions coming from the 
British government, it is important to recognize just how much inaccurate material was 
making its way to the Foreign Office.  An unattributed and unsigned personality report on 
Saad Zaghlul from the Foreign Office files for 1918 is a prime example: 
 
He [Zaghlul] joined the ranks of the Nationalists and was one of the chief 
adherents of Moustafa Pasha Kamil, the leader of the Nationalist Party in 
the time of Lord Cromer in Egypt…Lord Cromer determined to try the 
experiment of giving Zaglul a post in the government…The experiment 
was not a success.  From the outset Zaglul maintained his connection with 
the Nationalist Part and showed marked hostility to the British officials 
with whom he had to work…Finally his attitude became so unsatisfactory 
that Lord Kitchener removed him from office.287
 
Lord Cromer’s dispatches from that period did not in any way imply any such 
connection; rather to the contrary, they contrasted Zaghlul’s nationalism favorably with 
that of Kamil and his group.  Cromer was also frank in his admiration and praise for 
Zaghlul, as attested by his farewell speech.  Eldon Gorst, Cromer’s successor, also 
worked very congenially with him.  Zaghlul’s own diaries also very clearly contradicted 
these statements and demonstrated a lively hostility had developed between him and 
Mustafa Kamil, upon the latter’s appointment by Cromer to the Ministry of Education.  
Yet despite this accumulated evidence to the contrary, a report of this nature made its 
way into the Foreign Office files.  That was not the only report of this nature, but one of 
several such pieces.  It can be said with some degree of certainty that by 1918 Foreign 
Office intelligence collection on Egypt was far from intelligent. 
 By March 1913 several major developments had taken place. Lord George 
Curzon, had been appointed Foreign Secretary in January of that year, and General 
Allenby, then the Military Governor of Palestine, was quietly chosen to supersede 
Wingate in Egypt.  Wingate, while still retaining the title of High Commissioner, was 
recalled to London and kept there.  Meanwhile the acting High Commissioner in 
Wingate’s absence, Milne Cheetham, ordered the arrest and deportation of Zaghlul and 
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his nationalist colleagues on March 8.  Shortly thereafter, on March 21, Allenby was 
dispatched to Cairo as Special High Commissioner and Supreme Militray Commander.  
These changes being effected, Curzon was willing to receive the Egyptian ministers in 
London but still refused to entertain the idea of allowing the nationalist delegation the 
same courtesy. 
 By March 31, with most of the violence now under control, and after consultation 
with the ex-ministers Rushdi and Adly Pasha, Allenby telegraphed Lord Balfour the 
following surprising statement: 
 
I propose with your concurrence to issue passports to any respectable 
Egyptian who may wish to visit Europe, without reference to colour of 
their politics, as is done in Palestine and Syria…I have shown that I can 




This was shortly followed on April 6, by another course-altering decision on Allenby’s 
part: 
 
Outward quiet prevails but extremist feeling is increasingly violent and 
dangerous.  
 I have today seen the Sultan who is making a proclamation counseling 
quiet and obedience to the law. 
I shall issue tomorrow a proclamation to the following effect. 
Now that order has been in a great measure restored, I declare in 
agreement with his highness the Sultan that there are no restrictions on 
travel and that Egyptian who wish to leave the country are free to do so. 
Further I have decided that SAAD Pasha Zaghlul, ISMAIL Pasha SIDKY; 
MOHAMMED Pasha MAHMOUD, HAMAD Pasha EL BASEL shall be 
released from imprisonment and given similar freedom of movement.289
  
Allenby also requested that the notables be granted a hearing both by the Prime Minister 
and by Balfour, as well as other delegates who could confirm the international acceptance 
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of the British Protectorate over Egypt.290Allenby wrote candidly to Balfour: 
“Nevertheless, I think Zaghlul now represents [the] opinion of [the] majority of [the] 
Egyptian intellectuals.”291
Placed in a delicate position, the British government was ultimately forced to 
accede to Allenby’s wishes.  Zaghlul was released from Malta, along with his colleagues 
and headed for Paris and the Peace Conference. Their trip to Europe proved absolutely 
fruitless as the British had effectively curtailed all criticism of their position and received 
the support of both France and the United States.  The ideals of self-determination 
espoused by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, and the hopes that they had 
raised, were dashed.  A disappointed Saad Zaghlul eventually returned home empty-
handed and disenchanted.  His failure to secure Egypt’s independence aside, Zaghlul 
effectively remained until his death in 1927 the master of Egyptian popular opinion. His 
relationship with the British was never righted and from them he earned the labels of 
“radical” and “obstructionist” but never again would the British ignore or trivialize him.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 Perceptions are products of the moment.  The period covered by this study, from 
1882 through 1919, features many moments and hence many different perceptions, even 
for the same individual.  The intent of this chapter was to track these changes and 
demonstrate how alterations in perception occurred over time; and how they actually 
helped determine the course of events.  In addition this chapter has attempted to 
demonstrate the great extent to which the dilution of the Agent’s authoritativeness, at 
least after Kitchener, created a situation where the ultimate decision makers in London 
were considerably and progressively more ill-informed.  This loss of authoritativeness 
came despite an enhancement in authority, with the move from Agent’s to High 
Commissioners, and in the case of Allenby Special High Commissioner and Supreme 
Military Commander.  Yet none of those possessed the authoritativeness and esteem of 
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Cromer, or even Gorst and Kitchener.  Gradually the voices claiming to speak with 
authority on Egypt increased, while in reality true understanding decreased.  This was 


























Much of the literature written regarding the 1919 revolution persistantly questions 
how the deterioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations could have been averted.  In reality, an 
Anglo-Egyptian clash over the future of Egypt was inevitable, for Egypt and the 
Egyptians had changed while the British requirements of Egypt remained the same.  That 
is not to say that a wiser and more perceptive understanding of Egyptian aspirations could 
not have averted a great deal of violence, bloodshed and bitterness at least in 1919.  In 
retrospect, it is difficult to ascertain whether Britain and Egypt could have arrived at a 
compromise, despite Lord Milner’s optimism.  This is where tracking the changes of 
perception from both sides proves tremendously informative.   
Two critical developments significantly worsened relations between Egypt’s elite 
and its British occupiers.  These relationships were severely damaged during Kitchener’s 
tenure as Agent.  Much of the damage was caused by Kitchener’s personality and his 
seeming indifference to alienating able and generally cooperative Egyptian individuals 
such as Saad Zaghlul.  This is not to imply that Zaghlul’s enmity with Kitchener caused 
the violence in 1919, for there were more substantial issues that occurred wartime 
developments that contributed to general Egyptian dissatisfaction. However, it was 
Zaghlul who gave the opposition a much-needed focus and a very powerful voice.  To 
complicate matters further, the British occupation administration gradually lost its 
cohesiveness, just as it appeared to have lost touch with Egyptian sentiment.   
The consequences of Kitchener’s disregard for elite Egyptian sentiment were 
compounded by the factionalism of the British administration during McMahon’s tenure.  
From this time onward the Agents, no longer commanded the authoritativeness with the 
British government that they had previously enjoyed.  This is made patently clear during 
Wingate’s tenure as High Commissioner, when his rather prescient analyses of the state 
of Egyptian nationalist feelings were routinely ignored in favor of far less insightful, if 
more congenial assessments.  The British government occupied with the conclusion of 
the war in Europe, thus missed the gravity of the situation in Egypt. 
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  There also appears to have been some validity to the statements made by al-
Afghani, al-Nadim, and Kamil against the British, that they never quite accepted the 
Egyptians as “equals.” For at least a certain faction of the British government, Egyptian 
demands for independence were not regarded as being heartfelt or genuine, but were 
portrayed as gambits by the ruling elite to improve their positions.  This was obviously 
not a true reflection upon the Egyptians they attempted to portray, but rather their own 
inability to acknowledge that Egypt and its people had changed.   
British strategic anxiety over the control of the Suez was also another persistent 
theme in British thinking.  Indeed even after the loss of the Indian Empire, and the 
apparent dissolution of the pretext of safeguarding the Empire’s lines of communication, 
Britain could not let Egypt go.  It took the absolute political defeat of the 1956 Suez war 
to convince Britain that its claims to Suez were no longer viable.  Even then, there was 
little acknowledgment that Egypt itself had changed, rather an acceptance that the world 
had changed.  Prior to 1956 Britain was still operating under the assumption, espoused by 
the Milner Mission, that the two nations could arrive at an agreement suitable to the 
interests of both.  The problem with this assumption was that even at the time that it was 
formulated Anglo-Egyptian relations had been severely damaged. 
On the Egyptian side of the equation there existed two broad schools of thought, 
which coalesced to a certain degree over the issue of independence.  The first was 
represented by al-Afghani, al-Nadim and Kamil.  That school of thought rejected all and 
any benefits of the British occupation.  To them the continuation of the British 
occupation was not a gradual path to sovereignty and independence but rather a 
continuous slide into enslavement. To Kamil, the trailblazer for 20th century nationalists, 
Egypt did not need to look to Britain but rather to Muhammad Ali, the founder of the 
khedival dynasty to retake a position of prominence in the world. To that end he 
exaggerated the accomplishments of Muhammad Ali’s reign and ignored the grave social 
ills that it brought with it.  Independence from Great Britain whatever the cost, could best 
characterize his political program.  But Kamil’s political program was limited, and his 
need to muster a large and powerful opposition to the British occupation made him 
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appear unprincipled.  The Khedive, the French, the Ottomans, and the Germans were all 
seen as potential allies, and the price that they might exact should the struggle for 
independence succeed was not an issue on which Kamil chose to dwell.  The program of 
the Nationalist Party he founded was limited to promoting independence and some form 
of constitutional government, but in reality it had no experience in management or 
government.  The British were indeed correct in stating that the Egyptians were not ready 
to govern, but then Kamil was correct in assuming that the British would never judge 
them ready to govern. 
The second Egyptian school of thought was infused by the more conciliatory 
spirit of Muhammad Abduh, who acknowledged the necessity of reform prior to 
independence.  The period of British tutelage though was hardly supposed to be 
indefinite, and the very limited inclusion of Egyptians in high administrative posts was 
soon seen as a sign of British opposition to proper reform.  By 1917, Saad Zaghlul 
became the driving force behind this new group of nationalists that later coalesced in the 
Wafd Party.  They adopted Kamil’s earlier calls for Egyptian independence while 
acknowledging the benefits of prior British rule.  Experienced in administration and in 
governance the Wafd Prty’s ability to carry out a constitutional political program was 
vastly superior to that of Kamil’s ill-fated Nationalist Party.  After the revolution of 1919,  
however, they placed themselves in a position where compromise with Britain became 
increasingly difficult.  British accusations that the wafd had unleashed a destructive and 
intolerant spirit in Egypt may have been well deserved, but without such an unleashing 
the British might never have acknowledged the extent to which the situation in Egypt had 
changed. 
By the end of the First World War Western notions of liberty and self-
determination had undermined the concept of imperialism.  Egypt had imbibed 
sufficiently from those principles to render a continued occupation intolerable to many of 
its people.  Compromise over the nature of British presence in Egypt also became 
increasingly difficult to achieve as the bitterness and distrust each side harbored toward 
the other was magnified by imprisonments, deaths, and perceived humiliations.  The 
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Anglo-Egyptian relationship that Cromer and Gorst had so carefully nursed into existence 
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